Energy Crisis Hits Moldova

Moldova remains heavily dependent on Russian energy imports and as a result has recently faced repeated energy crises, particularly when subjected to supply cuts from Moscow. Since the war in Ukraine began in 2014, Moldova has felt the impact acutely, with its energy security further weakened by near-total reliance on Russian gas. The Kremlin has used energy as a geopolitical weapon, pressuring Moldova and influencing its foreign policy.

In October 2021, Gazprom—Moldova’s primary energy supplier—cut gas deliveries and raised prices, plunging the country into a state of emergency. The situation deteriorated further following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, escalating Moldova’s energy insecurity and forcing Chișinău to seek alternative energy sources.

Fig 1 –

The data in figure 1 shows a steep decline in the imported electricity and gas from the outset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and follows the decline through 2022 and 2023. That is due to the decreased supply of gas and electricity that Russia has been willing to provide to Moldova along with the limited supply that other countries, primarily, Romania were able to offer to Chisinau.

Fig. 2 – The structure of natural gas providers in Moldova

Figure 2 shows how Moldova has diversified its energy sources since 2023, shifting to Energocom as its main provider. This has reduced Moldovagaz, the provider of Russian gas, to just 0.2% of its imports, according to a report by the National Agency of Energy Regulation of the Republic of Moldova (ANRE, 2023). The second figure provides a clearer picture of Moldova’s current energy situation. When analysed alongside previous data, it highlights a discrepancy between Moldova’s pre-war Russian gas imports and its current alternative supply routes.

The Cost of Diversification

Diversification has come at a cost, with alternative suppliers charging higher prices, the rising energy costs in Moldova have a ripple effect on businesses and households alike. While the power supply is currently sufficient, base electricity tariffs have surged by 75% to 4.1 lei per kWh, as approved by ANRE (Euractiv, 2025). Thus, economically, uncertainty may go beyond public dissatisfaction and may erode investor confidence, slowing down foreign investment and economic growth.

The Energy Crisis

The expiration of the Russia-Ukraine gas transit contract in December 2024, means there is no longer a corridor for Russian gas to reach Moldova. Additionally, Gazprom’s suspension of supplies under the pretext of a $709 million debt has left Transnistria in crisis. Heavily reliant on Russian gas, the region faces a potential humanitarian disaster. Research from Crisis Group (2024) indicates that schools and kinder gardens are without heat, while 72,000 households lack gas. If the crisis persists, mass migration from Transnistria is inevitable.

Previously, Transnistria’s Moldovan State District Power Plant used free Russian gas to generate electricity, supplying both Transnistria and the right bank. This arrangement benefited both Tiraspol, which secured foreign currency, and Chișinău, which obtained cheaper electricity (Solovyov, 2025). However, with this trade ceasing on January 1st, both Moldova and Transnistria must now navigate a crisis that has already engulfed the rest of the country.

Wider Political Implications

Energy price hikes will reverberate across every sector, destabilising the economy and intensifying political tensions. This presents an opportunity for Eurosceptic and pro-Russian forces to gain ground in Moldova.

The energy crisis cannot, however, be viewed solely through an economic or social lens—it is deeply political, especially with parliamentary elections approaching. As Sarah Rainsford highlighted in a BBC report, the crisis has already fueled Russian disinformation campaigns. Even during the presidential elections, Russia’s SVR intelligence agency falsely accused Maia Sandu of planning to retake Transnistria by force to regain control over energy supplies (Rainsford, 2025).

The crisis has had tangible political consequences, including the dismissal of Moldova’s Energy Minister, Victor Parlicov, in December 2024 due to mounting pressure over the energy situation. Now, with Gazprom halting all trade with Transnistria—the only gas supplier for the separatist region—Moldova faces an even more precarious situation. A shift towards Russia would create a hostile environment for foreign private investment in Moldova.

Furthermore, business relations with Moldova’s closest ally and primary trade partner, Romania, are likely to be impacted by the looming crisis. As Moldova faces growing instability in the coming months, market confidence may decline, potentially discouraging private investment. While Romania will undoubtedly continue its support, its own political turbulence—following the annulment of the first round of presidential elections in December—adds another layer of uncertainty to the economic landscape.

As Moldova struggles to navigate this crisis, the coming months will be crucial in shaping both its energy security and political trajectory.

Looking Ahead: The Need for Energy Diversification

The only viable solution for Moldova in the foreseeable future is to expedite its energy diversification efforts. Energy transition means greater independence for Moldova, and increasing its capacity for renewable energy production will enhance domestic stability.

The funds received from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the United States should be partially allocated to building infrastructure that supports renewable energy production. As noted by the IEA (2022), Moldova’s largely agricultural economy presents significant potential for developing biomass energy. Decarbonising its energy supply can provide the much-needed security Moldova currently lacks.

A shift towards renewable energy for electricity generation remains an underdeveloped sector that could reduce Moldova’s reliance on external suppliers. Strengthening its energy transition efforts will also aid Moldova’s EU accession process. For this reason, Chisinău’s absolute commitment to its Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) 2025-2030 is essential for the country’s future security (UNDP, 2024).

Decarbonisation and ambitious renewable energy targets are not just economic necessities; they represent Moldova’s best defence against an increasingly aggressive Russia and its destabilisation tactics.

Bibliography

ANRE (2023). The activity report. [online] Anre.md. Available at: https://www.anre.md/en/raport-de-activitate-2-10 [Accessed 12 Feb. 2025].

Crisisgroup.org. (2025). Securing Moldova’s Future as the Gas Runs Low | Crisis Group. [online] Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/moldova/securing-moldovas-future-gas-runs-low [Accessed 12 Feb. 2025].

IEA (2022). Overview – System Integration of Renewables in Moldova: A Roadmap – Analysis. [online] IEA. Available at: https://www.iea.org/reports/system-integration-of-renewables-in-moldova-a-roadmap/overview.

Moldovei, S. (2025). Energy. [online] Energy. Available at: https://statistica.gov.md/en/statistic_indicator_details/14 [Accessed 12 Feb. 2025].

Rainsford, S. (2025). Moldova faces energy crisis as flow of Russian gas ends. BBC News. [online] 1 Jan. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cy8ymx50kz8o.

Solovyov, V. (2025). Moscow Sees Transnistria Gas Crisis as an Opportunity to Wreak Havoc in Moldova. [online] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/01/moldova-crisis-transnistria-politics?lang=en [Accessed 12 Feb. 2025].

UNDP (2024). The Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan – a roadmap for green economy and energy – was publicly consulted. [online] UNDP. Available at: https://www.undp.org/moldova/press-releases/integrated-national-energy-and-climate-plan-roadmap-green-economy-and-energy-was-publicly-consulted.