NATO Enlargement, Identity and Divergent Security Perspectives: a Constructivist Approach

‘Postcommunist Russia finds itself within borders which reflect no historical precedent. Like Europe, it will have to devote much of its energy to redefining its identity. Will it seek to restore the lost empire? Will it shift its center of gravity eastward and become a more active participant in Asian diplomacy? By what principles and methods will it react to the upheavals around its borders, especially in the volatile Middle East? Russia will always be essential to world order and, in the inevitable turmoil associated with answering these questions, a potential menace to it’ (Kissinger, 1994, p. 25).

Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s quote, although written 26 years ago, remains prevailing as one of the most intriguing questions yet to be answered. After the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, Western institutions – namely the European Union (EU) and NATO – expanded eastwards, towards the post-Soviet space. This expansion was greeted with apprehension by Moscow, which saw its former satellites and constituent republics join the US and its allies – a threatening move of an erstwhile anti-Russian coalition near its borders. However, Western perception was not of an aggressive move, but rather a way to prevent a return to the past and provide an extension of shared values and norms. Security, for the West, was not related to the old balance of power politics, being instead related to stability and common identity (Neumann and Williams, 2000, pp. 369-370).

Constructivism, identity and security

Constructivism as a theory in international relations (IR) has as its fundamental proposition that human beings are social beings and, therefore, social relations make or construct ourselves into who we are (Onuf, 1998, p. 59). As Onuf (1998, p. 59) argues, ‘People make society and society makes people’. In other terms, constructivism holds that the world is not predetermined, but built as actors act. The world we live in is socially constructed everyday by ourselves in our interactions. As opposed to structuralists and some neorealists, the theory rejects the predetermination of anarchy. Anarchy is rather a social construction, as so, its nature can vary between conflict and cooperation. Norms and rules also are important concepts for constructivism since they organize and guide international relations (Nogueira and Messari, 2005, pp. 163-164).

Identity is also an important concept for constructivists such as Wendt (1992). The author argues that identity is acquired by an actor by participating in collective meanings: ‘Identities are inherently relational: Identity, with its appropriate attachments of psychological reality, is always identity within a specific, socially constructed world,’ Peter Berger argues. Each person has many identities linked to institutional roles, such as brother, son, teacher and citizen. Similarly, a state may have multiple identities as ‘sovereign’, ‘leader of the free world’, ‘imperial power’ and so on. The commitment to and the salience of particular identities vary but each identity is an inherently social definition of the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and one another and which constitute the structure of the social world’ (Wendt, 1992, pp. 397-398).

According to Neumann and Williams (2000), identities are variable and constituted in relational processes. They are pivotal for an actor’s course of action considering that ‘perceptions of the situation in which actors find themselves and the courses of action which they view as reasonable to pursue are constructed in the context of their identities’ (p. 362). As outlined by the authors, a useful approach to identity-formation, complementary to collective-meanings, is one which focuses on the role of narrative structures within the process. This path, narrative conceptions, […] focus on the ways in which identities are constructed, maintained and transformed through the telling of ‘constitutive stories’. These narratives provide a context of meaning within which an actor’s identity, the situation within which they are located, and the actions deemed reasonable or appropriate to both, are knitted together within a coherent (if multi-variant and open-ended) whole’ (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 362).

Narratives of identity are social and relational in two important aspects: they are historically and socially constructed and need recognition by other actors. It is not enough to claim an identity in order to gain it, rather, it must have internal stability and social effectiveness, as well as being acknowledged as legitimate by others. In turn, the narrative process approach can be linked to a theory of action based on the concept of roles and what institutional theorists have nominated ‘logic of appropriateness’. Basically, supporters of this theory argue that behavior requires executing the obligations in a given situation and trying to determine the essence of an adopted position. Consequently, action originates from a perception of necessity instead of preference and an actor in this logic would need to maintain a balance between behaviour and a self social conception in order to keep its identity alive (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 363).

