The Georgia-West Relations: Realism or Cultural Hegemony

Introduction

Marx’s theory posits that a cultural elite decides what is a cultural and political norm. To make the enlargement process, vital to security and strategy, competitive, there needs to be firstly a counternarrative to the political levelling by the hegemon but an alternative narrative that puts in the spotlight history, norms, and values, the consideration of the ones de facto treated as mere subjects that need correction and enlightenment. Georgia is a test of whether the West could be competitive and sell its supranational institutionalism compared to Russo-Chinese transactionalism. However, the ratio of the cooperation and how funds are allocated is often presented to East Europeans as increasingly value-based according to Western standards, an echo to Marx’s cultural hegemony, and less about concrete cooperation and a road to integration that takes into consideration societal peculiarities and sensibilities. Regarding the recent turn to Georgia and the West relations, to discard a culturally hegemonic approach is to resume strategic and meaningful dialogue and cooperation, refrain from supporting an opposition unable to prove stolen elections and put forward a pragmatic strategy by contributing to the divisions within. 

The EU Accession Process, the OSCE Report and the Venice Commission

The integration process to the EU is officially described as being merit-based. From official statements and reports, the unilaterally halted EU accession process owes to political and cultural contingencies. While the official 2024 Report signals shortcomings in the electoral system/process, the Osce report on the last elections is classified as “competitive”. While polarisation between the ruling party and the opposition, including the foreign-funded NGOs, is extreme, there is a positive result in the sections such as public administration reforms (“moderately prepared”), the judiciary (“some level of preparedness”), and the fight on corruption (“partly implemented”). The fundamental rights are ‘in place’ while the freedom of expression is ‘between an early stage of preparation and having some level of preparation’. The media landscape is described as ‘diverse’, including compliance against hate crimes, despite the political polarisation, a feature of local politics, while the chapter Justice, freedom, security registers “limited progress”. The chapter on the fight against organised crime registers “some level of preparedness”. From a close reading of the report, one sense that the recurrent term ‘anti-Western narratives’, the criticism against the Law on transparency of foreign influence and the criticism levelled against the law on family values are the main stumbling blocks to the EU integration according to the EU’s demand on compliance with the Venice Commission ‘suggestions’. Thus, the Venice Commission does not provide ready-made solutions. From the theoretical considerations, the suggestions provided could be read through the lenses of Marx’s cultural hegemony. It appears that the Venice Commission Report and, indeed the OSCE itself, could be disputed for the perceived cultural bias, the expertise, such as the OSCE composition and vote system, thus the cultural understanding of the peculiarities and traits, the legalistic versus the organic in terms of understanding of a particular society, and, by extent, the political influence exerted by the very hegemon, including external influences, to the detriment of dialogue. 

Strategic Competitiveness?

Moreover, Western inconsistency compounds the lack of strategy and interest towards integrating Georgia. The reluctance, since the 2008 Bucharest Summit, to at least upgrade Georgia’s constitutional objective to be part of NATO, halt the cooperation and EU accession, and provide more military and political support to end the occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, valuable Russian assets to weaponise the reliance on gas and hold Georgia hostage to its economic and territorial threats show the limited commitment to invest in Georgia strategically other than its civil society. The Russian presence in breakaway Abkhazia is pivotal to undermining the Russian presence in the Black Sea. 

The geopolitical implications behind building a seaport of Anaklia are proof of the race among the US, Russia and China, the latter also regarding the development of Batumi and Poti, to exert regional influence. Developing a broad Black Sea security should be ensured by challenging the Russo-Chinese influence by committing and acting upon NATO-EU membership.

Getting entangled in the dispute between the government and the opposition does not prioritise the resumption of EU accession and a start to NATO accession set as goals in the constitution of the country. The call for second elections in the country, a mantra by European Media, is usually under fire for lack of objectivity and for openly expressing a partisan short-term narrative that infringes upon internal security and stability. The narrative that the Georgian Government intends to shift from the West to Russia neglects Georgia’s compliance, despite geographical and economic constraints, and how the EU’s and NATO’s continued delay of membership and the halted integration and cooperation have de facto allowed Russia to step in. A lack of competitiveness and the reliance on cultural projections and desiderata make the Euro-Atlantic integration process less appealing, more ideological and less practical given how the West demands small states to detach from Russia while refusing to provide a logical timeframe for membership, real military support, realistic expectations, and the reasonable flexibility. Forgetting how a lack of genuine strategy and commitment to mitigate dependence weighs on the cautious way small states in the Russian orbit tread is political myopia. 

Conclusion: Time for Realpolitik?

The West has been, at best, inconsistent in terms of investment and military support and presence, and at worst, ideological in dealing with local governments and socio-political realities, therefore making Georgia further slide towards dependence on Russia and China. Pinning the trust on biased allies to adopt an approach, despite the record of it and the double standards towards other neutral NATO members and similar legislations, should not influence cooperation and integration with Georgia. While the Georgian Dream’s balancing policy towards the West, China and Russia, much like many post-Soviet states, is not what policymakers would like, the West’s passivity and ideological approach towards potential allies are responsible for Georgia’s dissatisfaction and hesitancy. Understanding Georgia’s complex identity between West and East should persuade the West to propose an equal partnership leading to honourable membership according to the societal fabric, the reality on the ground and economic constraints. 

References 

Official Sources

https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/principles-and-values/aims-and-values_en https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/at-usaid-waste-and-abuse-runs-deep/ https://mfa.gov.ge/en/european-union/946166-saqartvelos-evrokavshirshi-integratsiis-sagzao-ruka https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2024ge/MAINENEM/

https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-10/eu_accession_process_clusters%20%28oct%20202 2%29.pdf

https://euneighbourseast.eu/enlargement/

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https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/view/6171895?publication=0

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https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/georgia/

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_38988.htm

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/civil-society-facility-georgia_en

https://mfa.gov.ge/en/national-security-concept

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2024-0054_EN.html

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