Stress-testing a “Supporting Work” Expansion: Access to Work and Wage Support

Access to Work is under growing pressure as demand outpaces the system’s ability to provide timely support. This article examines how expanding the scheme, or introducing a complementary wage-support pilot, could help more disabled people enter and remain in employment. It argues that disability employment support should be treated as a core labour-market investment rather than a peripheral area of social spending.

The latest NAO report on Access to Work (AtW) offers a sobering assessment of the scheme’s mounting capacity pressures (NAO, 2026). Over the past five years, demand has more than doubled, with applications rising from 76,100 in 2018–19 to 157,000 by 2024–25, an increase that has overwhelmed the system and driven average processing times far beyond the DWP’s 25-day target, reaching 109 working days by late 2025 (NAO, 2026). The resulting backlog now stands in the hundreds of thousands, a bottleneck that delays access to support and risks impeding disabled people’s ability to enter or remain in employment (NAO, 2026). This not only frustrates individual aspirations but also undermines the government’s aim to narrow the disability employment gap, which remains stuck near 30 percentage points (DWP, 2026a).

AtW remains the principal mechanism by which the state funds ‘reasonable adjustments’, ranging from ergonomic equipment to interpreters, through direct grants to individuals (NAO, 2026). While the scheme is generous at the individual level, with annual support capped at £69,260, its aggregate budget has failed to keep pace with surging demand, with it growing more slowly than demand in recent years, contributing to rising backlogs (NAO, 2026). As a result, many eligible applicants are left waiting, unable to access timely assistance. If the government is serious about making ‘supporting work’ a reality, this must be recognised as a structural capacity challenge, not just an administrative issue (NAO, 2026). One plausible response would be to pilot a temporary Wage Support scheme for employers or to scale up AtW itself, thereby testing whether additional tools can relieve pressure and expand access.

Scenario Analysis

To show the impact of expanded support, consider a scenario in which the government allocates an additional £100 million annually to help disabled people enter employment. This would supplement existing AtW funding; using the NAO’s own parameters, it is possible to estimate the likely outcomes of such an intervention.

The NAO observes that AtW is a demand-led scheme, with expenditure rising by approximately 2.8 per cent in 2022–23 (£196 million compared to £191 million the previous year). In this context, an additional £100 million would represent a substantial increase and could be transformative in terms of system capacity (NAO, 2026). Current programme data provide a useful benchmark. With annual spending of roughly £190 million supporting around 74,000 individuals, the implied average cost per participant is approximately £2,500–£3,000, reflecting a mix of lower-cost workplace adjustments and more intensive support (NAO, 2026). On this basis, an additional £100 million could, in principle, expand capacity to support a further 35,000–40,000 individuals per year.

The significance of this increase lies not simply in the headline number, but in what it implies for system capacity, with the current long processing delays and administrative backlogs meaning that many eligible individuals are unable to access support in a timely manner (NAO, 2026). Expanding throughput at this scale would materially reduce waiting times and begin to shift AtW from a rationed system toward a more responsive one. Set against the backdrop of 3.5 million claimants on Universal Credit or ESA health-related routes, and millions more disabled people currently out of work, even an additional 35,000–40,000 supported individuals per year remains modest in aggregate terms (DWP, 2026b). However, at the margin, such gains are economically meaningful; each additional participant supported into employment increases the effective labour supply and helps to narrow the disability employment gap.

The broader economic mechanism is straightforward but important; moving individuals from inactivity into employment not only reduces benefit expenditure, but it also generates tax revenue, partially offsetting the initial support cost. At the same time, earned income improves financial stability and reduces the risk of persistent poverty among disabled individuals, and over time, this contributes to a more sustainable welfare system, in which support is better targeted and fiscal pressures are moderated. In this sense, AtW should be understood not as a static cost, but as a labour-market investment with measurable economic returns; as such, the key constraint is not programme effectiveness at the individual level, but the system’s ability to scale delivery in line with demand.

Measured Signals to Watch

Several measurable indicators will determine whether expanded support is translating into real labour market outcomes. The most immediate is processing capacity; the NAO provides clear benchmarks, with a 25-day target compared to current processing times of around 109 days (NAO, 2026). Monthly data on backlogs and processing times should therefore be closely monitored, as sustained reductions would indicate that delivery capacity is improving.

Policy implementation signals will determine whether expansion is operationalised (DWP, 2023). While the Transforming Support white paper (DWP, 2023) sets out a reform pathway, progress depends on concrete measures such as updated Access to Work guidance, pilot wage-subsidy schemes, or employer-focused incentives. The emergence of clear timelines or funding commitments would signal that policy intent is translating into delivery.

Finally, broader labour market trends provide the ultimate test of effectiveness; trends in the disability employment rate and long-term sickness-related inactivity should be closely tracked, particularly among prime working-age groups (ONS, 2023). Even incremental improvements would be significant, given the scale of the existing employment gap (DWP, 2026a).

Conclusion

The NAO’s findings make clear that AtW faces a structural capacity constraint rather than a marginal funding shortfall; expanding the programme will require upfront investment, but the costs are quantifiable and directly linked to employment outcomes. A targeted expansion of AtW or a complementary wage-support pilot would provide a practical test of whether increased capacity can translate into sustained employment gains. When scaled effectively, such interventions can both increase labour market participation and reduce long-term fiscal pressures; the alternative, however, risks entrenching inactivity, increasing welfare costs, and constraining labour supply. Ultimately, the question is not whether disability employment support is effective, but whether it can be delivered at sufficient scale to meet demand; it should, as such, be treated as a core labour-market policy tool, rather than a peripheral area of social spending.

Bibliography

Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), (2023) Transforming Support: The Health and Disability White Paper, GOV.UK. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/transforming-support-the-health-and-disability-white-paper/transforming-support-the-health-and-disability-white-paper

Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), (2026a) Universal Credit Work Capability Assessment statistics, April 2019 to December 2025, GOV.UK. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/universal-credit-work-capability-assessment-statistics-april-2019-to-december-2025/universal-credit-work-capability-assessment-statistics-april-2019-to-december-2025

Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), (2026b) The employment of disabled people 2025, GOV.UK. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/the-employment-of-disabled-people-2025/the-employment-of-disabled-people-2025

National Audit Office (NAO), (2026) The Access to Work scheme, National Audit Office. Available at: https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/the-access-to-work-scheme-summary.pdf

Office for National Statistics (ONS), (2023) Rising ill-health and economic inactivity because of long-term sickness, UK: 2019 to 2023, ONS. Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peoplenotinwork/economicinactivity/articles/risingillhealthandeconomicinactivitybecauseoflongtermsicknessuk/2019to2023