NATO Enlargement, Identity and Divergent Security Perspectives: a Constructivist Approach
Introduction
“Post-communist Russia finds itself within borders which reflect no historical precedent. Like Europe, it will have to devote much of its energy to redefine its identity. Will it seek to return to its historical rhythm and restore the lost empire? Will it shift its center of gravity eastward and become a more active participant in Asian diplomacy? By what principles and methods will it react to the upheavals around its borders, especially in the volatile Middle East? Russia will always be essential to world order and, in the inevitable turmoil associated with answering these questions, a potential menace to it.” (Kissinger, 1994, p. 25)
Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s quote, although written 26 years ago, remains prevailing as one of the most intriguing questions yet to be completely answered. After the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, western institutions – namely the European Union (EU) and NATO – expanded eastwards, towards the post-soviet space. This expansion was greeted with apprehension by Moscow, which saw its former satellites and constituent republics join the US and its allies – a threatening move of an erstwhile anti-Russian coalition near its borders. However, the western perception was not of an aggressive move, but rather a way to prevent a return to the past and provide an extension of shared values and norms. Security, under the western perspective, was not related to the old balance of power politics, being instead related to stability and common identity. (Neumann and Williams, 2000)
This essay seeks to explore the divergent security viewpoints of both Russia and alliance members related to NATO’s expansion after the end of the Cold War in the light of constructivist IR theory, focusing on an identity perspective. It is divided into four sections: the first will expose and explore theoretical ground on constructivism, identity and security; the second deals with NATO’s enlargement and transformation of its identity; third will investigate Russian post-cold war identity and divergent security perspectives; and finally, the last section contains a brief conclusion.
Constructivism, identity, and security
Constructivism as a theory in IR has as its fundamental proposition that human beings are social beings and, therefore, social relations make or construct ourselves into who we are. As Onuf (1998) argues, “people make society, and society makes people” (p. 59). In other terms, constructivism holds that the world is not predetermined, but built as actors act. The world we live in is socially constructed everyday by ourselves in our interactions. As opposed to structuralists and some neorealists, the theory rejects the predetermination of anarchy and the idea that it defines IR study. Anarchy is rather a social construction; as such, its nature can vary between conflict and cooperation. Norms and rules also are important concepts for constructivism, since they organize and guide international relations. (Nogueira and Messari, 2005)
Identity is also an important concept for constructivists such as Wendt (1992). The author argues that identity is acquired by an actor by participating in collective meanings: “Identities are inherently relational: ‘Identity, with its appropriate attachments of psychological reality, is always identity within a specific, socially constructed world,’ Peter Berger argues. Each person has many identities linked to institutional roles, such as brother, son, teacher, and citizen. Similarly, a state may have multiple identities as ‘sovereign’, ‘leader of the free world’, ‘imperial power’, and so on. The commitment to and the salience of particular identities vary, but each identity is an inherently social definition of the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and one another and which constitute the structure of the social world.” (pp. 397-398)
Furthermore, identities are variable and constituted in relational processes. They are pivotal for an actor’s course of action considering that “perceptions of the situation in which actors find themselves and the courses of action which they view as reasonable to pursue are constructed in the context of their identities.” (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 362) A useful approach to identity-formation, complementary to collective-meanings, is one that focuses on the role of narrative structures within the process – the narrative process. This path evolves the relation between the so-called “constitutive stories” and the ways in which identities are constructed, maintained, and transformed through the telling of these stories. They “[…] provide a context of meaning within which an actor’s identity, the situation within which they are located, and the actions deemed reasonable or appropriate to both, are knitted together within a coherent (if multi-variant and open-ended) whole.” (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 362)
Narratives of identity are social and relational in two important aspects: they are historically and socially constructed and need recognition by other actors (it is not enough to “claim” identity in order to gain it; rather, it must have internal stability and social effectiveness, as well as being acknowledged as legitimate by others). In turn, the narrative process approach can be linked to a theory of action based on the concept of roles and what institutional theorists have nominated “logic of appropriateness”. Basically, proponents of this theory argue that behavior involves fulfilling the obligations in a situation and trying to determine the imperatives of an adopted position. As so, action stems from a perception of necessity rather than preference. Accordingly, within this line of thought, an actor which is “in touch” with identity in the way of sustaining consistency between the self in a social role and behavior. (Neumann and Williams, 2000)
