Crisis in the Arctic – Does Iceland’s Decision to Reopen the EU Membership Debate Signal a Shift in Politician Sentiment, or Wholesale Change?
Donald Trump’s decision to question Greenland’s defensive capabilities at the end of 2025 has had unintentionally positive impacts for European integration. Iceland has decided to relaunch its EU membership drive following the rise of pressures in the Arctic region, and has opted to “fast-track” (Politico, 2026) a referendum on the matter to August 2027 as a vote between restarting unification or table the concept for good. Iceland’s decision not to formally end the process means an easier renegotiation of a path into the Union on the back of a positive result. However, a stalling process last time may play a factor in a general disdain for this manoeuvre. Although a pro-European party is in government, the Social Democratic Alliance, domestic attitudes are mixed. The EPRS highlighted that marginally “more people against EU membership than in favour” (Leclerc, 2026, p.10), citing a Maskína poll in April 2025 where 40% were against membership. In this article, I will explore the extent to which the crisis in Greenland is responsible for the internal decision to reignite integration rhetoric.
Crisis is fundamentally tied to European enlargement as both a driver of expansion and as a case-study of a failure for the EU to make effective decisions. Iceland has historically epitomized this relationship with crisis accelerating the process while also highlighting fundamental belief-structures that may cause obstruction. In 2009, following the global financial crisis, Iceland opened accession negotiations with the European Union after its own banking system came under pressure. With a strong turnout in referendums on the IMF, Iceland simultaneously drew on a need for support from the bloc, and also highlighted that the European response was also ineffective. This suggests there was a possible disconnect between the electorate and the executive in the nation. With 27 of the 33 chapters opened by the time Iceland informally ended their bid for accession, the crisis appeared to have helped move Iceland closer to the Union. However, with agriculture and fisheries policy becoming inhibitors to the process, “the most challenging issues for Iceland, related to the accession, were not even discussed, and it remains unknown if an acceptable solution could be found.” (Hilmarsson, 2017, p.64)
Trump’s comments on Greenland have certainly helped stoke tensions in the Arctic regions, which were already facing regional pressure around Ukraine. Reporters highlight that “what used to be a cooperative relationship between countries in the region has been fragmented.” (DW, 2025) The historical precedent for the value of Iceland stems from events after the Second World War. The US deemed it critical to establish base-rights in Iceland due to the positioning between itself and Russia. “For the defence of the United States, it was considered second only to Greenland.” (Ingimundarson, 2021, pg.74) This defence-related discourse has become a primary talking point for the incumbent US government, albeit not in Iceland, in which a stronger global US presence appears to be becoming the norm. This was highlighted in Davos earlier in 2026, where Donald Trump stated that “every NATO ally has an obligation to be able to defend their own territory. And the fact is, no nation or group of nations is in any position to be able to secure Greenland other than the United States.” (Trump, 2026) Greenland’s position of sovereignty has been tied to Denmark, and this close relationship has dissipated some of the tensions. However, its distance from the EU may have made it an easier target for foreign actors to threaten without fear of retaliation. This same issue could become a threat to Iceland, who lack this Danish lifeline, and may therefore be looking towards the EU for this protection. In particular, whether the Icelandic population agree with this narrative remains to be seen.
Historical election data from Statistics Iceland shows that referendums have lower turnout than general elections. This isn’t unusual, but it is interesting that the 2012 constitutional referendum was less significant than the poignant Ice Save crisis. While the datapoints are limited, this spike in the face of a crisis gets closer to national elections, with the 2012 presidential election performing less well than the 2011 referendum on the IMF. These datapoints could suggest that a crisis beyond domestic issues has a tangibly positive impact on voter behaviour in Iceland, following international crises.
However, Trump’s messaging on Greenland has also considered the role of resources in the region, which highlights a challenge to referendum behaviour. As previously mentioned, fishing and agriculture form just two pillars that could cause friction. Fishing was an area of tension in previous accession discussions, with the existence of whaling. With 12% of its Total GDP and 7% of the workforce dependent on the fishing industry (Government of Iceland, 2026), this area is a significant one. Furthermore, the industrial nature of such a role and the specific skills required in the field make it a particularly sensitive industry that could have a lot of sway over the referendum. This helps to undermine some of the influence that these geopolitical pressures have, reflected by the narrative that this election will finalise the EU issue for the nation. Furthermore, while there is urgency manufactured by geopolitical threats, the slow accession process in the previous attempt is likely to be a lingering issue. Add in the issue of IMF tensions, EU challenges with migration and crises, and sovereignty, and the task of overcoming these blockages becomes monumental.
Overall, Iceland’s return to a referendum demonstrates that a perceived crisis can encourage leaders to make decisions that look at integration. This offers security by bolstering vocal support for a nation, which can help deter challenges to sovereignty. However, there is also a tangible atmosphere of disconnect with the electorate. With divided voters and salient issues of national importance, the impact of Rhetoric can help to move the needle for some voters, but may struggle to make a wholesale shift within the nation. On a positive note, conflict in Russia, Israel and Iran, the “geopolitical urgency” (Karjalainen, 2023, p.648) of enlargement has become a growing concern for European nations, which may help stave off some challenges imposed on accession countries. For candidate states, this series of crises makes the existence of stability within the European Union an attractive asset for smaller nations, particularly with pressure around Arctic regions growing, and may act as a political barometer for the geopolitical environment for proximate smaller nations grouping together in the future
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