Likewise, the logic of appropriateness has two essential aspects. First, it addresses the means by which one’s self-perceived identity is fundamental to their understanding of what action would be appropriate in a situation. Second, it is relational and social: an appropriate action is defined based on the social context of which the actor is part of and by the judgement of others. Being recognised as a certain kind of actor means to adopt a recognised behaviour viewed as appropriate to the situation, therefore, becoming a legitimate actor (Neumann and Williams, 2000, pp. 363-364).

As a result, ‘[…] undertaking specific actions in that situation is equally a sign of being a particular kind of actor. Analysed in this broadly social context, legitimate identities are inextricably bound to roles, and to structures of power. The linking of a certain kind of identity to a specific set of roles and its analogous forms of action is a fundamental structure of social power. The capacity to claim such identities, and to grant or deny them to others, is a source of social power.’ (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 363)

Neumann and Williams (2000, p. 362) conclude that ‘identity and action are inextricably related’, with the first then being variable and constituted through relational processes. By its turn, Wendt (1992, p. 398) argues that identities are the basis of interests. Under anarchy, identity-formation is concerned primarily with the security of the self. In other words, identities precedes interests and, as we have seen, are formed in relational processes, between identity and difference (Nogueira and Messari, 2005, p. 165). As a result, ‘concepts of security […] differ in the extent to which and the manner in which the self is identified cognitively with the other […]’ (Wendt, 1992, p. 399).

Buzan and Hansen (2009, p. 192) hold that security is a behavior to be explained rather than a political concept. Critics of traditional constructivism often accuse the theory of providing ideational, peaceful explanations of events, but ‘[…] ideas, norms and culture might spur as well as dampen expansionist and aggressive behaviour’ (Buzan and Hansen, 2009, p. 197). Examples of such cases can include the NATO enlargement in Central Europe and in the Baltic States which would imply mostly peaceful outcomes, and Russia’s response, which by its turn can, in some events, prove aggressive as in the Russo-Georgian war of 2008.

NATO’s enlargement and transformation

The end of the Cold War resulted in important geopolitical changes. First, it provided an immediate new world order based on the US’s unipolarity, universal norms and values (Kissinger, 1994, pp. 17-19). Unchallenged, now Western institutions had no clear or serious obstacles ahead to its expansion. However, this also meant that there was no enemy to counter which was NATO’s main purpose (Buzan and Hansen, 2009, p. 100). Second, the break-up of the Soviet Union provided 14 new states, in what came to be known as the ‘Post-Soviet Space’, in which Russia naturally ascended as the most prominent and powerful actor in the region. These new countries initiated a transition from planned (socialist) economies to market economies, and some of them, such as Russia, adopted the ‘shock therapy’ doctrine, which resulted in high unemployment and low wages. As a consequence, Russia entered into a huge economic depression, which also reflected on its military budget and its power (White, 2011, p. 128).

Under this context – absence of a clear security threat for the West and Russian relative weakness – NATO expanded: ‘The EU enlarged and deepened, and NATO not only endured but expanded. But while the EU clearly had an internal logic of its own, however contested, it was much less clear what the purpose of NATO now was. Did an unopposed West need an armed wing or could that job be left to the sole superpower? Could and should Europe now stand more on its own in defence matters, especially via the EU, which during the 1990s and early 2000s, enjoyed something of a spurt in both widening and deepening? The 1990s opened with many general ruminations on the implications of the new state of affairs for the existing institutions and arrangements’ (Buzan and Hansen, 2009, p. 167).

Neumann and Williams (2000) note that NATO’s expansion was not, for many scholars and policy makers, the logical step. After all, if NATO was created as a counterweight alliance in Europe to Soviet power, and this threat was gone, what was its purpose then? At first, it seemed that NATO, without any clear enemy or threat, was destined to dissolve itself. Nonetheless, it not only enlarged significantly in terms of membership, but also increased its cohesion and cooperation. According to the authors, this happened due to the fact that even though the Soviet Union was dissolved, this did not mean that there was no threat for the alliance. On the contrary: the biggest menace during the after the Cold Ear for European countries was the return of their past conflicts (Neumann and Williams, 2000, pp. 364-367).

