From Saudi Vulnerability to Washington’s Dilemma: The Limits of U.S.‑Saudi Security Interdependence
The U.S.-Saudi relationship is being tested by the Iran war and renewed Houthi pressure, exposing the limits of Washington’s security commitments to Riyadh. As Saudi Arabia seeks to reduce its vulnerabilities, the growing costs of regional instability are creating a strategic dilemma for the United States.
Recent developments in the Middle East, including the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran, growing insecurity in the Persian Gulf, and renewed tensions between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthis, have exposed a long-standing tension in the Riyadh-Washington relationship: close economic and defence ties do not necessarily produce automatic security guarantees. The current crisis highlights the limits of Saudi Arabia’s dependence on the United States, but it also creates strategic costs for Washington. The United States may seek to avoid opening another military front, yet prolonged pressure on a key regional partner can weaken partner confidence, complicate regional stability, and increase demands on U.S. military resources.
This relationship is best understood as one of “asymmetric interdependence.” Both sides would bear costs if their ties weakened, but those costs differ in scale, form, and ease of substitution. In the short term, Saudi Arabia faces greater operational and security vulnerability because of its reliance on U.S. defence systems and support. Washington’s costs are less immediate, but they can accumulate through instability in the regional order, strain on security partnerships, resource-allocation pressures, and questions about the credibility of U.S. commitments. Seen in this way, the issue is no longer simply one of Saudi vulnerability. It has also become a strategic dilemma for Washington.
Asymmetric Interdependence and the Limits of Security Commitments
The U.S.-Saudi strategic defence agreement of November 2025 deepened security ties between the two nations; however, this agreement should not be equated with a mutual defence treaty or an automatic U.S. commitment to military intervention in every crisis. Meanwhile, data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicate that between 2021 and 2025, approximately 77 percent of Saudi Arabia’s major arms imports, based on the SIPRI Trend Indicator Value (TIV), originated in the United States. This figure reflects the U.S. share of major arms transfers and should not be conflated with the dollar value of arms contracts.
In any case, Riyadh’s defence dependency extends far beyond the mere purchase of equipment. Factors such as personnel training, system maintenance and repair, access to spare parts and ammunition, intelligence and communications infrastructure, operational interoperability, and logistical support chains have integrated Saudi Arabia into an extensive defence ecosystem, one that would be difficult and costly to fully replace in the short term.
In a relationship characterized by mutual yet asymmetric interdependence, the volume of exchange alone does not determine bargaining power. Of greater importance are the distribution of disruption costs, access to alternatives, and the adjustment costs each party would face should the relationship be curtailed. From this perspective, a distinction must be drawn between sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity refers to the intensity and speed with which a party is affected by a shock within existing arrangements, whereas vulnerability becomes more pronounced when significant costs persist even after attempts to adapt, pivot, or utilise alternative options.
On this basis, the current situation cannot be explained by concepts such as “American betrayal” or Saudi Arabia being “sold out.” Washington determines its level of involvement in a crisis based on its definition of vital interests, the cost of intervention, the risk of war escalation, the probability of success, and other strategic priorities. These calculations do not necessarily align with Riyadh’s preferences. The limited U.S. response to the 2019 attacks on the Abqaiq and Khurais facilities, which initially halted about 5.7 million barrels per day of Saudi oil production, had already demonstrated that extensive security cooperation does not automatically translate into a U.S. willingness to intervene militarily in every attack against Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia’s de-escalation with Iran and the restoration of bilateral ties in 2023 can also be viewed, alongside other factors, as part of Riyadh’s effort to reduce its exposure to conflicts over whose initiation and trajectory it lacks full control. Such an interpretation should not overlook Saudi Arabia’s own agency in the Yemen war; Riyadh has been a key player in that conflict for a significant portion of the past decade. The issue is not merely that Saudi Arabia is a passive recipient of the consequences of others’ decisions; rather, the region’s security environment has become so interconnected that no single actor can fully insulate itself from the repercussions of decisions made by other players.
The 2026 war has exposed this asymmetry on a different level: the gap between decision-making authority and the burden of consequences. Saudi Arabia played no decisive role in the decision to launch a U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, yet disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, rising transport and insurance costs, threats to energy infrastructure, and oil market instability directly affected its economy and security. Riyadh has limited influence over some of the decisions shaping its security environment, yet it cannot insulate itself from their consequences.
