Trump 2.0 and the Geopolitics of Climate Withdrawal

The return of Trump-era climate policy signals a major shift in global sustainability governance. Rooted in nationalism and climate skepticism, it weakens international cooperation and stalls progress on the UN Sustainable Development Goals, particularly SDG 13 (Climate Action) and SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals). By 2022, the U.S. had achieved about one-third of its 2030 emissions reduction target. Climate Action Tracker projections predict a more significant reduction in emissions by 2030 compared to historical trends. However, these projections indicate the U.S. will fall 23%–37% short of its 2030 target, highlighting the need for further action. The current target of 50–52% emissions reduction by 2030 is not compatible with a 1.5˚C climate goal (CAT,2024). Trump 2.0 would likely exacerbate this gap, undermining progress by reversing key climate policies and further weakening the United States’ role in global climate action. The U.S. shapes the direction and credibility of global climate efforts as the world’s second-largest emitter and the largest funder of environmental efforts. Therefore, the United States withdrawal has serious political and financial impacts, especially for climate-vulnerable countries in the Global South.

Retreat from Multilateralism

The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement was a foundational moment in its broader disengagement from multilateral frameworks. Although the U.S. formally re-entered the agreement under President Biden, the credibility of American leadership in climate negotiations has since been weakened. Trump’s “America First” foreign policy led to the withdrawal or defunding of key UN bodies, including the Human Rights Council and UNRWA. This undermined not only diplomatic trust but also structures supporting sustainable development and humanitarian aid. For many Global South nations, U.S. inconsistency has reinforced the view that climate finance and development aid are politically contingent. Additionally, with multilateral leadership weakened, alternative blocs have gained prominence. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with its own green finance standards is one example (Sun and Yu, 2023). This shift raises the risk of regulatory competition rather than global convergence. Therefore, the U.S. approach to a global problem through political-economic nationalism reinforces a wider trend among other countries to address the issue at regional or national levels.

Climate Finance Gaps

One of the clearest consequences of U.S. withdrawal is the weakening of global climate finance. The U.S. withdrawal from global climate finance initiatives, particularly the Loss and Damage Fund, and the Green Climate Fund, had serious implications for international climate efforts. The Loss and Damage Fund was established to assist developing countries vulnerable to climate change impacts, such as extreme weather events, rising sea levels, and other environmental disasters. These nations often lack the resources to manage the financial burden of such damage. The U.S. was one of the largest contributors to these funds, and its withdrawal has sharply reduced the support for vulnerable countries. As a result, the funds remain critically underfunded, limiting their ability to assist those most affected by climate impacts. For low-income countries, the U.S. withdrawal from these financial mechanisms has serious consequences. These nations are often the least responsible for climate change, but suffer disproportionately from its effects. Without the necessary funding from climate finance mechanisms, these countries face severe delays in their climate adaptation efforts. This causes delays in building infrastructure that can handle climate shocks, and in planning for long-term climate resilience.

The table, based on data from Climate Action Tracker (2024), shows that all major emitters fall short in climate finance. The U.S. has a positive score only for domestic targets, which suggests its approach to climate resilience is nationalistic. On the other hand, the lack of financial support from climate finance mechanisms worsens vulnerabilities in developing regions. For instance, developing countries face severe vulnerabilities but lack the financial resources to implement sufficient mitigation strategies. In fact, annual climate finance flows must increase by at least sixfold compared to current levels, reaching USD 8.5 trillion per year between now and 2030, and over USD 10 trillion per year from 2031 to 2050, to keep global temperature rises within 1.5°C (Strinati et al., 2024). Therefore, U.S. disengagement from financial mechanisms has left a significant gap, as the country was previously one of the largest contributors (OECD, 2022). Without this funding, low-income nations face severe delays in infrastructure adaptation and climate resilience planning.

Net-Zero Reversals

In early 2025, major U.S. financial institutions, including BlackRock and JPMorgan Chase, withdrew from the Net Zero Asset Managers initiative and the Net-Zero Banking Alliance, respectively (Goldhaber,2025). Similarly, other major banks such as Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo exited the Net-Zero Banking Alliance amid conservative backlash against environmental policies (Herzlich, 2025). Given the dominance of U.S. capital markets, these shifts have reverberated internationally, discouraging long-term green investments in emerging markets already facing capital shortages and climate-related vulnerabilities.

International Cooperation

MacNeil and Paterson (2020) discuss how shifts in U.S. climate policy have influenced global climate governance. The US shift sends a signal to other wealthy nations that climate finance commitments may not be as binding or as critical as previously thought, potentially undermining global climate goals. This could also weaken the political will to fulfill the promises made under international agreements like the Paris Agreement. Even before the return of Trump-era policies, the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C remained uncertain, putting the broader climate action agenda at risk (UNFCCC, 2021). With Trump’s return, implementation of the climate agenda on a global scale appears increasingly unfeasible.

Conclusion

Beyond financial metrics, the U.S. climate reversal has deepened global strategic divides. American inconsistency in climate policy has weakened diplomatic coalitions and empowered climate-sceptic governments. The Trump administration’s climate retreat should not be viewed solely as a domestic policy shift, but rather as a trigger for a global trend. Trump administration illustrates that climate risks are increasingly shaped by ideologies and political strategies. The future of global sustainability efforts depends not only on environmental realities but on whether major powers stay committed to working together in an era of rising nationalism and geopolitical competition.

References

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