Likewise, the logic of appropriateness has two essential aspects; First, it addresses the means by which the self-perceived identity is fundamental to their understanding of what is an appropriate action in a given situation. Second, it is relational and social: the “appropriate action” is determined based on the social structure in which the actor is located and on the judgment of others. Additionally, each particular kind of action is seen as appropriate for a given kind of actor in a single action. Being recognized as a certain kind of actor means to adopt a recognized behavior viewed as appropriate to the situation, therefore, becoming a legitimate actor. As so, “undertaking specific actions in that situation is equally a sign of being a particular kind of actor. Analyzed in this broader social context, legitimate identities are inextricably bound to roles, and to structures of power. The linking of a certain kind of identity to a specific set of roles and its analogous forms of action is a fundamental structure of social power. The capacity to claim such identities, and to grant or deny them to others, is a source of social power.” (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 363)
Neumann and Williams (2000) conclude that “identity and action are inextricably related”, with the first being variable and constituted through relational processes. (p. 362) By its turn, Wendt (1992) agrees. The author holds that identities are the basis of interests. Under anarchy, identity-formation is concerned primarily with the “security” of the self. In other words, identities precede interests and, as we have seen, are formed in relational processes between identity and difference. (Nogueira and Messari, 2005) As a result, “concepts of security […] differ in the extent to which and the manner in which the self is identified cognitively with the other […]”. (Wendt, 1992, p. 399)
Thus, security, in a traditional constructivist approach, can be viewed as a behavior to be explained, and not a concept which is inherently contested and political, as other IR theories hold. As Buzan and Hansen (2009) describe: “security, in short, is a behavior to be explained, not […] a concept which is inherently contested and political.” (p. 195) Critics of traditional constructivism often accuse the theory of providing ideational peaceful explanations of events. However, these explanations do not always imply peaceful outcomes. Ideas, norms, and culture can both either spur or dampen actions usually seen as aggressive or even expansionist behavior. Examples of such cases are the NATO enlargement in central Europe and baltic states, which would imply mostly peaceful outcomes, and Russia’s response, which by its turn can, in some events, prove aggressive as in the Russo-Georgian war of 2008.
Post Cold War NATO’s enlargement and transformation
The end of the Cold War resulted in two important (geo)political changes. First, it provided an immediate new world order based on the US’s unipolarity, universal norms, and values. (Kissinger, 2014) Unchallenged, now western institutions had no clear or serious obstacles ahead to its expansion. However, this also meant that there was no enemy to counter – which was NATO’s main purpose. (Buzan and Hansen, 2009) Second, the break-up of the Soviet Union provided 14 new states, in what came to be known as the “Post-Soviet Space”, in which Russia naturally ascended as the most prominent and powerful actor in the region. These new countries initiated a transition from planned (socialist) economies to market economies, and some of them, like Russia, adopted the “shock therapy” doctrine, which resulted in high unemployment and low wages. As a consequence, Russia entered into a huge economic depression, which also reflected on its military budget – and its power. (WHITE, 2011)
Under this context – the absence of a clear security threat for the west and Russian relative weakness – NATO expanded: “The EU enlarged and deepened, and NATO not only endured but expanded. But while the EU clearly had an internal logic of its own, however, contested, it was much less clear what the purpose of NATO now was. Did an unopposed West need an armed wing or could that job be left to the sole superpower? Could and should Europe now stand more on its own in defense matters, especially via the EU, which during the 1990s and early 2000s, like ISS itself, enjoyed something of a spurt in both widening and deepening? The 1990s opened with many general ruminations on the implications of the new state of affairs for the existing institutions and arrangements.” (Buzan and Hansen, 2009, p. 167)
However, NATO’s expansion was not, for many scholars and policymakers, the logical step. If NATO was created as a counterweight alliance in Europe for soviet power, and this threat was gone, what was its purpose then? At first, it seemed that NATO, without any clear enemy or threat, was doomed to cease its existence. Nonetheless, it not only enlarged significantly in terms of membership but also increased its cohesion and cooperation. According to Neumann and Williams (2000), this happened due to the fact that even though the Soviet Union was dissolved, this did not mean that there was no threat to the alliance. On the contrary: the biggest menace during the Post-Cold war for European countries was the return of their past conflicts.