Thus, NATO occupied a symbolic position of collective security in a new era. It was an important mechanism for the articulation of its members where it was possible to discuss security matters: ‘the Alliance acted as a symbolic marker, a rhetorical touchstone through which the threat of fragmentation and the return of the past might be countered, and securing NATO from this threat -maintaining the organisation because its existence was a value in itself – became one of the central goals and political challenges of the Alliance’ (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 366).

Additionally, the organization’s scope has also changed. From a traditional military alliance, NATO turned itself into an institution based on shared values and principles. Based on the Brussels Declaration (1988), the alliance is a voluntary association between free and democratic states, based on interests and values, and in which security is indivisible (NATO, 1991, cited in Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 366). As former NATO Secretary General (SG) Manfred Wörner stated, these were the new guiding principles in order to advance the organization’s agenda. Moreover, Wörner also argued that without the US’s commitment to the alliance, European states would lack the reassurance element which enabled them to get over their past differences and move together towards integration (Wörner, 1988; Wörner, 1991, cited in Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 366).

If NATO was to avoid its members returning to their past rivalries and establish a new European collective security system in a post-Cold War world, this meant that the old balance of power politics and traditional security conceptions had to be overcome. Therefore, Neumann and Williams (2000) argue that narrative resources were applied to alter the alliance’s identity in order to overcome old security conceptions and antagonisms and promote a new security framework based rather on common norms and values. Consequently, changes were presented as continuity, in a process that focused on the centralisation of the organisation and, on a deeper level, re-articulation of its identity and history (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 367).

This re-articulation started in the 1990 London Declaration, in which the member-states enhanced the shared values – democracy, human rights, security, stability and the peaceful resolution of disputes. One year later, former SG Wörner’s assessment reduced the role of the Soviet Union in the foundation of the organization and focused on the alliance’s role in approximating long standing-adversaries, such as Germany and France, as well as avoiding US’s isolationism (Wörner, 1991). In 1993, German Defence Minister Volker Rühe argued that member states’ political and strategic positions were based on shared values and interests and it was this, and not an existential threat, that was NATO’s hub (Rühe, 1993, in Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 369).

According to this narrative, the alliance was not obsolete with the end of Cold War, rather, was returning to its true foundations and role: ‘The Cold War, so often seen as NATO’s defining rationale and forging struggle, could now be presented as an unfortunate historical deviation, an anomalous period during which NATO’s true nature and identity was overwhelmed by a regrettable military necessity, the passing of which allowed NATO to return to its true historic role’ (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 369). In other words, the organisation was now part of a civilizational structure, formed on the basis of common heritage, culture and values in Europe and North America. The strategic content was not its driving force (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 370).

Hence, Neumann and Williams (2000, pp. 369-370) argue that the re-articulation of NATO’s identity coincides with a change in NATO’s vision and security perception. According to them, security can be understood in a cultural perspective both positively and negatively. The first identifies security with cultural and civilisational principles – which are part of new NATO’s identity. The second, considers threats emerging from the absence of these conditions. Therefore, threats to security would not be states (such as the Soviet Union once was), but rather the absence of democratic political and cultural institutions. This menace became labelled as ‘instability’, and included internal issues, such as economic inequalities between member states and developing neighbours which could spill over to the alliance members (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 370).

Since NATO incorporated cultural values and a civilisational vision to its framework, it transcended the traditional military alliance thinking, focused on geopolitical logic. From this change on, there were no fixed enemies: instead, all states were potential members. The decisive factors which would determine friend from enemy would be their social structures, institutions and culture. As a consequence, security and culture became increasingly related to democracy, and external relations would be dictated not anymore by geopolitics, but rather this extended view of security in terms of culture and values. NATO turned itself into an integrated cultural community, in which its members were not only allies, but entities participating in the organisation naturally due to its political structures and shared values. Thus, enlargement was simply an extension of this community, which was open to any country which shared this vision, and not anymore directed against any particular state. Conversely, it did not exclude anyone (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 371).

