The Implications of a New Iranian Front Against Saudi Arabia

The possibility of continued attacks on Riyadh from Iran-backed proxies in Iraq would harden Saudi Arabia’s stance against Tehran and tests its relations with Washington.

On January 23, Saudi missile defences intercepted and destroyed a kamikaze drone targeting Riyadh. A previously unknown group calling themselves the Righteous Promise Brigade (‘al-Wa’ada al-Haq’) claimed responsibility for the attack through the pro-Iran militia Sabreen News outlet on Telegram. In a statement, the group claimed the attack was an act of retribution targeting the royal palace in Riyadh in retaliation for the two suicide bombings of the Islamic State (ISIS) which killed 32 people in Baghdad two days prior. This is because pro-Iran groups often perceive a shared ideology between Saudi Arabia and ISIS and allege that Saudi money funds ISIS. The statement also threatened to carry out an attack on Dubai if “the crimes of Bin Salman and Bin Zayed are repeated.”

Three days later, a loud explosion was heard in the skies above the city. Saudi authorities did not comment on the explosion, but videos on social media suggested a ballistic missile was destroyed by the capital’s air defence systems. An English message on Sabreen News said the “Iraqi Resistance group,” a term used to include all pro-Iran militias, were again exacting revenge by “openly targeting Saudi Arabia.” Another message in Arabic said that “one suicide bomb in Baghdad = one drone in Riyadh.”

Who was responsible?

In addition, while Saudi Arabia, including Riyadh, has been frequently targeted by Yemen’s Houthi group in recent years, the Houthis denied responsibility for the first attack, whilst remaining silent for the second one. This is a move which would be out of character given their history of falsely claiming attacks they haven’t carried out, such as the drone strikes on Abqaiq and Khurais oil refineries in 2019. The lack of a strong implication that the Houthis are responsible from the Saudis also seems to lend credence to the view that an Iran-backed Iraqi militia is culpable.

Saudi anti-missile systems would have been able to discern a rough origin of the drone given its flightpath, and so determine whether it was launched from Iraq or Yemen. The value of the Righteous Promise’s claim of attack to pressure the Saudis would thus be void unless the latter knew the drone was launched from Iraq. Riyadh’s silence on the matter, given their incentive to attribute blame to the Houthis, increases the likelihood that the missiles came from Iraq.

As I have previously written, a number of new, shadowy Iran-backed militias groups have materialised in the past year with a self-declaratory statement, sometimes claiming an attack on US targets, before disappearing into obscurity. It is probable that these groups are formed or backed by the larger and more established pro-Iran militias such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq or Kata’ib Hezbollah, who were accused of launching the Abqaiq-Khurais attack in 2019. These smaller militias are created with the aim of obfuscating their enemies and give Tehran a means of ‘plausible deniability’ for attacks on US or Saudi targets. They also act as a fresh brand on Iran’s proxy network to apply the piecemeal pressure Iran wants to on its adversaries.

The likelihood of the Righteous Promise Brigade’s claim

The Righteous Promise Brigade falls neatly into this category of mysterious splinter militia. The probability of the group’s claim for the Riyadh attack being true is given force by its being broadcasted via the pro-Iran-linked Sabreen News, and that Kata’ib Hezbollah praised the attack on their Telegram account, also calling on other militias to follow suit. Kata’ib Hezbollah frequently includes Saudi Arabia in its anti-US and anti-Israel rhetoric, is it did when it accused the three countries of being behind the Baghdad suicide bombings.

Given also that Kata’ib Hezbollah’s missile and drone capabilities likely exceed that of other Iraqi militias, and that only its advanced capabilities could direct a drone as far as Riyadh (some ~450 km from the Iraqi border at its nearest point), it seems probable that Kata’ib Hezbollah had a heavy hand in the attacks. While it is also likely that the Righteous Promise Brigade is affiliated with Kata’ib Hezbollah, if it is not a mere smokescreen for them anyway, the evidence suggests that Iranian arming and direction of one or both of those groups must have been necessary for the attack to be carried out.

A thorn in two sides

The emergence of Iran-backed Iraqi militias as regular attackers of Saudi Arabia, which the two recent explosions may presage, represents a threat the Gulf Kingdom has hitherto avoided. What is perhaps most worrying for Saudi Arabia is the Righteous Promise Brigade’s declaration that the attack was part of the “balanced deterrence campaign,” which is how the Houthis have branded their own attacks on Saudi Arabia since 2019. The linking up of Iraqi militias with the Houthis to co-ordinate attacks in the pursuit this campaign is a development which is seriously concerning for the Saudis since it effectively leaves them vulnerable on their northern and southern flanks.

If attacks from Iraq continue, Saudi Arabia may be dealing with a two-front drone threat which will test the efficacy of its anti-missile defence systems. On an operational level, it might require Saudi to invest more in its air defences to protect its people, with the American PATRIOT system being an obvious choice. However, with the recent news that the Israeli Iron Dome system will be deployed by US forces in the Gulf, this may be another option which could help pave the way for normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Testing the US-Saudi relationship

The attacks were likely part of Iran’s recent campaign of incremental pressure to force the Biden administration to relieve sanctions on Iran and return to the JCPOA, a campaign that has included uranium enrichment to 20% and the staging of military drills involving drones. Given this, and the ongoing brinkmanship between Washington and Tehran on restarting JCPOA negotiations, continued attacks from Iraq could test the limits of the Saudi-US relationship, and possibly cause it to suffer in the face of a hardened Saudi stance on Iran. Continued attacks would strengthen the resolve of Saudi Arabia to combat the threat of Iran-backed militias in Iraq through closer security co-operation with Baghdad, and also likely see them make stronger entreaties to Washington not to soften their policy against Tehran.

This is especially the case if Iran-backed militias follow through on their promise to attack Dubai, which would be a first for the UAE, who have been entirely free from a major terrorist incident throughout decades of regional upheaval. A Dubai attack would toughen the resolve of the Saudi-UAE alliance and strengthen their hand on Iran policy in Washington, possibly testing the willingness of the Biden administration to re-engage with Iran through the JCPOA.