Thus, NATO occupied a symbolic position of collective security through a new era. It was an important mechanism for the articulation of its members where it was possible to discuss security matters: “the Alliance acted as a symbolic marker, a rhetorical touchstone through which the threat of fragmentation and the return of the past might be countered, and securing NATO from this threat—maintaining the organization because its existence was a value in itself—became one of the central goals and political challenges of the Alliance.” (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 366)
Additionally, the organization’s scope has also changed. From a traditional military alliance, NATO turned itself into an institution based on shared values and principles. According to the Brussels Declaration (1988), the alliance is a voluntary association between free and democratic states, based on interests and values. Hence, security is indivisible. As former NATO Secretary-General (SG) Manfred Wörner asserted, these were new guiding lines in order to advance the organization’s agenda. Moreover, Wörner also stated that without the US’s commitment to the alliance, European states would lack the reassurance element which enabled them to get over their past differences and move forward toward integration.
If NATO was to avoid its members returning to their past rivalries and establish a new European collective security system in a post-cold war world, this meant that the old balance of power politics and traditional security conceptions were to be surpassed. Therefore, narrative resources were applied to alter the alliance’s identity in order to overcome old security conceptions and antagonisms and promote a new security framework based rather on common norms and values. Consequently, changes were presented as continuity and vice-versa, in a process that focused on the centralization of the organization and, on a deeper level, re-articulation of its identity and history.
This re-articulation started in the 1990 London Declaration, in which the member-states enhanced the shared values – democracy, human rights, security, stability, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. One year later, former SG Wörner’s assessment downplayed the role of the Soviet Union in the foundation of the organization and focused on the alliance’s part in approximating long standing-adversaries, such as Germany and France, as well as avoiding the US’s isolationism. In 1993, German Defence Minister Volker Rühe argued that member states’ political and strategic positions were based on shared values and interests and it was this, and not an existential threat, that was NATO’s hub.
According to this narrative, the alliance was not obsolete with the end of the Cold War; rather, was returning to its true foundations and role: “The Cold War, so often seen as NATO’s defining rationale and forging struggle, could now be presented as an unfortunate historical deviation, an anomalous period during which NATO’s true nature and identity were overwhelmed by a regrettable military necessity, the passing of which allowed NATO to return to its true historic role.” (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 369) In other words, the organization was now part of a civilizational structure, formed on the basis of common heritage, culture, and values in Europe and North America. The strategic content was not anymore its center of gravity.
The re-articulation of NATO’s identity is concomitant to a shift in its vision and perception of security. This concept came to be viewed too from a cultural perspective in two ways: positively and negatively. The first identifies security with cultural and civilizational principles – which are part of the new NATO’s identity. The second considers threats emerging from the absence of these conditions. Therefore, the alliance’s threats are not anymore stated (as it was with the Soviet Union) but are now the absence of democratic cultural and political institutions that constitute a menace to security. This threat came to be known as “instability” and encompassed also internal issues, such as economic disparities between member states and other evolving neighboring countries, which were believed could spill over into NATO members.
The organization turned itself into a unique expression of a cultural and civilizational structure in terms of security. Doing so, NATO transcended the traditional military alliance role. There was no geopolitical thinking: no states were enemies, by the contrary; no countries are necessarily adversaries, all are potential members. What differed from each other were their social structures, institutions, and culture. Both security and culture became increasingly related to democracy, a new powerful cultural narrative. Consequently, external relations were not formulated under a geopolitical basis but rather based on security de-territorialization. New members of this integrated cultural community were not only allies but state naturally part of NATO due to their political structure and values. Accordingly, enlargement was an extension of this community, open to all those who share this vision. It was not directed to anyone and it did not intend to exclude anyone.