Neumman and Williams (2000, p. 372) summarize the expansion narrative as follows: ‘NATO declares itself the integral security dimension of Western civilisation at large and constructs a relationship to those who stand outside it that is importantly different from a balance of power logic. Crucially, this counters concerns that dividing lines are not to be redrawn in Europe through the continued unifying existence of the Alliance. NATO’s persistence and expansion thus becomes part of the solution to the threat of fragmentation rather than the cause of it.

From 1990 to today, 16 countries have joined NATO, with three of them (e.g. the Baltic states) being former republics of the USSR. Another 11 countries were considered to be part of the so-called Iron Curtain of socialist countries under the USSR’s sphere of influence. In addition, two post-Soviet nations are strong candidates to become future members: Ukraine and Georgia. Although NATO, as we have seen, has changed its identity from a traditional alliance to a cultural and value-based community, Russia (and so, Russian identity) continues to see the alliance as a threat to its security. If, on one hand, NATO rejects traditional geopolitics as the basis for its policy-making, Russia has a more classical view towards expansion.

Russian identity and divergent security perspectives

As Kissinger (1994, p. 25) noted, both Europe and Russia will have to devote energy to redefine its identities in the post-Cold War era. While Europe has chosen integration expressed in both EU and NATO, Russia struggled from the economic depression and cooperation with the West in the ‘hard days’ of 1990s to confrontation and economic development under Putin from the 2000s (Mankoff, 2009). Traditional Russian identity is still decisive for Moscow’s policy-making. As Mankoff (2009,p. 3) argues: ‘A state’s identity in the international system – whether it sees itself as a satiated or a revisionist power, a nation-state or an empire – provides the intellectual framework that shapes decisions about how power is employed.’

During medieval times, Russia was an European culture outpost surrounded by hostile societies. Threatened by all its neighbours, Russia expanded and conquered its enemies, as this was the only way it could grant its security. According to this view, failure to conquer its neighbours would result in submission and, eventually, destruction. Thus, for the next centuries Russia expanded in all directions, limited only by natural barriers or resource exhaustion. However, the rapid expansion was not accompanied by economic development or demographic growth, which left the new territories sparsely populated. As a result, Russian enlargement raised a feeling of vulnerability, as it brought more potential enemies than additional security. Consequently, Russian enlargement continued because it was easier than to stop (Kissinger, 2014, pp. 57-59).

According to Mankoff (2009), as time passed, two Russian principles were developed: Derzhavnost and Gosudarstvennost. The first refers to ‘Great Power’ ideology, in other terms, the Russian sense of belonging to the great powers club, and, consequently, the need to act accordingly. By its turn, Gosudarstvennost stands for the central role of the Russian state both for the political and economic life of the country and also considers that the national interest in foreign policy must be defined in reference to the well-being of the state, rather than, for example, respect for international norms and protection of civilians (Mankoff, 2009, pp. 61-62). Furthermore, Russian essence consists in the belief of an especial mission: to serve as a bridge between two distinct worlds (Europe and Asia) while remaining exposed to threatening forces which do not comprehend its vision (Kissinger, 2014, p. 63).

As Russia was born within a hostile environment, its leadership became stronger in order to manage its huge territory and its menaces which came to be seen negatively in Europe (Kissinger, 2014, pp. 61-62). As such, it is not surprising that these characteristics are still evident today. According to Mankoff (2009), under Yeltsin’s administration (1991-1999), foreign policy was cooperative towards the West in general. Russia suffered from economic depression and reduced its military budget, becoming weak, and used its foreign policy to insert itself in a post-Cold War world. During early 1990s the pro-Western foreign policy was much more ideological than compared to the later years relative pragmatism and Russia and NATO maintained dialogue over several issues, including enlargement. However, Moscow still saw the alliance as a threat in the Russian view because ‘[…] after all, [NATO] remains a military alliance devoted above all to issues of ‘hard’ security and for many Russians still carries the associations of the Cold War, when its very raison d’etrê was to check Russian power’ (Mankoff, 2009, p. 164).

Yet according to Mankoff (2009), not only Russia saw NATO as a threat, but also expected the organisation to keep its supposed promise to halt expansion after German reunification. Nonetheless, NATO entered in a continuous process of enlargement and upgraded its military capacity, movements which Moscow saw as both menacing and provocative. Additionally, NATO enlargement was a threat due to the fact that it was expanding towards Russian borders in the erstwhile Warsaw Pact members and even former soviet states (Mankoff, 2009, p. 164).

