Central Africa: The Multipolar World Order and Regime Survival

The successful coup against Gabon’s President Ali Bongo in 2023 sent shockwaves across the Gulf of Guinea. Since then, no other Central African government has been ousted, raising the question of how outwardly fragile regimes in Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo can survive and muster international support.

The long-term prospects for Central Africa’s aged presidents are uncertain. In fact, Equatorial Guinea’s President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo has held office for 45 years, Cameroon’s President Paul Biya for 43 years, and the Congo Republic’s President Sassou Nguesso for 40 non-consecutive years. On the other hand, Gabon’s ex-President Ali Bongo succeeded his father, who took power in 1967 but was ousted in August 2023 by his cousin, current President Brice Oligui Nguema (unrelated to Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo), who plans to legitimise his rule through elections this year.

Meanwhile, the military capabilities of the Central African countries lag behind regional powers such as South Africa, or even small European countries such as Portugal (CIA, 2024). Furthermore, excluding Cameroon, which is fighting two insurgent movements, the Central African nations in the graph below are shown to have small standing armies. However, the military effectiveness of the Central African countries is limited by their small populations, large territories and the corrupt practices of senior officers (Kisangani and Pickering, 2022, P. 14; Transparency International, 2024). Therefore, to mitigate these failings, the four countries have diversified their economic and security relations with a range of international powers.

Central African Military Personnel

Cameroon

Cameroon faces an Islamist insurgency in its north and a separatist Anglophone insurgency in its southwest. Consequently, the conflicts are caused in part due to the exclusion of regions outside central Cameroon from economic and infrastructural development (Tumanjong, 2024). At the same time, while President Biya will run for re-election this year, the 92-year-old is potentially ill and rarely seen in public (Bensimon and Cam, 2024). Furthermore, his frailty and lack of a designated successor could result in a post-election coup or infighting among the political elite upon his death (Kiwuwa, 2024).

Meanwhile, as demonstrated by the sudden reshuffling of military staff after the Gabonese coup, President Biya fears a mutinous military and has thus sought external support to guarantee his security (Isong, 2023). Thus, Cameroon’s relationship with Russia is important as it buys Russian arms, and Russian mercenaries use Cameroonian ports to export minerals from the Central African Republic (Olivier, 2022). Moreover, President Biya’s opportunism extends to military cooperation with countries such as Britain and Israel (Mossberg, 2025). Hence, peacefully managing the 2025 election and establishing a succession plan would limit unrest spreading from Cameroon’s peripheries to Douala and Yaoundé.

Equatorial Guinea

The output of Equatorial Guinea’s oilfields has decreased since the 2000s, which in combination with the fall in global oil prices in 2014 has resulted in a decade-long economic decline (Nakhle, 2024). Additionally, oil revenues are essential for funding the corrupt and personalised networks of the Equatoguinean state. Therefore, the loss of such revenues would create political instability and result in the elite’s participation in illicit fundraising activities such as deforestation or narcotics (Soares, 2008, P. 224). Consequently, the likelihood of President Obiang’s unpredictable son Teodoro succeeding his 82-year-old father has added to the concerns of oil companies operating in the country (Rukanga, 2024).

Whilst large American oil corporations are leaving Equatorial Guinea (Nhede, 2024), President Obiang has found support elsewhere. Nonetheless, the country is strategically important because of its energy reserves and Bioko Island’s location at the centre of the Gulf of Guinea (Department of State, 2022). Thus, President Obiang has bought Russian air defence systems and invited Russian mercenaries into the country to increase his regime’s security (Lionel, 2024). Meanwhile, Chinese interests in Equatorial Guinea are both strategic and economic, in particular due to its interest in establishing a naval base in the deepwater Bata port (Eguegu, 2024).

Gabon

Gabonese politics and foreign relations were stable under the Bongo dynasty and have remained so after the 2023 coup. However, President Nguema has not advocated for resource nationalism, in contrast to the Malian and Nigerien military juntas that seized assets from Western mining companies (Foden, 2024). As a result, he has allowed the continuation of France’s Bongo-era investments in Gabon, indicating that the events of August 2023 were an intra-elite affair and not a genuine revolution (Bhattacharya, 2023).

Given France’s loss of influence in the Sahel, it views Gabon as an indispensable African partner and has not sanctioned President Nguema or his country’s oil industry (Kane, 2024). Furthermore, Gabon enhanced its relations with China to a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership in 2023, which was followed by PLA ships briefly docking in the country later that year (Eguegu, 2024). Conversely, President Nguema has exploited Russia’s international isolation by selling it sanctioned Western goods and allowing ships from Russia’s shadow oil tanker fleet to register in Gabon (Belsat, 2025).

The Republic of Congo

President Sassou Nguesso has dominated Congolese politics since the 1997-1999 civil war. Meanwhile, the energy-related fallout of the Russo-Ukrainian war has increased European interest in Congolese oil and gas. In fact, Congo has been highly indebted since the Cold War, with its financial stability hindered by its undiversified oil-dependent economy (Soares, 2008, P. 257). Consequently, American-Congolese relations are hampered by corruption and alleged human rights abuses (Congressional Research Service, 2019). On the other hand, $2.5 billion in Chinese loans have enhanced Congo’s infrastructure but worsened its precarious finances (Gardner et al, 2020).

Italy and the energy company Eni have invested significantly in Congo’s non-energy sectors and energy industry respectively (Energy Capital and Power, 2025). As a result, President Nguesso has diversified Congo’s energy relations to include major consumers such as India, with Azerbaijan and China investing significantly in the Congolese energy sector (Dakhling, 2024; EIA, 2024). Additionally, Azerbaijani weapons sales to the Congolese President’s loyal Republican Guard have helped coup-proof his regime and enabled the repression of large protests after elections (OCCRP, 2021).

Conclusion

To summarise, the Central African regimes are exploiting the increasingly multipolar international system for significant economic and security-related benefits. In the medium to long term, military coups by ambitious generals or unrest after contentious elections are the most pressing challenges to the region’s elderly but astute political operators.

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