The Houthi crisis has also highlighted the distinction between defence cooperation and a guarantee of intervention. During the recent crisis, Mohammed bin Salman sought increased U.S. military support; however, Washington has so far refrained from direct, large-scale involvement in the ongoing confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, opting instead to continue intelligence cooperation and targeting assistance. Around the same time, the potential sale of 48 F-35 fighter jets and 49 associated engines to Saudi Arabia, as part of a package valued at approximately $24.3 billion, entered the U.S. legal and regulatory review process. This step does not, however, equate to the actual delivery of the aircraft or the finalisation of the contract.
These two trends are not contradictory; rather, they represent different levels of the security relationship. Arms sales, capability transfers, intelligence sharing, defence support, deterrence, and direct military intervention do not constitute commitments of the same magnitude. Thus, Riyadh’s primary issue is not the absence of a security relationship with the United States; the ambiguity lies in the point at which extensive defence cooperation translates into Washington’s operational readiness to bear military costs directly.
The energy sector also clearly illustrates the distinction between sensitivity and vulnerability. To reduce its operational reliance on the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia has invested in the East-West Pipeline and export capacity via the Red Sea. However, recent attacks on parts of this transport network demonstrated that establishing an alternative route does not necessarily eliminate risk. Prior to the recent disruption, the East-West Pipeline transported approximately four to five million barrels of oil per day, making it a vital component of Saudi Arabia’s export network.
Diversification, therefore, can alter the geography of risk without entirely eliminating it. A portion of the risk may shift from Hormuz to overland pipelines, Red Sea ports, and subsequently the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The benchmark for successful diversification is not merely the existence of an alternative route but its capacity to mitigate the residual costs incurred following a shock.
The intensity of Saudi Arabia’s short-term sensitivity became evident in the summer of 2026. According to an International Energy Agency report from September, Saudi crude oil supply dropped from approximately 8.24 million barrels per day in July to 5.97 million barrels per day in August, a decline of more than 2.2 million barrels per day in a single month. However, Saudi oil exports, which had dropped to approximately 2.4 million barrels per day in August, rebounded to more than 4 million barrels per day in September, according to current shipping and cargo-tracking data. By rerouting exports and employing alternative, albeit costlier, arrangements, Riyadh managed to mitigate some of the disruption. Consequently, Saudi Arabia’s structural vulnerability lies not in an absolute inability to adapt, but rather in the cost, limitations, and incompleteness of the options available to maintain export flows once a crisis strikes.
This issue is of particular significance to Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation programme. Despite progress in diversification, International Monetary Fund assessments indicate that oil and petroleum products still account for approximately 69 percent of the Kingdom’s exports. Thus, reducing the Saudi economy’s long-term reliance on oil remains dependent on financial resources largely derived from the energy sector. Consequently, disruptions to oil export security are not merely a matter of current revenue; they can also strain the financial resources of the very process aimed at reducing future dependence on oil.
Riyadh’s reaction to this situation should not be simplistically interpreted as a “pivot away from the United States.” A more precise formulation is the management of dependency: preserving the benefits of the security relationship with Washington while simultaneously mitigating the costs associated with a lack of alternatives. Regional de-escalation, the expansion of ties with other powers, the diversification of energy routes, and the pursuit of complementary security partners can all be understood within this framework.
However, an increased number of partners does not equate to strategic autonomy. In the short term, none of the available options can fully replace the comprehensive capabilities that the U.S. defence ecosystem provides to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh’s likely objective, therefore, is not so much to break free from dependency as to reduce its concentration, expand external options, and strengthen its bargaining power within that same asymmetric relationship.
From Saudi Vulnerability to Washington’s Dilemma
The ongoing crisis imposes costs beyond Saudi Arabia. Washington, too, faces a set of constraints, specifically the challenge of translating material superiority into sustainable strategic outcomes amid a multitude of commitments and limited resources.