This is fundamental for Russian policy-makers who consider that Russia, as a great power, has a sphere of influence, its Near Abroad, the post Soviet space. For Russia, the fact that the military alliance which was created to check its power and is expanding towards its borders, adding countries in its sphere, and making a classical geopolitical move of encirclement, is to say at least, dangerous. NATO’s march to the East has affected Russian security calculations while reviving Cold War era fears on Russian strategic isolation and encirclement (Mankoff, 2009, p. 147).

Hence, Russia responded to these challenges with strength. Two examples can be pointed to: Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014). The first case, which became known as Russo-Georgian War, was a military conflict that materialized Russia’s attempt to undermine a pro-Western government, and, to a greater degree, Western (especially US) influence in the region. (Mankoff, 2009, p. 263) Russia supported a separatist movement within Georgia to use it as an instrument of pressure. In Ukraine, as in Georgia, Russian strategy remained the same: using domestic political instability to undermine pro-Western governments, limit its influence and keep the countries inside Moscow’s sphere. Nevertheless, Ukraine saw Russia’s response as its maximum as Crimea was annexed by Russia. Both countries were, and still are, improving relations with both NATO and EU (Souza, 2016).

Moreover, Ukraine’s crisis also highlighted Moscow’s worries of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system installation, one feature of Russian perception of NATO as a traditional military alliance (Mankoff, 2009, p. 173). Vladimir Putin, in an interview, stated that if Ukraine was to make an agreement with NATO regarding ABM, ‘it would be seen as a threat due to the fact that when a country joins the alliance neither their politics nor society can not alter the decisions made by NATO, including ABM. […] We would need to answer that in any way’ (Stone, 2017, p. 265). He also stressed common Russian perception of NATO as a Cold War era institution, affirming in a previous interview that: ‘NATO, as far as I am concerned, is reminiscent of the past. It was founded during the Cold War between two systems […]” (p. 58).

Hence, it is clear that there are two divergent security perspectives. On one hand, Russia, oriented by realpolitik, geopolitics and cold calculations of power, sees NATO as a threat to its security. (Mankoff, 2009) This behavior can be traced to its identity: derzhavnost is deep-rooted in Russian policy circles, and so, great power politics and a sphere of influence are important concepts in its foreign policy (Mankoff, 2009, p. 12). As Mankoff (2009, p. 13) argues, ‘Russia’s identity and self-perception as one of a handful of great powers in a multipolar world is too well entrenched.’

With this identity in consideration, one can apply the concept of logic of appropriateness as described in Neumann and Williams (2000, p. 363) as follows: Russia, as a great power, must impose itself in its sphere of influence. Any attempts of intrusion by foreign powers or organisations (such as NATO) will be met with resistance. Although Russia did not oppose NATO during its expansions during 1990s and early 2000s, Mankoff (2009, p. 40) describes that Moscow was too weak to address these problems properly, and it was more focused in organizing itself domestically before engaging in foreign entanglements, a strategy called sosredotochenie (reconcentration).

Furthermore, the logic of appropriateness can also be applied not only by fulfilling the obligations as a great power, but also from necessity (March and Olsen, 1999): Russia needs to stop a strategic encirclement from a military alliance whose main purpose was initially to contain Soviet power (Mankoff, 2009, p. 147). Likewise, hard power, such as military action (as seen in Georgia in 2008) is considered as an appropriate response from a self-perceived great power as a measure to protect itself from other great powers (such as the US) and NATO from intrusion in Russian sphere of influence (Mankoff, 2009, p. 123).

In other words, if Russia perceives itself as a great power and wants to be perceived as such by others, it must act like one, as Mankoff (2009, pp. 61-62) argues. Moreover, just as Neumann and Williams (2000, p. 370) theorise that NATO’s behaviour and actions are directly related to its identity and the way in which it cognitively identifies the other, the same thinking can be applied to Russia: a great power with military capabilities which needs to protect itself against perceived encroachment from a military alliance.

