Europe and the Western Balkan’s Multipolar Moment
An analysis of how Western Balkan nations have evolved to become a strategic priority for European security and the EU’s revitalized enlargement plan.
The recent extension of Serbia’s gas deal with Russia, while it continues to cultivate its Strategic Partnership with the European Union (EU) on critical minerals, draws attention to the EU’s revitalized enlargement plan to integrate Western Balkan (WB6) countries (Reuters,2026). The enlargement strategy aims to create a security union enhancing EU’s defence capabilities in the wake of geopolitical tensions instigated by Russia-Ukraine conflict. Simultaneously, it counters the increasing influence of China and Russia in the region (ECFR,2025).
Since the onset of the Russia- Ukraine conflict in 2022, Western Balkan countries (WB6) have evolved to become a high-stakes strategic priority for European security. The region, often described as a “geopolitical chessboard”, is a critical geopolitical “frontier” for external powers like the United States, Russia, and China.
WB6: Between Strategic Priority and Strategic Risk
Expertise in producing military assets, dual use infrastructure, existing industrial bases, and the strategic location of the western Balkans are adding value to Europe’s push for self-reliance and regional integration on the defence front. The pursuit of EU’s transactional and sector specific proximity building initiative is at the expense of liberal norms as the accession process of the WB6 increasingly focuses on external threats instead of legitimizing their commitment to EU’s long standing democratic values (CIDOB, 2025).
The EU’s partnership agreement with Serbia, following the decision to reduce critical mineral dependence on China, has been criticised for undermining Serbia’s fragile rule of law and their social and environmental standards (SWP, 2025). In addition, Bosnia & Herzegovina are also experiencing a quiet surge in exploration projects. The dominant perception in resource rich WB6 countries is that weak governance has enabled international companies to avoid scrutiny in mining (European Western Balkans, 2025). Beyond WB6, the EU’s rush to secure strategic minerals for defence modernisation from Sweden, Portugal, and Spain has fueled objections from green groups for not undergoing compliance assessment as per EU environmental laws standards (Climate Home News,2025).
Critics argue there is a heightened risk of regional fragmentation under the EU’s one-size-fits-all solution as the Western Balkans countries have separate interests, different political temperament, and interest-based ties with Russia (CIDOB, 2025). The ongoing developments in EU–Western Balkans defence cooperation lack EU’s long standing tailored approach towards building sustaining regional integration such as the Berlin Process, Belgrade- Pristina dialogue, and efforts to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo. Moreover, five Member States (Cyprus, Greece, Slovakia, Spain and Romania) have yet to recognize Kosovo’s independence.
The inter-dynamics of defence cooperation within WB6 countries are just as equally complex. Serbia denounced the 2022 Tirana Declaration, a push for regional stability, for threatening its sovereignty as it aimed to enhance defence capabilities of signatory nations of Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo. Such contestations remain an obstacle for collective security objectives. Serbia’s reciprocal defence cooperation agreement with Hungary and Slovakia also risks emboldening their longstanding rivalry with Croatia (CIDOB,2025).
Balkan’s Multipolar Moment
The slow pace of EU enlargement has enabled other actors like Russia, China, Turkey, and the United States to expand their influence. Significant differences remain among the WB6 countries on the issue of Russia. For example, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska have not yet imposed sanctions on Russia.
Overall, the foreign policy of the WB6 countries remain fragmented. While Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia are strongly pro-Western and aligned with EU/NATO, Serbia pursues a multi-vector policy with the EU, US, Russia, and China. Although Serbia maintains military neutrality, it has not joined EU sanctions on Russia. Bosnia and Herzegovina (fragmented by ethnic divisions) composed of the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska tilts toward the West, Serbia, Russia, or China respectively. Given the complex circumstances, Kosovo has mainly prioritized securing its international recognition and EU integration.
Nourishing the regional cleavages is a strategic advantage for Russia as it hinders full Balkans’ integration with western institutions. Reports claim Moscow “retains some influential political and energy levers in the region” through their ties with Serbia (ISPI, 2025). Furthermore, Russia has refused to recognize Kosovo’s independence, a policy priority for Serbia. Unlike other EU members, Serbia is heavily dependent on Russian gas.
Besides Russia, the ‘China’ question is missing from the EU’s enlargement strategy. Montenegro’s almost collapse into China’s debt trap in 2021 has not triggered any major critical debate in the WB6 policy circuit (ECFR,2025). WB6 countries choose to maintain interest-based dynamics, while Serbia mostly engages with Beijing. Education is emerging as a quieter channel where China is shaping its perceptions in the Balkans through university scholarships and student exchanges (RFERL, 2026).
The US remains a dominant security actor for Kosovo, Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro; however, Russia’s tactical moves, China’s soft presence, and the Russia-Ukraine war have all increasingly conditioned the US strategic bandwidth in the region. Selective non-alignment, hedging, and issue-based bargaining all shape the divergent trajectories of WB6 countries.
Normative Risks and Economic Opportunities
The EU’s enlargement plan holds normative risks and economic opportunities. Their longstanding normative commitment to democratic values has given legitimacy to its criticism towards China. Driven by the urgency of defence modernisation and geographic security, the EU’s proximity to WB6 might affect its narrative governing in future foreign policies. Additionally, it raises key questions about the inter-dynamics of defence cooperation among the EU nations once the plan is effective. Particularly, Serbia’s close ties with Russia puts EU’s strategic mineral deal in a complex rubric with the aim of defence modernisation and security of its frontiers from Russia.
The push for economic diplomacy of WB6 countries has remained limited to intra-regional efforts with little external engagement. Led by strong India- Serbia ties, WB6 economic diplomacy with South Asian countries has remained restrained. The enlargement plan holds opportunities for non-EU nations, especially small nation states, to plan an easy entry to the EU market economy. This gives more opportunity for WB6 countries to diversify from the EU market amid global fragmentation.
For Europe, WB6 is emerging as a testing ground for geopolitical credibility instead of a passive backyard. The EU will have to address the challenges that stem from disagreements and complex dynamics prevalent among the WB6 nations to win the normative narrative.
Bibliography
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CIDOB, ‘The Risks of a Reinvigorated EU-Western Balkans Defence Cooperation’, December 2025.URL: https://www.cidob.org/publicaciones/risks-reinvigorated-eu-western-balkans-defence-cooperation
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