Neuman and Williams (2000, p. 372) summarize NATO’s expansion narrative as follows: “Through this narrative, NATO declares itself the integral security dimension of Western civilization at large, and constructs a relationship to those who stand outside it that is importantly different from a balance of power logic. Crucially, this counters concerns that dividing lines are not to be redrawn in Europe through the continued unifying existence of the Alliance. NATO’s persistence and expansion thus become part of the solution to the threat of fragmentation rather than the cause of it. In the words of the Study on Enlargement, ‘NATO’s enlargement must be understood as only one important element of a broad European security architecture that transcends and renders obsolete the idea of “dividing lines” in Europe.”
From 1990 to nowadays, fourteen countries have joined NATO, with three of them (the baltic states) being former republics of the USSR. In addition, two post-soviet nations are strong candidates to become future members: Ukraine and Georgia. Although NATO, as we have seen, has changed (or returned) its identity from a traditional alliance to a cultural and value-based community, Russia (and so, Russian identity) continues to see the alliance as a threat to its security. If, on one hand, NATO rejects traditional geopolitics as the basis for its policy-making, Russia has a more “classical” view towards expansion.
Russian identity and divergent security perspectives
As Kissinger (1994) noted, both Europe and Russia will have to devote energy to redefine their identities in the post-Cold War Era. While Europe has chosen integration expressed in both EU and NATO, Russia struggled from the economic depression and cooperation with the west in the “hard days” of the 1990s to confrontation and economic development under Putin from the 2000s on. Traditional Russian identity is still decisive for Moscow’s policy-making. As Mankoff (2009,p. 3) argues: “A state’s identity in the international system—whether it sees itself as a satiated or a revisionist power, a nation-state or an empire—provides the intellectual framework that shapes decisions about how power is employed.”
During medieval times, Russia was nothing more than a European culture outpost surrounded by hostile societies. Threatened by all its neighbors, Russia expanded and conquested its enemies, since this was the only way it could grant its security. However, expansion did not stop: according to Russian view, failure to conquer its neighbors would result in submission and, eventually, destruction. Thus, for the next centuries, Russia expanded in all directions, limited only by natural barriers or resource exhaustion. This was an ambivalent action: the rapid expansion was not accompanied by economic development or demographic growth, which left the new territories sparsely populated. As a result, Russian enlargement raised a sentiment of vulnerability. Expansion, under Moscow’s view, brought more potential enemies than additional security. Kissinger (2014) argues Russian enlargement continued because it was easier than to stop.
As time went on, two Russian principles have evolved: Derzhavnost and Gosudarstvennost. The first refers to Great Power ideology – in other terms, Russian sense of belonging to the club of the great powers, and, consequently, the need to act accordingly. By its turn, Gosudarstvennost stands for the central role of the Russian state both for the political and economic life of the country, and also considers that the national interest in foreign policy must be defined in reference to the well-being of the state – rather than, for example, respect for international norms and protection of civilians). (Mankoff, 2009) Furthermore, Russian essence consists in the belief of an especial mission: to serve as a bridge between two distinct worlds (Europe and Asia), although remaining exposed to threatening forces that do not comprehend its vocation.
Russia was born into a hostile environment. The Euroastic giant grew with a strong government (and leaders) and was seen with disdain by Europe. (Kissinger, 2014) As such, it is not surprising that these characteristics are noted until today. Under Yeltsin’s administration, from the immediate break-up of the USSR to 1999, foreign policy was cooperative towards the west in general. Russia suffered from economic depression and a reduction of the military budget becoming weak and used its foreign policy to insert itself in a post-cold war world. During the early 1990s, the pro-western foreign policy was much more ideological than compared to the later year’s relative pragmatism, and Russia and NATO maintained dialogue over several issues, including enlargement. However, Moscow still saw the alliance as a threat in Russian view because “[…] after all, [NATO] remains a military alliance devoted above all to issues of ‘hard’ security and for many Russians still carries the associations of the Cold War, when its very reason d’etrê was to check Russian power.” (Mankoff, 2009, p. 164)
Not only Russian see NATO as a threat but also expected the organization to kept its supposed promise to halt expansion after German reunification. Nonetheless, NATO entered in a continuous process of enlargement and upgraded its military capacity, movements in which Moscow saw as both menacing and provocative. Additionally, NATO enlargement was a threat due to the fact that it was expanding towards Russian borders in erstwhile Warsaw Pact members and even former soviet states. This is fundamental for Russian policy makers considering that Russia, as a great power, has its sphere of influence, it’s Near Abroad – the post-Soviet Space. For Russia, a military alliance that was created to contain soviet power is expanding towards its borders, adding countries in its sphere, and making a classical geopolitical move of encirclement, is to say at least, dangerous. As Mankoff (2009) argues, NATO’s march to the east has affected Russian security calculations while reviving Cold War Era anxieties on Russian strategic isolation and encirclement.
