Taiwan’s Defense Adaptation to Political Realities

Taiwan must adapt its defense stragety to political gridlock and the realities of war

Taiwan’s military, officially the Republic of China Armed Forces (ROCAF), is attempting to revitalize its defense after several decades of drawdowns and stagnation. Alongside needing to restructure the armed forces and civil service, Taipei has faced  blind spots in the country’s defense,  driven partly by pro-China parties in the parliament ready to hamper the country’s defense planning

Retention in the ROCAF is seeing shortfalls, obstruction over defense planning remains prominent, bargaining over Taiwan’s arms sales by the United States is hindering upgrades in logistics, and pro-China spies and agents remain a major existential threat.

In lieu of political hurdles and internal security threats, Taipei will need to drastically develop a doctrinal framework if a Taiwan contingency were to occur. Taipei cannot rely on a gridlocked political system that could hinder training, growth, and proficiency of its armed forces and the island’s defense, and because of this, a decentralized contingency will be needed.

Domestic realities continue to hamper the ROC military’s readiness

A June 2026 US Congressional Research Service report found that the  United States and regional partners have raised concerns over Taiwan’s stagnant military, as China’s capabilities continue to eclipse all Indo-Pacific countries. A major focus for the ROCAF is an increase in its defense budget, which is facing critical pushback due to domestic politics.

The Kuomintang (KMT), for months, stalled Taiwan’s original $40 billion defense spending proposal increase as the party is hedging on growing ties with the Chinese government (CCP) and looks to ruin the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) image. After months of gridlock, Taipei passed a lower $24.6 billion special defense budget, which is much shorter than the original target goal.

Despite a victory in getting a defense spending initiative passed, albeit at a lower value than previously drafted, Taipei is still facing hurdles from its biggest partner and de facto guarantor, the United States.

The Trump administration has stalled Taiwan’s pending arms sale after the President alluded to using it as a ‘bargaining chip’ against China after his state visit in Beijing. The $14 billion weapons package has been intertwined with Trump’s ongoing dialogues and rivalry with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Indefinitely stalling Taiwan’s arms sales benefits China, which currently has an edge over America with rare earth minerals, diplomatic outreach, and naval production. This advantage could deepen further: , the Iran war is draining air defense interceptors, which countries such as Russia and China will study and change their calculus on, as reported by the New York Times.

Adapting defense through bypassing pro-Beijing parties and influence

The ROCAF will need to rely on a punishing asymmetrical doctrine through conventional warfare and potential counterinsurgency if China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), were to gain a foothold in Taiwan. For such contingencies to happen, Taipei will need to rearrange its defense around political hurdles and domestic existential threats.

Outside of obstruction from the Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), internal security threats stemming from Beijing’s apparatus remain a critical concern for Taipei. The Ministry of State Security (MSS), China’s espionage agency, has spent decades embedding spies and recruiting pro-unification agents in Taiwan that could threaten Taiwanese security through hybrid methods.

Military officers and party officials have all been arrested or indicted for espionage charges, including former staffers of the ruling DPP, which shows the limits of MSS’ activities as the Democratic Progressive Party is the strongest advocate for self-determination. 

Furthermore, self-inflicted energy policies have made Taipei vulnerable to hybrid or direct attacks if China were to assault or blockade Taiwan directly.The 2026 Iran war is exposing the vulnerabilities of countries which lack energy dominance, with Taiwan at the forefront of the turbulence. Taipei, after dismantling its last nuclear reactors, receives 70% crude oil and 38% liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports from the Strait of Hormuz.

Overall, LNG imports account for over 95% of Taiwan’s energy sector, which can be vulnerable to a Chinese naval blockade. Potential double agents and operatives employed by the MSS could conduct sabotage operations or lobby the pro-Beijing parties to block sustainable energy legislation, which could continue to make Taipei dependent on imports.

Policy recommendations

Adapting defensive contingencies established on political realities in Taiwan requires asymmetrical capabilities, decentralization of ROCAF divisions, more confidence and command in field officers, and more assertive counterintelligence implementation.

First, Taiwan’s central wartime strategy and defensive budgeting procurements should continue focusing on capabilities that would make any amphibious assault or direct attack a nightmare. The PLA’s conventional capabilities far eclipse the ROCAF’s, but Taiwan has geography and growing capabilities of making a potential war costly to China’s economic future.

Akin to the 2026 Iran war, Taipei should aim for capabilities of repelling an amphibious force and deterrence such as missiles that can reach PLA mainland and South China Sea bases. With political interference, a smaller $24.6 billion defense procurement could focus on shoreline defenses, air defense systems, anti-ship missiles, and other logistics that could support a potential blockade-repellent.

Secondly, with potential threats from governmental standstills, a majority KMT-TPP government could enact legislation that hinders the readiness of ROCAF quick reaction forces. A remedy can be more decentralized units that can enact autonomous defensive operations, which the Ministry of Defence acknowledged as a contingency in late 2025.

Stronger counterintelligence networks and allocating funds into concrete vetting could help mitigate MSS spy networks on the island, including in the parliamentary system. Identifying weak points in Taiwan that are vulnerable in a blockade, such as the lack of nuclear energy and building up energy reserves, will require concrete legislation to be passed and sustained.

Taiwan’s political gridlock is throwing an obstacle in its defense, but it is a hurdle that can be remedied. Taipei will need to adapt its wartime contingencies around the political upheavals that could hinder response time for key frontline units. Ultimately, war is defined by the political leadership you have and not the one you want, and the ROC military will need to show that the armed forces can rapidly adapt to change.