Why Washington Should Overlook Political Differences in its Approach to the Lula Administration
The domestic elections of foreign states are critically important to foreign policies as no state nor its interests are static. Moreover, the behaviour of states in the international domain is influenced by internal socio-political events as much as external variables. Policymakers in the US kept a keen eye on the recent Brazilian elections as the outcome was a crucial variable in determining both the future relationship between the two countries and the positioning of Russia and China in South America. Incumbent president (and eventual winner) Lula da Silva has an unfriendly relationship with the current US administration while maintaining friendly and increasingly close ties with
China and
Russia. If Flavio Bolsonaro had won, the
path forward in US-Brazilian relations might have been simpler given his sympathies with the Trump administration and likely willingness to break Brazil’s alignment with China.
But Bolsonaro did not win. American support while Bolsonaro refrains from recognising the election’s result and sponsors conspiracy theories to undermine its credibility is deeply unwise. The result would be a much-degraded relationship and a situation conducive to Chinese and Russian encroachment. The sensible path for US foreign policy is to recognise why Lula and his Worker’s Party prefer working with Washington’s rivals and appealing to the needs which compelled each to seek the other. It is both possible and reasonable to realign for US policymakers to realign their approach and to behave as a more supportive political and economic partner state than China or Russia.

Fundamentally, Lula’s decision to align with China is not dictated by international power games that do not allow for realignment; it is a freely chosen strategy based on reasonable assessments. Brazil’s economy is in a
poor state of health with inflation and slow growth poised to worsen, depending on future fiscal policy, according to researchers at Spanish multinational financial services group BBVA. China has better designed its foreign policy to aid ailing economies, and Lula highly values alleviating domestic problems through beneficial international relationships.
Recent cooperation, such as the
agreement to abandon the petrodollar in 2025, creates a seemingly inviolable relationship while Lula is in office, but a closer look at the details of some bilateral agreements reveals an opening for the US. Brazil is a leading supplier of energy critical minerals and is seeking to industrialise through its new industrial policy Nova Indústria Brasil to avoid a
disadvantageous position in the global supply chain. The United States could match Chinese efforts to befriend Brazil by facilitating these industrialisation efforts. Indeed, providing adequate investment and support would not only draw Brazil closer to the United States, but over time it might convince successor administrations to reconsider the petrodollar. Such a move would require leniency and flexibility from negotiators and US companies involved, but the political goodwill could be worth the effort

The amicable relationship between Russia and Brazil would be easier for the United States to address with greater assertiveness through soft power initiatives and goodwill. In 2025, on a state visit to Moscow aimed at deepening economic ties between Brazil and Russia, Lula seemed to express satisfaction with the trade imbalance, citing ‘a rather deficient trade flow [for Brazil]’ of ‘approximately USD 12.5 billion’, but in which ‘
we understand the growth for potential is very large’. The US can alleviate concerns over trade imbalances by engineering a fairer series of trade deals and investments with Brazil to further industrialise its economy and ensure the state stands on equal footing with the United States. In contrast, Russia’s economy is floundering amidst the struggles of the Ukraine War. With the Russian economy in a worse position now than in 2025, it is an opportune time for the United States to engage with Lula. Russia’s
top export to Brazil is refined petroleum, of which the United States is a leading producer. With some work, American petroleum could supplant Russian exports and in the process diminish Russia’s importance to Brazil’s domestic stability.
There are vulnerable aspects to both Russia’s and China’s relationship with Brazil that American foreign policy should take advantage of through soft power and goodwill to alleviate Lula’s concern for domestic stability and public welfare. The recent election should not deter US statesmen from pursuing a vital diplomatic goal in South America if Washington is to match the efforts of rivals to erode American influence on the international stage. Regardless of whether the current administration in either state is fond of the other, there are substantive, persistent domestic concerns both parties can alleviate by working alongside each other rather than perpetuating the current state of affairs.