What Spain’s Migrant Amnesty Means for National Elections

This piece examines how Spain’s 2026 mass amnesty for migrants will impact voting behaviour ahead of the national elections next year in 2027.

Nearly 1.2 million people have applied for Spain’s extraordinary mass regularisation scheme, shattering official estimates of 500,000 applicants. The scheme, dubbed a mass amnesty, will bring irregular (undocumented) migrants out of illegal work and living arrangements, giving them a chance to gain legal (regularised) status in order to contribute towards Spanish society.

The 2026 mass amnesty is Spain’s seventh in its history as a democracy, and is a bold step away from growing anti-immigration sentiment spreading across the EU. Successful applicants are given a crucial one-year work and residency permit which can then be renewed on expiry. Lauded as an ethical and humanitarian achievement, it gives regularised status to undocumented migrants who can boost Spain’s economy. Newly-regularised migrant workers fill gaps in employment and contribute to public revenues through higher tax collections.

Yet, concerns arise over the impact mass regularisation could have on public services, jobs, and national culture – key areas of importance to Spanish voters. As national elections loom next year, this scheme is a gamble by the Spanish leader Pedro Sánchez and his Socialist (PSOE) Party on the support for pro-migration policy. It is at a time when right and far-right political parties (Vox) are gaining traction with voters on core economic, political and social issues, including immigration.

How might the 2026 amnesty affect the voting behaviour of Spanish citizens? And what does this mean for political risk? The conservative Partido Popular (PP) party are expected to win in 2027 as the PSOE trails in the polls. However, this is so far contingent on a power sharing agreement with Vox, a party that harbours extreme views on public policy that raises questions of protectionism and risk in the business environment. But precisely how the mass regularisation scheme impacts voting may depend more on the culture and race of newly-regularised migrants, rather than the economic benefits or drawbacks they may bring. 

Mass Regularisations: What, Why and When?

Despite a positive approach to migration, Spain’s rigid laws make it challenging for some migrants to gain legal status, particularly for those from outside the EU. As of 2026, nearly one in five of the non-EU population are undocumented migrants living in an irregular situation (Funcas, 2026).

A popular pathway to legal residency for foreigners is known as Social Arraigo, or Social Roots, whereby migrants (without a visa or permit) need a three-year proof of residency and a minimum one-year employment contract to qualify for legal status (Plaza Casares, 2026). But demonstrating roots in Spain means some migrants must first live in the country illegally to build up proof of residency. This has created social and political pressure as these migrants are forced into illegal living and working conditions, influencing a rise in irregular migration.

Offering mass amnesties to migrants living in irregular (illegal) situations allows Spain to bring these individuals into the formal economy. Most of these irregular migrants have either (i) entered the country illegally, such as through border crossings or by sea; (ii) overstayed their visas, such as entering on a tourist visa and illegally staying in the country; or (iii) they are rejected asylum seekers that have chosen to remain (Finotelli, Cassain and Echeverria, 2024).

Spain has held six other mass regularisations since 1986, granting work and residency permits to just over 1.2 million people (De Antonio and Pérez Galindo, 2026). The aim of the schemes – dubbed amnesties because it exonerates the illegal status of those applying for regularised status – has been to clamp down on illegal working, provide rights to those locked out by the migration system, and allow migrants to contribute to Spanish society.

Cross-party support has been essential to the success of these schemes. Four have been under socialist governments, the Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE) in 1986, 1991-1992, 1996 and 2005, while the other two occurred under the conservative Partido Popular (PP) governments in 2000 and 2001. The latest (and largest) scheme in 2005 was driven by large support from employers unions and organisations who needed workers to fill gaps in employment. Under J.L.R Zapatero’s PSOE government, the 2005 scheme regularised, or “normalised”, 576 506 people to reduce the size of the informal economy and take control of illegal working in the country (Garcés Mascareñas, 2026b). 

Spain’s Shifting Attitude to Immigration

Surges in migrant arrivals have tested Spanish attitudes to immigration in recent years. The EU nation has grappled with a sharp rise in illegal border crossings from Africa, thanks to its proximity; and higher immigration from Latin American nations too, as a common culture, history and language with Spain make it a target destination for many migrants from these countries (Gálvez-Iniesta and Groizard, 2021).

