The Race for Critical Minerals: Can the Shield of the Americas Challenge China’s Grip on Supply Chains?
Washington’s Shield of the Americas seeks to challenge China’s grip on critical minerals, but diplomatic partnerships alone cannot overcome decades of industrial dominance.
The United States and Colombia announced renewed cooperation after signing a Memorandum of Understanding targeting critical minerals and rare earths extraction. More recently, Paraguay joined the Pax Silica initiative, pledging to leverage its critical-mineral potential on behalf of its North American counterpart. Last in a series of bilateral partnerships, the United States drew a pattern of securing critical mineral supplies across the Americas, which all point to a broader shift in U.S. hemispheric strategy: access to strategic resources increasingly ties to regional security and economic alignment. Precisely, the members of the Shield of the Americas gathered and jointly declared the integration of supply diversification into the economic dimension of the coalition (U.S. Department of State, 2026b). However, could a growing network of partnerships genuinely challenge China’s industrial dominance? Transforming diplomatic commitments into a viable alternative to established Chinese supply chains will be difficult, especially given China’s entrenched position in mineral processing and its rooted influence across South America.
Critical Minerals as the Strategic Chokepoint in U.S.-China Competition
Now cornerstones of industrial competitiveness and national security, critical minerals underpin the advanced technologies that run our lives, from defense systems and semiconductors to electronics, transportation, and clean energy. Rare earth elements (REEs), by contrast, are a specific group of 17 metallic elements that form a subset of critical minerals (Li, 2025) and are known for being difficult to extract and separate. Processing technologies remain highly concentrated: simply put, China has built industrial-scale capacity and technical expertise to dominate rare-earth separation and refining. Its dominance accounts for 91% of global refined output of magnet rare earths in 2024, and it holds roughly an 85% share of rare-earth refining (IEA, 2026a).
This downstream dominance grants China significant geoeconomic leverage and the capacity to disrupt supply chains (Szczepański, 2025), and Beijing has shown no reluctance to demonstrate the significant power it holds. This past year, China imposed a series of export controls on seven critical rare-earth components. Nonetheless, Beijing decided to suspend those controls until November 2026 (Szczepański, 2025; Baskaran and Schwartz, 2025), reminding us of its crucial advantage over the industry.
Breaking this bottleneck has recently prompted Washington to diversify and secure supplies. Naturally, the Trump administration resorted to exploiting possibilities with partner countries, notably South America, which holds significant deposits of several strategic minerals. Safeguarding mineral sourcing positions neighboring nations to play a key role in the race for mineral access, especially through initiatives like the Shield of the Americas.
The U.S.’s Bid to Reshape the Americas: Integrating Resource Supply into Hemispheric Security
The Trump administration has sought to link its hemispheric security agenda to broader efforts to diversify critical supply chains, using what was once conceived as a multilateral counter-cartel initiative to loosen China’s influence over South America and control over critical supply chains.
Held for the first time in early March 2026, the Shield of the Americas conference was solely intended to consolidate efforts around fighting off the expansion of transnational gangs and narcotrafficking networks. The growing political emphasis on security in several Latin American countries has created opportunities for Washington to amplify cooperation through this structure and advance its own strategic priorities. Hence, the initial point quickly shifted to structuring a coalition, building on interstate commitments toward shared security objectives. Indeed, the Trump administration “had already identified the Western Hemisphere, strategic resources, critical supply chains and regional economic relationships as national security priorities” in the 2025 National Security Strategy (Rivera Muñoz and Zamanillo, 2026). The logical next step was to aggressively implement the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine through this new regional framework and structure shared geoeconomic objectives.
The fifteen members of the SotA officially pledged to defend hemispheric sovereignty through three core pillars: economic cooperation, security, and multilateral coordination. Among other things, the coalition members committed to defending their economies by “exploring investment screening mechanisms; safeguarding critical minerals supply chains through diversified and reliable sourcing”, as specified in the Joint Statement on Defending Hemispheric Sovereignty (U.S. Department of State, 2026b).