This dilemma should not be equated with Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability. U.S. dependence on Saudi Arabia is not of the same nature as Riyadh’s operational reliance on U.S. defence systems. Nevertheless, persistent instability in Saudi Arabia or an erosion of bilateral ties could have significant repercussions for Washington, affecting the stability of energy markets and trade routes, the cohesion of regional security arrangements, partner confidence, competition with other powers, and the costs of crisis containment. The relationship is reciprocal, yet the asymmetry lies precisely in the differing nature and substitutability of these respective costs.
The first phase of the war between the United States and Israel, on the one hand, and Iran, on the other, began on February 28 and lasted just over a month, concluding with a ceasefire on April 7. While military operations inflicted significant damage on some of Iran’s capabilities, the initial ceasefire failed to resolve fundamental disputes. A subsequent understanding reached in June also proved short-lived, and hostilities resumed. By September 2026, the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran remained locked in a cycle of limited strikes, temporary lulls, and diplomatic efforts.
Assessing the outcome of this war requires distinguishing among three distinct levels: operational achievement, strategic impact, and political resolution. Destroying military targets or degrading a portion of an adversary’s operational capacity may count as success at the first level without necessarily preventing the restoration of capabilities or leading to enduring political arrangements. Thus, the issue is not one of denying U.S. military gains, but rather of evaluating the extent to which they translate into more sustainable outcomes.
It is therefore more accurate to say that while the United States achieved significant operational successes, the durability of the ceasefire, the prevention of the resurgence of threatening capabilities, and the establishment of more stable arrangements regarding nuclear and security disputes have remained constrained. The issue lies in the potential gap between the capacity to inflict military damage and the ability to shape the post-operation political landscape.
This dilemma also has material and resource-allocation dimensions. On September 15, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that U.S. military operations against Iran through August 1, 2026, would cost the Department of Defense approximately $38 billion. Furthermore, the continuation of the conflict, depending on the intensity of operations, could incur additional costs of roughly $2 to $3 billion per month.
More critical than the financial costs is the consumption of military resources. The CBO has noted that the extensive use of missile-defence interceptors could strain the inventories of certain systems for years, a limitation that becomes even more significant should a simultaneous crisis arise involving an adversary possessing a large arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles.
Washington’s challenge, therefore, is not merely a question of “possessing power” versus not possessing it, but rather of how to allocate limited and costly capabilities across multiple potential, simultaneous commitments. Opening another broad front against the Houthis entails not only direct costs but also opportunity costs related to the expenditure of munitions, defence systems, intelligence assets, operational forces, and strategic attention.
In terms of material power, the Houthis are not comparable to the United States. Their significance stems precisely from the disparity between their limited resources and their high capacity for disruption. For a non-state actor to create a strategic problem, it need not defeat a greater power on the battlefield; it is sufficient for it to be able to threaten vital infrastructure and routes, deplete the adversary’s defensive resources, and turn the prolongation of the crisis into a tool for exerting pressure.
Experience from recent years has shown that military operations can erode some of the Houthis’ capabilities, yet achieving a lasting reduction in their missile, drone, and naval capacities is far more difficult. Consequently, a distinction must be drawn between material capability, the readiness to employ it, the cost of such employment, and the likelihood that military action will yield a sustainable outcome. The central question is not whether the United States possesses the power to defeat the Houthis, but rather at what cost it can exert a lasting influence on their behaviour.
If, at a time when the political outcomes of the war involving Iran have yet to fully stabilise, a far smaller actor manages to keep a key U.S. regional partner under pressure for an extended period, the repercussions could extend well beyond Yemen. Iran, Russia, and China would not necessarily conclude that the United States lacks military might; however, Washington’s conduct could reveal insights into its tolerance for costs, the prioritisation of commitments, the conditions for intervention, and its capacity to manage multiple simultaneous crises.
This deduction should not be reduced to the simplistic assumption that refraining from intervention in one crisis automatically diminishes U.S. credibility across all other conflicts. The transferability of credibility depends on the nature of the commitment, the significance of the interests at stake, the similarity of the situations, and how other actors interpret U.S. behaviour. Nevertheless, if the gap between material capacity and political outcomes becomes a recurring pattern, it could influence the calculations of both partners and rivals.
It is precisely here that the asymmetric nature of the U.S.-Saudi relationship becomes more apparent. Riyadh’s costs are primarily material, security-related, and immediate; in contrast, Washington’s costs are primarily strategic, allocative, reputational, and cumulative. While the two are neither equal in magnitude nor of the same nature, they demonstrate that asymmetry does not mean that a disruption in the relationship is cost-free for the more powerful party.
