How Presidential Nominations Shape Brazil’s Highest Court

Brazil’s Supreme Court is structurally politicised due to presidential nomination power, weak Senate oversight, and life tenure, which together embed executive influence into judicial appointments and contribute to ideological polarisation. Introducing ranked nominations with Senate selection and fixed 10-year terms would reduce executive control and strengthen judicial independence through predictable turnover.

Brazilian politics is far from intuitive. The country has many different political parties, is no stranger to serious corruption scandals (involving most former presidents) and has a great portion of its parliament which is known as the “centrão” (a significant number of deputies who do not automatically align with proposals from the left- or right-wings).

In the midst of this troubled political context, the judicial branch should be the arbiter, protecting the constitution and the rule of law. However, here arises a major problem arises: the institutional design of the supreme court and its system of president-based nomination can turn the judiciary into a bargaining chip for the executive power.

The Design of The Brazilian Supreme Court (STF)

In order to understand the politicisation of the Brazilian Supreme Court, we must understand how Brazilian Constitution of 1988 intended it to function. According to article 101, the Supreme Federal Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF) is the guardian of the Constitution. The document institutionalises the STF as follows:

Article 101. The Federal Supreme Court is composed of eleven Justices, chosen from among citizens over thirty-five and under seventy years of age with notable legal knowledge and unblemished reputation. (CA 122, 2022)

Sole paragraph. The justices of the Federal Supreme Court shall be appointed by the president of the Republic, after their nomination has been approved by an absolute majority of the Federal Senate.

This article lays the legal foundation of the institution. The first fact we may notice is that only eleven Justices comprise the Court, all nominated by the President with the approval of the Senate. This mechanism theoretically means the executive and legislative branches act as a counterbalance to the judicial branch, similar to the ideas of French Enlightenment intellectual Montesquieu. But herein lies the first pitfall: the Brazilian Senate almost always approves the President’s nomination as a matter of protocol (a solitary exception in more than a century was Jorge Messias’ 2026 rejection following his nomination by Lula in 2025, as reported by Veiga).

The second challenge regards the pre-requisites to become a Justice. The constitution states that any person nominated should have “notable knowledge and unblemished reputation”, but it fails to define “notable knowledge”. Should the nominee be a lawyer or a judge? Or could we consider a Bachelor in Law without the Bar Licence a person of notable knowledge? These ambiguities are among the main questions raised by the advocates for a redesign of the STF.

It is important to note there are no term limits for a seat in the STF. Justices hold life tenure until their mandatory retirement at the age of 75. Since the lower age limit is 35, a Justice can potentially keep their seat for four decades before being replaced.

The current composition of the STF has 10 men and only one woman. Seven of the court were nominated by presidents affiliated to the PT party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or Worker’s Party). This imbalance is due to the fact that five elected presidents since 2002 have come from this party. The next graph shows the composition of the STF and the presidents and parties that nominated them in chronological order:

Of the seven Justices nominated by Lula and Dilma, two previously worked as lawyers for the PT party: Dias Toffoli and Cristiano Zanin. Zanin, most notably, served as Lula’s personal defence attorney during the Car Wash corruption scandal and the subsequent legal proceedings.

The influence of the executive branch contributes to the politicisation of the Brazilian judiciary, starting with the nomination process and the ministers’ prior relationship with the President of the Republic. In this sense, a clear separation can currently be observed between the ministers appointed by left-wing parties (the majority) and those appointed by right-wing parties. Naturally, in routine legal matters, the ministers act with a more technical approach. However, due to the country’s polarisation, the Supreme Court also experiences interference that leads to its own polarisation on political matters, in some shifting away from the technical nature inherent to the position. If justice is indeed blind, it should be purely technical and not a tool of politics. (Da Silva, 2026).

A Plausible Structural Change

While several proposals to restructure the Brazilian Supreme Court have been floated, none has succeeded in Congress. A plausible framework to minimise politicisation in the STF could introduce two structural changes:

1) Ranked Nomination: the president should not nominate one candidate for the seat at STF, but a minimum of three. In this system of nomination, the Senate would have a voting to decide who out of the three nominees would become the new Justice.

2) Term Limits: there should exist a term limit for the Justices. A term of 10 years would be sufficient for the Justices to develop their work. In this way, the STF would always have regular rotation of the Justices and the sitting president would not maintain as much influence over the courts as we see today.

These reforms are occasionally debated in the National Congress, but have not yet gained the prominence they deserve. Yetit remains plausible to apply these changes in the Brazilian Supreme Court just as in other countries like Germany, France, Mexico, or South Africa, to name a few.

References

Brazilian Constitution (2022). Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil. Federal Supreme Court. Available at: https://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/legislacaoConstituicao/anexo/brazil_federal_constitution.pdf. (Accessed: 18 June 2026).

Da Silva, Camila (2026). STF ganha protagonismo na política e vira tema de campanha eleitoral; veja propostas dos presidenciáveis. G1. 10 May. Available at: https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/2026/noticia/2026/05/10/stf-propostas-dos-presidenciaveis.ghtml. (Accessed: 18 June 2026)

Montesquieu (1989) The Spirit of the Laws. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (originally published 1748).

Veiga, Edison (2026). Antes de Lula, quem foi o último presidente a ter indicado ao STF barrado pelo Senado. BBC. 29 Apr. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/articles/c4g059w2d9qo.amp. (Accessed: 18 June 2026).

Vivas, Fernanda (2026). STF é formado por 11 ministros indicados pelos presidentes da República; veja a composição atual da Corte. G1. 29 Apr. Available at: https://g1.globo.com/google/amp/politica/noticia/2026/04/29/stf-e-formado-por-11-ministros-indicados-pelos-presidentes-da-republica-veja-a-composicao-atual-da-corte.ghtml. (Accessed: 18 June 2026).