The administration thus accelerated the development of cooperation frameworks worldwide and across the continent, building on the orientations set by the first Critical Minerals Ministerial (U.S. Department of State, 2026a). Alongside its bilateral agreements, the United States sought to scale up investments since 2022, pumping more than $1 billion into the sector as of 2025 (Campbell and De la Hoz, 2026). More recently, Trump revamped the friendshoring initiative created by his predecessor to strengthen multilateral coordination with the creation of the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE) in February 2026. For instance, the first Ministerial led to the creation of 11 new bilateral agreements or MoUs, including four involving South American SotA members.
Such an acceleration in partnerships clearly aims to address the Donroe Doctrine’s main priorities: prevent great-power adversaries from controlling or operating critical assets in the Western Hemisphere (Berg, 2026) and secure strategic geographies. Taken together, these initiatives reflect Washington’s broader efforts to reinforce its strategic position in the Western Hemisphere, using the continent’s right-leaning shift to reaffirm its presence.
From Mineral Access to Industrial Independence?
China’s processing dominance doesn’t necessarily reflect resource concentration or mining dominance. As shown in the data visualization, South America sits on a mineral treasure chest, yet abundance alone confers no industrial leverage, as value is created downstream.
After tightly weaving a diplomatic architecture around critical minerals, Washington now faces the challenge of translating these frameworks into a competitive supply chain and catching up to a deeply entrenched industrial ecosystem built over several decades. This will require substantial investment in extraction, processing, and industrial infrastructure, as well as time: a 2010 report issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office cited industry estimates that rebuilding a domestic rare-earth supply chain could take up to 15 years (Berg, 2026; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010). This report highlighted a warning that remains relevant today: developing domestic capabilities will be delayed by the need to develop new technologies and overcome reliance on patents and expertise held abroad (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010).
Although committing substantial funding to build and operate domestic midstream processing facilities (Carl-Yoder et al., 2026), a major gap remains between financial commitments and operational capacity. The time required to scale operations industrially, acquire technical expertise, and bring new facilities online is a concrete obstacle to the implementation of a resilient supply chain for the U.S.
More broadly, the West is standing up to a giant running an “industrial fortress” built through decades of state-sponsored R&D funding. Beijing has carefully paved the way to create a technology lock by mastering processing technologies the West largely abandoned because of their environmental costs (Zhang, 2025). Lower production costs and more permissive environmental policies let Chinese producers consolidate their competitive advantage, while training tens of thousands of engineers and building an industrial ecosystem that is difficult to replicate (Zhang, 2025). China has since reinforced this advantage by prohibiting exports of processing technologies and weaponizing its monopoly, using lawfare and export controls.
Holding this monopoly grants China the power to delay the development of alternative capabilities and to spread its influence worldwide, especially in strategic geographies such as South America (Pintle, 2026).
An Inoffensive Diplomatic Architecture or Ready-Made Framework for Extraction?
Figure 1. Critical mineral resources across Latin America. Sources: Latinometrics (2026), U.S. Geological Survey (2026), and International Energy Agency (2026).
The geographical distribution of selected mineral deposits and exploration projects across South America illustrates the region’s strategic potential for supply-chain diversification. The underlying data include projects at different stages of exploration, feasibility assessment, and development. The region’s mineral endowment is also unevenly distributed, yet the region’s mineral wealth represents a strategic opportunity for supply diversification and reducing vulnerabilities. With known and commercially exploited lithium deposits spread across Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile, the Lithium Triangle’s share accounts for roughly 43% of the world’s identified resources (Frolova, 2026). Neighboring significant copper reserves in Chile and Peru (respectively 18.4% and 8.7% of the world’s reserves), Brazil holds around one-quarter of global known rare earth reserves, with one of the largest ionic clay deposits in Serra Verde (USGS, 2026).
