EU’s Limited Response on Belarus and Turkey Following the Gymnich Meeting

Introduction

After the two-day informal meeting in Berlin on 27 and 28 August, foreign ministers of EU member states agreed on moving ahead with sanctions against Belarus. They hinted as well at possible sanctions on Turkey if it did not scale back its drilling activities in the disputed waters in the eastern Mediterranean region. The Gymnich meeting, as it is called, can be interpreted as the EU showing seriousness regarding the events along its eastern and southern borders. However, looking more closely, the meeting highlights the severe constraints faced by the EU in its response to the geopolitical unfoldings of these two regions.

Response on Belarus

On its eastern periphery, tensions are brewing in Belarus, following August’s presidential election, which saw President Alexander Lukashenko emerge victorious with 80 percent of the vote. Protests since then have followed, with many voicing their concerns over the legitimacy of the election results, and demanding Lukashenko’s resignation. Even the labour sector- considered a strong support base of Lukashenko- has joined the protesters. Sviatlana Tikhanovskaya who contested the presidential election as the surprise replacement for her husband, Sergei Tikhanovsky (arrested on charges of inciting violence), has fled the country after the election day. From Lithuania, she has been operationalizing her efforts to form a coordination group aimed at the transfer of political power in the country.

Several countries including Russia, China, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan have accepted the election result and have called for non-interference in Belarus’s internal affairs. EU member states, on the other hand, have refused to recognize the result and instead called for the imposition of sanctions against individuals involved in electoral fraud and crackdown on protesters. So far, the member states have agreed on 20 names, with the list likely to expand in the coming days.

What is happening in Belarus is of significant concern to the EU given its geopolitical importance as a buffer state. Until now, Belarus had maintained the policy of balancing between Russia and the West. However, efforts by Poland and Lithuania who have been the most supportive of the opposition in Belarus suggest that the two countries want to tilt the balance in West’s favour — by supporting opposition and likely pro-Western political change in Minsk. To that extent, Poland was the first to call for an emergency European Union summit on the political situation in Belarus right after Lukashenko declared victory. Similarly, Lithuania not only housed Sviatlana Tikhanovskaya but, along with the foreign ministers of Estonia and Latvia, has banned Lukashenko and 30 other Belarusian officials from entering the Baltic countries. To further weaken Lukashenko’s position, the Baltic countries have decided to halt electricity trade by 2021. No doubt Poland and Lithuania have their interests in Belarus. Strengthening the eastern flank has been among their top foreign policy priorities. Attention on Belarus and a strong EU response could work in their interest and strengthen their position vis-à-vis Russia.

However, the EU has been more careful in formulating its response. Their care is reflected in its decision to sanction only a few selected individuals, as the outcome of the Gymnich meeting suggests. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the EU is dealing with several issues, most importantly, managing the economic fallout of the pandemic. With a 1.83 trillion-euro budget and Coronavirus recovery package, the EU’s attention is more inward then outward. Second, Western European countries have little appetite as to what happens in Belarus. France and Germany are more interested in having a manageable relationship with Russia than offsetting the balance in Belarus which may prove counterproductive for their foreign policy objectives. Likewise, Southern European countries, for instance, Italy, Greece, and Cyprus are more concerned about Turkey’s aggressive manoeuvres in the eastern Mediterranean than fighting for the cause of democracy in Belarus. Cyprus even tried to block the sanctions on Belarus unless the EU agreed to put pressure on Turkey.

Therefore, what the EU foreign leaders agreed to in Berlin is a more calculative response then what may otherwise suggest. Not recognizing the election results and sanctioning few individuals is the best the EU can do to showcase that it cares about the events unfolding on its eastern flank without spoiling its relations with Russia.

Russia for its part too is equally concerned with the events in Belarus. Belarus, after all, is the only remaining western buffer it has. Therefore, it is in Russia’s interest that events in Belarus do not spiral out of control. So far, Moscow has not intervened military in Belarus although Putin did mention that Russia has set up a backup law enforcement unit on the request of President Lukashenko. From Moscow’s perspective, the importance of Belarus cannot be overstated, and hence it would want to keep Belarus pro-Russian or at least neutral in case a political change does occur. If the Lukashenko regime survives the protests, the sanctions which the EU will implement will hinder Minsk’s relationship with Brussels, thereby giving Moscow an edge over its engagement with Lukashenko.

Response on Turkey

As limited as the EU’s response has been on Belarus, similar is the case with Turkey. Turkey for the better part of this year has pursued an aggressive foreign policy in the eastern Mediterranean region. In February, it allowed thousands of migrants to cross borders and enter Greece, irking the EU. In June, French foreign ministry accused the Turkish navy of acting in a hostile manner and preventing it from enforcing a United Nations arms embargo on Libya.

Moreover, in recent weeks, Turkey has upped the ante with Greece and Cyprus by engaging in energy exploration activities in the disputed waters, guarded by its fighter jets and warships. Discovery of hydrocarbons along its periphery have piqued Ankara’s interest as its need for energy has increased over the years and domestic production has proven inadequate to meet the local demand. According to a 2019 OECD report, Turkey relied on imports to meet more than 80% of its total energy needs, with oil and natural gas coming from countries like Russia, Iran, the US, Qatar, and Azerbaijan.

Therefore, diversifying its suppliers, and reducing its reliance on countries that are hostile to Turkey has become a fundamental principle of its energy policy. The discovery of new sources of energy in the Mediterranean offers Turkey that opportunity. This explains why Turkey was so anxious about signing a maritime agreement with the Libyan GNA last year and renewing gas exploration activities in areas that Greece considered as its economic zone. Turkey’s action prompted Greece and Egypt to sign a maritime boundary agreement of their own. Greece along with Cyprus, France and Italy have also started joint naval and air drills of the coast of Cyprus to deter Turkey’s action and defend freedom of navigation.

However, these measures are likely not going to deter Turkey’s ambition. In fact, the Erdogan administration is using the rhetoric of growing anti-Turkey coalition in the Mediterranean to pursue its doctrine of Blue Homeland or Mavi Vatan. The doctrine envisages Turkey to have greater control over the Mediterranean region and reclaim the mercantile and maritime supremacy that the Ottomans once had. At its heart, the doctrine supports the idea of Turkey’s geographical location as its strength- giving the country strategic depth.

Moreover, Turkey is also aware of the fact that the EU will find it difficult to formulate an aggressive response and would instead focus on finding a diplomatic solution to the problem, giving it room to use the strategy of ‘escalate to deescalate’. The lack of unanimity and insistence on diplomacy is precisely what the outcome of the Gymnich meeting displayed. Led by Greece, France and Cyprus wanted to implement sanctions on Turkey. Instead what the member states agree on was using the threat of sanctions to incentives Turkey to change its behaviour and scale down its activities. Germany, which holds the European Union’s rotating presidency, insists on diplomacy as the way forward. This is partially because of Germany’s adopted identity of civilian power which makes it fearful of using more assertive and militaristic policies thus favouring co-operation and multilateralism. Moreover, Germany and the EU are concerned about the breakdown of the refugee deal with Turkey which could send waves of refugees to the European borders similar to the situation in 2015-16. Erdogan is aware of EU vulnerabilities and knows how to exert back the pressure. Unless EU adopts a more assertive geopolitical face, it will find itself with limited options.