Hence, Russia responded to these challenges with strength. Two examples can be pointed to Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014). The first case, which became known as Russo-Georgian War, was a military conflict that materialized Russia’s attempt to undermine a pro-west government, and, to a greater degree, western (especially the US) influence in the region. (Mankoff, 2009) Russia supported a separatist movement within Georgia to use it as an instrument of pressure. In Ukraine, as in Georgia, Russian strategy remained the same: using domestic political instability to undermine pro-west governments, limit its influence and keep the countries inside Moscow’s sphere. Nevertheless, Ukraine saw Russia’s response as its maximum as Crimea was annexed by Russia. Both countries were and still are, under improving relations with either NATO or EU, respectively.
Moreover, Ukraine’s crisis also highlighted Moscow’s worries of anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) system installation, one feature of the Russian perception of NATO as a traditional military alliance. Vladimir Putin, in an interview, stated that if Ukraine was to make an agreement with NATO regarding ABM, “it would be seen as a threat due to the fact that when a country joins the alliance neither their politics nor society can not alter the decisions made by NATO, including ABM. […] We would need to answer that in any way.”(Stone, 2017, p. 265) He also stressed the common Russian perception of NATO as a Cold War Era institution, affirming in a previous interview that: “NATO, as far as I am concerned, is reminiscent of the past. It was founded during the Cold War, between two systems […].” (p. 58)
Therefore, it is clear that there are two divergent security perspectives. Russia, oriented by realpolitik, geopolitics, and cold calculations of power, sees NATO as a threat to its security. (Kissinger, 1994) This behavior can be traced to its identity: derzhavnost is deep-rooted in both Russian policymakers and society, and so, great power politics and the Russian sphere of influence are important concepts in its foreign policy. As Mankoff (2009) argues, “Russia’s identity and self-perception as one of a handful of Great Powers in a multipolar world is too well entrenched.” (p. 310) Accordingly, it can be seen from a logic of appropriateness: Russia, as a great power, must impose itself in its sphere of influence. Any attempts of intrusion by foreign powers or organizations (such as NATO) will be met with resistance. Although Russia did not oppose NATO during its expansions during the 1990s and early 2000s, Mankoff (2009) describes that Moscow’s was too weak to address these problems properly, and it was more focused on organizing itself domestically before engaging in foreign entanglements – a strategy called sosredotochenie (reconcentration, in English).
Furthermore, the logic of appropriateness can be explored not only from fulfilling the obligations as a great power but also from necessity: a strategic encirclement from a military alliance whose main purpose was to contain Soviet power. Likewise, hard power, such as military action (such as in Georgia, 2008) is seen as an appropriate response from a self-perceived great power as a measure to protect itself from other great powers (as the US) and NATO from intrusion in the Russian sphere of influence (the post-Soviet Space). In other words, if Russia perceives itself as a Great Power (and wants to be perceived as such by others), it must act like one. Correspondingly, Russian behavior and action are directly related to its identity and the way in which it cognitively identifies the “other” (NATO, in this case) – as a result, altering its conception of security.