The Shield of the Americas offers Washington a ready-made framework to exploit this potential. Yet, signing a memorandum does not produce minerals: Colombia’s critical mineral potential remains largely unexplored and under-mapped (U.S. International Trade Administration, 2026a), and the MoU only commits both countries to identify projects within six months (Morung Express, 2026). Guyana is only starting to map its potential in manganese, rare earths, copper, and nickel, where insufficient geological data and limited road access have long deterred large-scale developments (U.S. International Trade Administration, 2026b). Venezuela, meanwhile, has its potential undermined by outdated geological data and illegal mining controlled by subversive groups in the Orinoco Mining Arc (Reuters, 2026). And finally, Washington does not start from a blank page: Chinese investors have established a significant presence across South America’s mining sector through acquisitions, greenfield projects, and other investment commitments. The Regional Repository of Chinese Investments in South America records projects across several countries and mineral sectors, illustrating the breadth of this involvement.
Figure 2. Chinese mining investments in Latin America. Sources: Pintle (2026), S&P Global, and the Regional Repository of Chinese Investments in Latin America (2024).
MMG Ltd., Guoxin International Investment Co. Ltd., CITIC Metal Co. Ltd., CMOC Group Ltd., and Baiyin Nonferrous Group Co. Ltd. are just a few examples. As the map shows, Chinese state-owned companies have entered the region’s extraction and processing value chains. Their investments, which span a range of assets and commodities, from copper and iron ore to lithium and niobium, have reached $10.05 billion since 2014 (Pintle, 2026). This established presence carved out a significant advantage for China in strategic parts of the continent, although the extent of state ownership and control varies between investors. In particular, Chinese state-owned companies hold a controlling 62.5% interest in one of the major copper-producing operators, the Las Bambas mine, located in Peru (Pintle, 2026).
Can Washington Actively Reclaim the Americas?
Since the turn of the century, China has unmistakably established itself as a major economic partner for the region, becoming the second-largest trading partner with a 37.3% share in 2023, right behind the U.S. (Jütten, 2025). Beyond consolidating its influence through significant loans and investments spanning energy, infrastructure, and telecommunications industries, critical minerals exploitation has become the cornerstone of this presence.
Besides maintaining mineral interests in twelve countries of South America (Heduvan, 2025) and signing more than 20 cooperation agreements through the Belt and Road Initiative (Pintle, 2026), Beijing has already implemented ambitious mega-projects. The megaport of Chancay in Peru, considered the “largest Chinese port in the hemisphere” by U.S. Congress member María Elvira Salazar, illustrates how this economic presence can translate into long-term logistical advantage (Delgado, 2026).
Majority-owned by China’s COSCO Shipping Ports, the deep-water port has become a major link between South America and Asian markets. Its strategic importance could further grow through planned transport connections to mineral-extraction areas in the Andean highlands (Delgado, 2026), a project entrusted to the Power Construction Corporation of China. Yet another piece of a wider pattern of Beijing’s involvement in the region’s mining sector (Rare Earth Exchanges, 2026), the port holds the capacity and infrastructure to link every step, from extraction to shipping abroad, into one seamless logistics chain (Heduvan, 2026).
Even if Washington partly secures access to South America’s mineral resources and gradually develops alternative capacity, this would not automatically trigger economic decoupling from Beijing, nor would it establish a competitive supply chain. South American economies continue to have strong commercial incentives to maintain relations with China, while the continent’s rightward political shift, very convenient to Washington, could wear off sooner than expected. On the other hand, South American countries will have to reaffirm their sovereignty over resources by exploring alternative economic options. That is, capturing a greater share of the value generated by their mineral resources and finally evading Chinese or American predation.
There is no need to reiterate the point made by Galeano in his book *Open Veins of Latin America*: mineral resources rarely benefit the inhabitants of the lands that are actively exploited, and growing demands are bringing the question of resource sovereignty back to the forefront of public debate. Furthermore, concerns about pollution and the harmful effects of this activity remind us that carrying out the energy transition comes at the expense of some (Plan Colibrí et al., 2026), as the extraction of these minerals is necessary yet extremely polluting. These demands open the door to new developments: affected communities have long sought to assert their sovereign rights over resources and reconcile their exploitation with their own understanding of the territory itself (Plan Colibrí et al., 2026).