However, on the other hand, NATO’s identity was not formulated solely by power calculations and geopolitics and it is not defined nowadays as such. Although the alliance was formed mostly in order to contain Soviet power, it was never only a military arrangement. Since its foundation, in 1949, NATO was also a political instrument, a means of cooperation among its members for socio-economic matters as well as diplomatic ones. It is based, as we have seen, in common norms and values, which were transformed in the identity of a culturally-based civilisational community, in a process that resembles in many ways the EU. 

New members are subjected to a check list of five basic criteria: established democracy, respect for human rights, market-oriented economy, armed forces under civilian control and good relations with neighbouring states (Evans and Newnham, 1998, pp. 350-353).

Above all, NATO focused after the Cold War in maintaining itself from dissolving and avoiding the return of past conflicts. It transformed its identity – or returned to its original – using narrative processes which enhanced common heritage and culture by joint declarations and leaders speeches. This mentality has affected the modus operandi of the alliance: there were no enemies, new members were not only allies but part of a greater community, enlargement was an extension of this community, and security became increasingly linked to stability and democracy, in other terms, political and cultural structures of the states concerned (Neumann and Williams, 2000).

One example of this mentality can be found in Bill Clinton’s speech in 1995: ‘NATO’s success has involved promoting security interests, advancing values, supporting democracy and economic opportunity. We have literally created a community of shared values and shared interests, as well as an alliance for the common defence. Now, the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union want to be a part of enlarging the circle of common purpose, and in so doing, increasing our own security’ (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 371-372).

‘As Europe’s identity increasingly comes to be based on a consensus about values and institutions, the great power ambitions that have motivated Russian foreign policy for most of the country’s post-soviet history have put it at odds with the postmodern and postimperial Europe taking shape on its borders.’ (Mankoff, 2009, p. 148) The end of the Cold War brought many changes to world order. One of them was the necessity of redefinition of identities of Europe and Russia (Kissinger, 1994, p. 25). While the first chose political, economic, military and cultural integration, Russia at first remained aloof, albeit few timid approaches to join Europe, and finally decided to lead its own path (Neumann and Williams, 2000, pp. 376-377). As some constructivists argue, ‘identity and action are inextricably related’ (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 362), thus, this behavior, as well as eventual confrontation, can be explained in the light of their identity formation. The question is not whether Russia and NATO have divergent identities, and, as a consequence, security perspectives, but if it is possible to conciliate their positions.

On one hand, the alliance sees its enlargement as a way to extend its community, reducing instability and avoiding the return of past conflicts (Neumann and Williams, 2000). On the other, Russia sees it as a threat towards its borders, a strategic encirclement which is aimed to destroy its sphere of influence (Mankoff, 2009, p. 147). It is clear that both envision their respective courses of action as procedures to enhance their own security. However, the more NATO expands members, especially in former Warsaw Pact states, the more Russia responds aggressively.

This can not be said to be without warning, as since Yeltsin, Russian leaders affirm that NATO made a promise not to enlarge eastward to fill the space left by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (Mankoff, 2009, p. 164). Additionally, scholars have also argued that expansion would be a mistake: ‘Russian aggression in Eastern Europe will be encouraged, and not discouraged, by NATO’s expansion. The threat which NATO incursions should deal with could be triggered by NATO’s actions, once more dividing Europe in two blocs. European security as a whole – particularly Central and East Europe’s security – would be diminished, and not amplified.’ (Brown, 1995, cited in Howorth, 2014, p. 87)

It seems, however, that any hopes for a de-escalation of tensions is out of question in the medium term. Recent events show that Russia under Putin will continue its grip in the post-Soviet space, such as in Belarus and Armenia. Moscow mediated a recent peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. It is evident that Russia will keep these countries at hand, resisting effusively any Western attempt to enter Moscow’s sphere of influence, as was with Georgia and Ukraine. Conversely, NATO will not retreat from its ambitions to add even more members to its organisation, as recent talks between the Atlantic Secretariat and Georgia and Ukraine progresses.

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