Different from Russia, NATO’s identity was not formulated solely by power calculations and geopolitics – and most definitely is not defined nowadays as such. Although the alliance was formed mostly in order to contain soviet power, it was never “just” a military arrangement. Since its foundation, in 1949, NATO was also a political instrument, a means of cooperation among its members for socio-economic matters as well as diplomatic ones. It is based, as we have seen, on common norms and values, which were transformed in the identity of a culturally-based civilizational community, in a process that resembles in many ways the EU. New members are subjected to a checklist of five basic criteria: established democracy, respect for human rights, market-oriented economy, armed forces under civilian control, and good relations with neighboring states. (Evans and Newnham, 1998)
Above all, NATO focused after the Cold War on maintaining itself from dissolving and avoiding the return of past conflicts. It transformed its identity – or returned to its original – using narrative processes that enhanced common heritage and culture by joint declarations and leaders’ speeches. This mentality has affected the modus operandi of the alliance: there were no enemies, new members were not only allies but part of a greater community, enlargement was an extension of this community, and security became increasingly linked to stability and democracy – in other terms, political and cultural structures of the states concerned.
One example of this mentality can be found in Bill Clinton’s speech in 1995: “NATO’s success has involved promoting security interests, advancing values, supporting democracy and economic opportunity. We have literally created a community of shared values and shared interests, as well as an alliance for the common defense. Now, the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union want to be a part of enlarging the circle of common purpose, and in so doing, increasing our own security.” (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 371-372) Tony Blair has also spoken in support of enlargement following a similar pattern, in 2000: “Without enlargement, Western Europe will always be faced with the threat of instability, conflict and mass migration on its borders.” (Howorth, 2014, p. 83)
Conclusion
“As Europe’s identity increasingly comes to be based on a consensus about values and institutions, the Great Power ambitions that have motivated Russian foreign policy for most of the country’s post-soviet history have put it at odds with the postmodern and postimperial Europe taking shape on its borders.” (Mankoff, 2009, p. 148)
The end of the Cold War brought many changes to world order. One of them was the necessity of redefinition of identities of Europe and Russia. While the first chosen political, economic, military, and cultural integration, Russia at first remained aloof, albeit with few timid approaches to join Europe, and finally decided to lead its own path. As some constructivists argue, “identity and action are inextricably related” (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 362), thus, this behavior, as well as eventual confrontation, can be explained in the light of their identity formation. The question is not whether Russia and NATO have divergent identities, and, as a consequence, security perspectives, but if it is possible to conciliate their positions.
On one hand, the alliance sees its enlargement as a way to extend its community, reducing instability and avoiding the return of past conflicts. On the other, Russia sees as a threat towards its borders, a strategic encirclement which is aimed to destroy its sphere of influence. It is clear that both envision their respective courses of action as procedures to enhance their own security. However, the more NATO expands members, especially in former Warsaw Pact/Post-Soviet States, the more Russia responds aggressively. This can not be said to be without warning, as since Yeltsin Russian leaders affirm that NATO made a promise not to enlarge eastward Germany. Additionally, scholars have also argued that expansion would be a mistake: “Russian aggression in East Europe will be encouraged, and not discouraged by NATO’s expansion. The threat that NATO incursions should deal with could be triggered by NATO’s actions, once more dividing Europe into two blocs. European security as a whole – particularly Central and East Europe’s security – would be diminished, and not amplified.” (Brown, 1995 apud Howorth, 2014, p. 87)
It seems, however, that any hopes for a de-escalation of tensions are out of the question in the medium term. Recent events show that Russia under Putin will continue its grip in Post Soviet Space, such as neighboring countries as Belarus and Armenia. Whilst Belarus leader Lukashenko fights, with Russian support, for its power against protests demanding its renounce, Moscow mediated a recent peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. It is evident that Russia will keep these countries at its hand, resisting effusively any western attempt to enter this Moscow sphere of influence, as was with Georgia and Ukraine. Conversely, NATO will not retreat from its ambitions to add even more members to the “democratic community”, as recent talks between the Secretariat and Georgia and Ukraine progress.
This essay underlined the fact that identity is, and will remain a central feature of the study of International Relations, as well as Security Studies. As long as Russia and NATO members have so contrasting identities, their security perspectives will remain divergent.
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