From Mineral Diplomacy to Viable Supply Chains: Policy Priorities
Displacing the influence over critical mineral supply chains—across the world and within South America—will require far more than frameworks.
Diplomatic commitments are merely a starting point: Washington will have to step up its game and adopt a more operational approach. This includes conducting geological surveys, scaling up processing capacity, and building logistics that do not exist yet, to efficiently counter a competitor that has already stepped into the so-called “backyard”.
First, the SotA could provide a framework for expanding geological mapping and resource assessments in partner countries whose mining industries remain underdeveloped. Improving geological data and making exploration information more accessible is a key step. The foundations to realize it have since been laid out through the signing of bilateral partnerships (U.S. Department of State, 2026c); mobilizing the United States Geological Survey, national mining authorities, and geological entities could establish concrete technical cooperation. This, however, will require sustained funding, technical capacity, and clear agreements on data ownership and national sovereignty.
Second, Washington will have to sustain and expand economic support for midstream capacity development. Making midstream production commercially competitive with Chinese operations represents an expensive, time-consuming undertaking: replicating a China-West supply chain could cost the U.S. more than US$13.7 trillion by 2050 in investment across public and private entities (Gonçalves, 2026). Given the costs associated with water, energy, and transport infrastructure, higher production costs, and volatile mineral prices, a de-risking and gradual diversification strategy is much more realistic than pursuing a complete structural break. Sustaining and gradually increasing investment through development institutions like the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank, alongside multilateral lenders like the Inter-American Development Bank (FTI Consulting, 2026; U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, 2026), could help mobilize the necessary funding to achieve this objective.
Third, South American governments should make capturing a greater share of the value generated a mandatory condition for developing strategic partnerships through the SotA. National authorities, regional development institutions, and private investors should prioritize skills development, technology transfer, and opportunities for domestic suppliers, rather than focusing exclusively on mineral extraction and exports. Strengthening industrial capacity in the intermediate stages of production between extraction and high-value manufacturing could therefore reshape the continent’s development and place critical minerals at the core of economic transformation.
However, these objectives must be accompanied by credible environmental safeguards and meaningful consultation with exposed communities, especially Indigenous peoples across the Americas. This dimension also calls for agreement over common environmental indicators, transparent reporting mechanisms, and sustained engagement with communities throughout the project cycle. As highlighted by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), stronger regional cooperation could allow the completion of these objectives while fostering technological cooperation and placing the alignment of critical mineral strategies with climate and development goals at the center of the debate (UNCTAD, 2026). Whether pursued through the SotA or through existing regional institutions, such cooperation must keep sights set on resource sovereignty, integrate effective governance, and sustainably benefit member countries.
The Limits of Washington’s Bid to Reclaim the Hemisphere
The Shield of the Americas may provide a foundation to foster economic and political cooperation, but it is not, in itself, a route to industrial independence. A thriving network of partnerships around critical minerals cannot simply challenge China yet; the industrial leader holds advantages that are hardly reversible in the short term. Besides maintaining extensive investments in industrial development, countering these dependencies will require a much longer timeframe than diplomatic agreements alone can deliver. Time will be the most critical resource here.
More importantly, the outcome will not be determined by Washington and Beijing alone: South American governments must retain agency over their resources and partnerships. Reproducing an extractive model centered on exporting raw materials risks reinforcing the very dependencies Washington claims to challenge and replicating a predatory model that has long been criticized. The global mineral diplomacy architecture will truly prove useful if it actually helps diversify supply chains and benefits the whole hemisphere, and not only the U.S.
Time, investments, and sound cooperation are the most critical resources to mobilize in this endeavor.
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