April 7, 2026
North America, Defence & Security, International Relations

Hydrocarbon Colonialism of Donald Trump’s America

By Samuel O'Dell

Maximum pressure. These two words arguably define the primary foreign policy strategy of Donald Trump’s first presidential term (Kahalzadeh, 2022). Now in his second term, he has not only revived but exacerbated the strategy to secure a legacy as, in his view, an international peacemaker. Claiming in August 2025 to have “ended 8 wars in just 8 months” (Horton, 2025), he has contradictorily triggered two conflicts in eight weeks. The targets – Venezuela and Iran – exhibit striking similarities including nationalised hydrocarbon sectors and strategic aims antagonistic to the US. As Washington reportedly prepares for a third conflict in Cuba (Jao, 2026), this prompts analysis of a US foreign policy increasingly centred around aggressive military action to deny states influence through their energy sectors – termed here “hydrocarbon colonialism”.

Venezuela

For the majority of the 20th century, the United States occupied an influential position in the Venezuelan oil sector. Exerting control over oil extraction, refinement, and export infrastructure, US firms saw immense profits and influence in the region (Singh, 2026). Toward 1998, however, President Hugo Chávez accelerated the oil nationalisation project, redirecting exports toward Asia and the Caribbean – diminishing US control. From 2011 to 2025, shipments to the US steadily declined, supplanted by growing deliveries to China: South America’s largest buyer (Sun, 2014; Singh, 2026).

In an aggressive move to combat this, Washington launched Operation Absolute Resolve on 3rd January 2026, forcibly removing President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores under the cover of missile fire. Conducted without congressional approval and in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the operation brought both figures into US custody on narcoterrorism charges. Operation Absolute Resolve stunned Venezuela and the wider international community, though it followed years of quietly escalating intervention. In 2019, for example, the Trump administration froze billions of dollars in Venezuelan state assets, directly targeted the nationalised oil industry, and reportedly authorised a CIA unit to “hack Venezuelan government networks” (Dorfman, 2024) to precipitate the expulsion of (an increasingly authoritarian) Maduro.

Covertly overthrowing the Venezuelan government, in Trump’s first term, was ultimately unsuccessful and yet may have predetermined Washington’s decision to enact an aggressive military operation in 2026. Despite Maduro’s removal, the authoritarian regime endures under Trump-backed Delcy Rodríguez. Since Trump declared that “the U.S. would be running Venezuela in the immediate future” (Miller, 2026), oil flows to China have sharply declined, redirected once more toward the US and Europe.

Iran

Trump’s next hydrocarbon conquest targeted a state alike in its capacity for substantial oil revenues. Tracing contemporary tensions back to Iran’s democratic election of 1951, Mohammad Mossadegh posed a profound threat to Western interests. As a supporter of nationalising Iranian oil and ending British control through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now British Petroleum), the rise of Mossadegh prompted a joint CIA–MI5 coup to swiftly remove him from power (Thomson, 2014). A subsequent series of consortiums ensured continued British-American influence over Iranian oil – until the 1979 revolution dismantled foreign involvement and established a state-regulated oil sector under the new Islamic Republic.

In this respect, Iran mirrors Venezuela. Not only do both nations possess nationalised hydrocarbon sectors, but Venezuela has also previously attempted to join BRICS – of which Iran is a key member. President Hugo Chávez famously named Iran and Venezuela “brothers” (Al Jazeera, 2005), further deepening both ideological and realpolitik bilateral relations. Washington has therefore viewed Iran and Venezuela as aligned adversaries whose control over oil revenues challenges US strategic dominance. After forcibly removing Maduro, the US, in coordination with Tel Aviv, launched a military operation aimed at removing Iran’s ruling elite (Doucet, 2026).

The consequences have been severe. More than 1,400 civilians have been killed and over 18,000 injured (Al Jazeera, 2026). Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and several senior officials were assassinated. Global oil prices have surged following the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, destabilising markets worldwide, and in particular Asia. Yet despite these blows, the authoritarian structures in Tehran that Trump sought to dismantle remain largely intact.

Donald Trump has openly stated that once the Iranian regime is destroyed, he intends to “be involved in the appointment [of the country’s next leader], like with Delcy (Rodríguez) in Venezuela” (Doucet, 2026). Washington’s intended strategy for Iran therefore closely resembles its Venezuelan model: secure de facto control over national oil production either by eliminating the existing regime or coercing its successor. In essence, Washington’s campaign represents a new phase in hydrocarbon colonialism – a period to reshape global politics with humanitarian casualties as a necessary means to do so.

Cuba

Trump is now applying significant pressure on Cuba’s energy sector; the latest target of Washington’s hydrocarbon colonialism. On 29th January, the US President signed an executive order imposing ad valorem sanctions on states directly or indirectly trading with Cuba, with oil imports as a primary target (The White House, 2026). Washington further escalated the situation by enforcing a complete energy blockade, plunging the communist island into repeated nationwide blackouts (Al Jazeera, 2026a). This deepens the fallout from Trump’s hostile takeover of Venezuelan oil, historically integral to Cuba’s energy security.

Cuba has never been a major oil exporter, historically relying on Soviet supplies until the USSR’s collapse. After 1989, Havana reassessed its strategy for energy security. By 2009, most electricity generation depended on oil, natural gas, and other hydrocarbons (International Energy Agency, 2023), with roughly half produced domestically and half imported from Venezuela (Cursino, 2026). The blockade therefore carries severe consequences: Cubans are unable to power their homes, the tourism sector suffers from insufficient fuel required for airlines (Al Jazeera, 2026a), and pregnant mothers are not able to receive adequate hospital care (Grant, 2026).

Cuba has sought to expand domestic oil production through exploration in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EZ) (Arrastía-Avila and Glidden, 2017) situated in the Gulf of Mexico, shared de jure with the US and Mexico. Trump has openly declared his ambitions, claiming he will “have the honour of taking Cuba” (Nicoll, 2026). Such rhetoric, as well as the strategic terrain of the EEZ, may therefore serve to encourage a US military operation in Cuba – somewhat a culmination of over six decades of escalating ideological tension.

Future Implications

Whilst hydrocarbons are significant for Venezuela, Iran and Cuba respectively, each of the named (potential) conflicts have been initiated by the US for a variety of factors that merit further discussion. There are severe humanitarian impacts of US military aggression against any nation – particularly in protracted conflicts. Heightened military aggression, unsupported by domestic or international norms, laws and processes, make it increasingly likely that Washington is viewed as an irrational actor. As Trump’s hydrocarbon colonialism undermines Washington’s credibility and reliability on the international stage, nations may seek reassessment of their relationship with Washington, dramatically reshaping global politics.

 

References

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