As the number of irregular migrants has increased, so has the concern over integration and social cohesion among Spanish citizens (Miguélez Lobo, 2005; García-Juan and Güell, 2019). This has been a boon to right-leaning political parties who prey on shifting attitudes towards migration. The Vox party, in particular, has enjoyed steady growth in its popularity since its inception in 2015, campaigning on the idea that immigrants burden public services, influence crime levels, and undermine national culture (Indelicato, Martín and Scuderi, 2023). And when such extreme views take centre stage in election cycles, citizens’ attitudes towards immigration tend to become more negative too (Ibid).

In a small study for the publications El País and Cadena SER in May, most Spanish nationals surveyed (60%) believe there are too many immigrants in the country (Junquera, 2026). What’s more, a growing body of research finds that Spanish attitudes towards immigrants are increasingly based on prejudices towards their belief systems, culture and race (Mendez and Cutillas, 2014; Monras, Vázquez-Grenno and Elias, 2017; Gálvez-Iniesta and Groizard, 2021; Indelicato, Martín and Scuderi, 2023). How the mass amnesty impacts voting behaviour may therefore depend on where newly-regularised migrants come from, and how well they integrate into Spanish society.

What Does the Mass Amnesty Mean for Voting?

Undocumented migrants who settle in close proximity to Spanish nationals promote an uplift in votes for right-leaning parties, with a roughly 1% rise in the irregular migrant population connected with a 5-6% increase in voter share for the conservative PP party (Gálvez-Iniesta and Groizard, 2021). By regularising these migrants, the PSOE party could expect to reduce this voter premium.

Proximity to documented migrants, alternatively, promotes a higher share of votes towards left-leaning parties in Spain, with a 1% rise in the documented immigrant population associated with roughly a 3% increase in voter share for the PSOE (Gálvez-Iniesta and Groizard, 2021; Indelicato, Martín and Scuderi, 2023). If the ruling PSOE coalition can capitalise on the support for formalising irregular migrants, the 2026 amnesty could bode well for gaining support next year. But how well newly-regularised migrants integrate into their new communities appears to be just as important as the legal status of these migrants to Spanish citizens.

Spanish-speaking Latin American migrants tend to integrate better than other non-EU populations into local Spanish communities, particularly in areas where family ties already exist. With communities and national culture set to be a core debate in the 2027 national elections, higher Latin American immigration might help to assuage voters’ concerns over these issues.

But how immigrant backgrounds shape political support is difficult to unpack. Higher Latin American immigration has been shown to increase the participation rate at national elections, and increase the support for left-leaning (PSOE) parties (Mendez and Cutillas, 2014). Meanwhile, African immigration improves voter share on the right regardless of legal status (Ibid). This striking divide is an indictment of the cultural and racial prejudices influencing voting in Spain. Non-economic factors are becoming more important to national voters, overshadowing the possible economic benefits or drawbacks they may bring. This trend has coincided with the rise of far-right ideologies and political views in Spain, namely the rise of Vox, and displays the gamble the PSOE coalition are taking as we head into the election cycle next year.

The Road Ahead: National Elections and Political Risk

The bottom line for the 2026 amnesty is who is regularised. As the scheme came to a close on 30 June, nearly 1.2 million applications were received. Most applicants (67%) were from Latin America, while African nations formed 23% of the total (La Moncloa, 2026). In terms of voting, this bodes well for the PSOE party heading into a hotly-contested election cycle.

For political risk, a PSOE government in 2027 offers some clarity for business. They have proven to be a boon to the economy in recent years with GDP growth trending higher than the EU average. Immigration has been a key driver of this success. As of 2026, immigrant workers account for 72% of employment in domestic services, 45% in hospitality, 32% in construction and 31% in agriculture (Garcés Mascareñas, 2026a).

An influx of migrant labour could boost economic growth and public revenues, feeding a positive political spin on the economy for the PSOE. However, newly-regularised migrants have tended to be low-skilled, increasing the competition for low-skilled jobs at a time of high national unemployment (Ibid). This could feed into the anti-immigrant sentiment espoused by the PP and Vox parties, despite early indications that the mass amnesty could support voter share on the left.

If the PP and Vox parties are able to successfully mobilise support under the pretence of an immigrant threat to national culture and identity, they could stand to win a power coalition next year. Should this occur, the PP party will likely need to compromise on areas of public policy to more extreme views. This may include the controversial “national priority” policy favoured by Vox, whereby naturalised Spanish citizens are prioritised in the economy for housing and benefits over foreign nationals (Jones, 2026). But whether the 2026 mass amnesty can dash the hopes of a PP-Vox coalition depends on how well they control the narrative over immigration. As it stands, the mass amnesty will prove to be a boon to the PSOE government. Expect a tense election cycle next year.

References

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