From Managing Consequences to Seeking a Sustainable Solution?
Developments in the Red Sea have complicated this dilemma. In recent contacts in Oman, Houthi representatives stated that they do not intend to target American vessels and will focus their maritime pressure primarily on interests and ships linked to Saudi Arabia. They also emphasised their adherence to the 2025 ceasefire arrangements with the United States. This represents the Houthis’ stated position in the current situation, and its credibility must be assessed on the basis of their actual conduct.
Should their actions remain consistent with this selective pattern, Washington’s predicament will become more complex. Direct U.S. interests might remain somewhat insulated from pressure, while one of its key security partners continues to face military and economic coercion. Under such circumstances, the issue transcends the mere protection of U.S. shipping and touches upon the effectiveness of Washington’s security arrangements in the face of coercion directed at its partners.
At an operational level, U.S. policy in the Red Sea over the past few years has focused largely on managing the consequences of the conflict: protecting shipping, intercepting threats, conducting strikes to degrade Houthi capabilities, imposing sanctions, and negotiating to limit attacks on direct U.S. interests. Indeed, in explaining the 2025 military campaign, the U.S. administration explicitly identified freedom of navigation as a primary objective of the operation.
This policy must be distinguished from Washington’s long-standing support for a political resolution to the war in Yemen; the current debate regarding a “transition from management to resolution” does not imply that the United States previously opposed a political solution. The more precise question is whether Washington might shift from merely managing the immediate consequences that threaten its interests to engaging more actively in the sustainable de-escalation of the Saudi-Houthi conflict and the stabilisation of Red Sea security.
Here, too, a distinction must be drawn among resolving Yemen’s civil war, containing the Saudi-Houthi conflict, and ensuring the security of maritime shipping. While interconnected, these three issues are distinct and may require different political arrangements.
Direct contact between U.S. officials and Houthi representatives in Muscat, alongside Omani mediation, indicates that a diplomatic channel is active; however, this evidence is insufficient to conclude that a formal, established strategy for “conflict resolution” is taking shape. At best, this aligns with the analytical hypothesis that Washington may be gradually concluding that safeguarding its direct interests, without easing pressure on Saudi Arabia or establishing more stable arrangements in the Red Sea, is inadequate for the long-term protection of U.S. regional interests.
Pursuing such a path does not necessarily entail increased military intervention; it could involve a combination of deterrence, defensive support, economic pressure, direct negotiation, Omani mediation, and new political arrangements between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis. The potential advantage of this approach is that it shifts the focus from containing the fallout of attacks to altering the underlying conditions that allow the crisis to repeatedly regenerate.
Success along this path, however, is not guaranteed. If negotiations fail to reduce pressure on Saudi Arabia, if the resulting arrangements safeguard only direct U.S. interests, or if the Houthis retain an effective capacity to exert coercive pressure on Riyadh, the political and security costs of maintaining the status quo will rise for Washington. In that event, the search for a sustainable solution would itself become part of the U.S. predicament.
Washington’s Dilemma and the Issue of Effective Action
At this stage, the central issue is no longer merely how Saudi Arabia will manage its dependency; the United States, too, faces a choice among options, none of which is free of cost or risk.
Direct, large-scale intervention against the Houthis could consume significant resources, heighten the risk of conflict escalation, and entangle Washington in a campaign in which past experience has demonstrated the limitations of a purely military solution. Continuing with limited crisis management might allow the Houthis to maintain a significant capacity for disruption. Furthermore, distancing itself further from Saudi Arabia could incentivise Riyadh to explore alternative security options and influence how other regional partners assess the limits of their cooperation with Washington.
However, the “intervention versus non-intervention” dichotomy oversimplifies the issue. The decisive variable is the expected effectiveness of the action weighed against its costs.
If the United States launches a broader operation but fails to achieve a sustained reduction in the Houthis’ missile, drone, and naval capabilities, or in their ability to impose costs on Saudi Arabia, the situation could become even more difficult for Washington. Such an operation would not only consume more resources but, absent a commensurate outcome, would also draw greater attention to questions regarding the effectiveness of American power. For the Houthis, retaining a substantial portion of their operational capacity following a major campaign could serve as a source of political and propaganda capital.
