IRIS² and the Satellite Race Europe Is Not Winning

This piece compares the timelines and funding of IRIS², a multi-orbit satellite constellation, and the implications for European space policy.

The European Commission and the SpaceRISE consortium signed the IRIS² implementation agreement on 7 August 2026, following seven months of negotiation (European Commission, 2026). The agreement adds a 66-satellite defence and security layer to the constellation, bringing the total to 348 satellites, with first launches scheduled for 2029 (European Commission, 2026). The agreement follows several years of delay in the programme’s development, and coincides with separate constellation efforts by Russia and Ukraine, each reported to support drone operations independent of commercial providers such as Starlink.

The IRIS² Agreement

IRIS² is now valued at €15.6 billion, comprising approximately €11.6 billion in public funding from the European Union and the European Space Agency, and up to €4 billion from the SpaceRISE consortium, which includes SES, Eutelsat and Hispasat (Tom’s Hardware, 2026). Manufacturing responsibilities are distributed among Airbus Defence and Space, Thales Alenia Space, OHB and Aerospacelab (Tom’s Hardware, 2026). The August agreement authorises construction on the basis of terms negotiated earlier in the year. According to the European Commission, the additional 66-satellite layer is expected to increase secure governmental communications capacity by 60% within the European Union and by 54% globally, intended primarily for crisis response and military communications (European Commission, 2026). IRIS² operates within the wider framework of the European Space Shield, an initiative addressing space domain awareness and electronic countermeasures such as anti-jamming. As of August 2026, the Space Shield’s action plan and associated budget had not been published (European Parliament, 2026).

Comparable Programmes in Russia and Ukraine

Prior to the IRIS² agreement, Russia had begun deployment of a separate constellation, Rassvet, reported to consist of three satellites as of April 2026, with a further sixteen expected within the following months and a projected total exceeding 300 satellites by 2027 (Pultarova, 2026). The constellation is described in the same report as intended to provide Russian forces with a drone-control capability independent of commercial networks such as Starlink (Pultarova, 2026). Ukraine has pursued a comparable objective through its UASAT LEO programme, a planned constellation of 245 satellites, with the first satellite launch scheduled for October 2026 (Pultarova, 2026). The stated purpose of UASAT LEO is to enable Ukrainian forces to operate drones without dependence on Starlink terminals (Pultarova, 2026). Neither figure represents a confirmed final deployment; both are drawn from secondary reporting rather than verified launch data. The three programmes differ in reported timeline: Rassvet and UASAT LEO report deployment activity within 2026, while the IRIS² defence and security layer is not scheduled to begin launches until 2029.

Investment and Programme Fragmentation

The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates European military space investment will exceed $109 billion by 2030, with an additional $10 billion required to achieve burden-sharing parity with the United States and $25 billion required for full strategic autonomy (IISS, 2026). The same report states that, absent a coordinated strategy, this expenditure is likely to remain “an aggregation of national systems rather than an integrated operational architecture” (IISS, 2026). National commitments illustrate this pattern. Germany has allocated €35 billion to military space capabilities over five years (Pultarova, 2026). France has increased its military space budget to €10.2 billion for the 2026–2030 period (Pultarova, 2026). The United Kingdom has committed £4.2 billion to its next-generation Skynet constellation (Pultarova, 2026). These figures, together with the €15.6 billion IRIS² programme, are set out in Figure 1. Each programme operates on a distinct timeline and budgetary structure, without a shared technical specification.

Policy Recommendations

Several measures could reduce the divergence documented above. First, the European Commission could publish the Space Shield action plan and associated budget according to the timeline previously indicated, rather than allowing further delay of the kind experienced by IRIS². Second, interoperability requirements could be incorporated into national programmes such as Germany’s SATCOM Stage 4 and the United Kingdom’s Skynet upgrade prior to the finalisation of national technical standards, reducing the risk of incompatible systems. Third, the defence and security layer of IRIS² could be assessed against the reported deployment timelines of Rassvet and UASAT LEO as a benchmark, given that both programmes report initial deployment activity approximately three years ahead of IRIS²’s scheduled first launch.

Conclusion

The IRIS² implementation agreement constitutes a formal step toward deployment of the European Union’s defence and security satellite layer. Its scheduled timeline, however, places initial launches several years after comparable programmes reported by Russia and Ukraine. Whether the current funding structure, distributed across national and supranational programmes without a unified technical framework, is sufficient to close this gap remains dependent in part on the still-unpublished Space Shield budget and action plan.

References

European Commission (2026) ‘The European Union is accelerating and reinforcing IRIS²’, Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space, 7 August. Available at: https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/european-union-accelerating-and-reinforcing-iris2-2026-08-07_en (Accessed: 11 August 2026).

European Parliament (2026) ‘European Space Shield – action plan’, Legislative Train Schedule. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-new-era-for-european-defence-and-security/file-european-space-shield-–-action-plan (Accessed: 11 August 2026).

IISS (2026) Advancing European Military Capacity in Space. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, March. Available at: https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2026/03/advancing-european-military-capacity-in-space/ (Accessed: 11 August 2026).

Pultarova, T. (2026) ‘Is Europe Moving Fast Enough to Close its Space Defense Gaps?’, Via Satellite, 7 April. Available at: https://www.satellitetoday.com/government-military/2026/04/07/is-europe-moving-fast-enough-to-close-its-space-defense-gaps/ (Accessed: 11 August 2026).

Tom’s Hardware (2026) ‘Europe expands its Starlink rival to 348 satellites as IRIS² moves into implementation — €15.6 billion network will boost EU government capacity by 60%, with launches starting in 2029’, 7 August. Available at: https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/space/europe-expands-its-starlink-rival-to-348-satellites-as-iris2-moves-into-implementation-eur15-6-billion-network-will-boost-eu-government-capacity-by-60-percent-with-launches-starting-in-2029 (Accessed: 11 August 2026).