Consequently, factors such as the cost of action, the probability of success, the durability of the outcome, the risk of escalation, the opportunity cost of resource allocation, and the repercussions of failure or partial success must all be factored into the U.S. calculus. The experience of the Iran war has made the significance of these variables more tangible: Washington must weigh not only the direct costs of opening a new front but also the impact that increased consumption of munitions and defence systems would have on its readiness to meet other commitments.
In other words, the United States does not face a shortage of options; rather, it lacks an option that is simultaneously low-cost, low-risk, and likely to yield enduring success.
The issue of normalising relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel takes on significance within this same framework, though it should not be viewed merely as a function of the security relationship between Riyadh and Washington. The Palestinian issue, the situation in Gaza, and Saudi demands regarding a pathway to a Palestinian state remain critical, independent variables in Riyadh’s calculations. U.S. security support is, therefore, one component of the political price of normalisation, not the sole determining factor.
Nevertheless, as the gap widens between the security costs imposed on Saudi Arabia and the level of support it receives from the United States, Riyadh’s security bargaining position within any broader deal with Washington will become increasingly significant. From this perspective, normalisation could, alongside other factors, emerge as a key negotiating lever for Saudi Arabia.
In this context, two general paths are conceivable. Washington might incorporate enhanced security support, including support regarding the Houthis, into a broader political agreement with Riyadh. However, another possibility exists: if Houthi pressure and the security and strategic costs of maintaining the status quo escalate, the United States might be compelled to alter the level or nature of its intervention before such a comprehensive deal is reached. The premise of this analysis is that the continuation of current trends could increase the likelihood of this second scenario.
The mechanism underlying this hypothesis involves a combination of pressures: sustained pressure on Saudi Arabia, rising costs of defence support, constraints arising from the allocation of U.S. resources across multiple crises, the risk of eroding partner confidence, and Riyadh’s growing incentive to develop external alternatives. While no single factor would force Washington to alter its policy, their cumulative effect could shift the cost-benefit calculus of maintaining the status quo.
This argument does not advocate for a wider war. A more sustainable strategy for Washington would likely need to combine credible deterrence and defence support for Saudi Arabia with political arrangements designed to reduce both the incentive for continued conflict and the Houthis’ capacity for disruption. The primary challenge lies in identifying a combination that is militarily credible, politically sustainable, and compatible with other U.S. strategic priorities regarding resource allocation.
Conclusion
The net result of these developments is, therefore, neither the end of the U.S.-Saudi partnership nor Riyadh’s imminent departure from Washington’s orbit, but rather a redefinition of the political terms of the two nations’ asymmetric interdependence. To date, Saudi Arabia has sought to mitigate some of the costs associated with this dependency through regional de-escalation, the diversification of energy routes, and the cultivation of complementary partners. While these measures have significant limitations, they demonstrate Riyadh’s intent to expand its external options and reduce the concentration of its vulnerabilities.
On the other hand, Washington’s decisions regarding the extent of its support for Saudi Arabia have become a decisive factor in the future trajectory of the relationship, though that trajectory remains influenced by Saudi Arabia’s own agency, the actions of the Houthis, Iranian policy, the Palestinian issue, and broader regional developments. The question remains: Will the United States incur greater costs to bolster the efficacy of existing security arrangements? Will it manage to shift its Red Sea policy from mere consequence management to a more sustainable framework? Or will it accept a degree of distancing that further incentivises Saudi Arabia to pursue strategic diversification?
Should Houthi pressure persist and existing defensive, intelligence, and diplomatic tools fail to contain it at an acceptable level, the cost of maintaining the status quo could rise for the United States. This is not because Washington faces the same immediate, direct vulnerability as Riyadh, but rather because of the cumulative repercussions for resource allocation, the effectiveness of regional security architectures, partner confidence, and the calculations of rivals.
Ultimately, the decisive question is no longer whether the United States possesses the capacity to alter the status quo. The more important question is when, and with what combination of political and military tools, and with what degree of confidence in their effectiveness, Washington will conclude that the cost of maintaining the status quo has come to exceed the cost of changing it.
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