Belarus Political Crisis: Challenges for the EU and Russia

The platforms Golos and Zubr and the Honest People Initiative in their final report on Belarus’s presidential election have contested the election results through their analysis of data from 1,310 out of 5,767 polling places, where photographs of official voting records were taken and shared. According to the records from 1,310 polling places, the opposition candidate Svetlana Tikhanovskaya received 81% of total votes cast in her favour, i.e. 471,709 votes out of 588,619. This means that she received only 116,910 additional votes from the remaining 4,457 polling locations, where voting records were not disclosed. Such discrepancies evidence that votes for Tikhanovskaya were not properly counted since at the polling stations where the reports were available, the vote cast for Svetlana Tikhanovskaya is on average 13 times higher than at the polling stations where reports were not obtained.

Source: Final Report on 2020 Presidential Elections in Belarus

Although post-election protest movements had taken place before, the rallies did not endure long and the protesters never succeeded in mobilizing large groups of the country’s population, including industrial workers and population in the rural areas of the country. This time, however, grassroots activism has evolved ahead of the presidential election. Belarus has seen an unprecedented level of resentment of different groups, including massive walkouts of workers at major state-owned enterprises normally loyal to the regime. Even so, this unprecedented popular uprising has been accompanied by an extreme crackdown leading to thousands of arrested and injured and causing the deaths of at least six people.

Alexander Lukashenko’s secret inauguration on 23 September made it clear that he isn’t planning on stepping down any time soon or starting a negotiation with the opposition. Instead, he kept denying the election fraud and blamed the popular uprisings on meddling by the Western states – undermining any prospects for overcoming a political deadlock any time soon. However, the longer he holds power, the more challenges pile up, including the deteriorating economic situation and growing pressure from the outside. Although in the previous years Lukashenko has been effectively balancing between the West and Russia  — playing off one side against the other in an attempt to retain space for maneuvering, while shoring up his authoritarian rule in the country – now he has significantly less space for such maneuvering.

Given the strategic position occupied by the country, the Belarus internal standoff poses dilemmas for the major geopolitical powers neighbouring the country. While the EU is ramping up pressure on Lukashenko, refusing to recognize him as a legitimate president, Russia is seeking to reap its own benefits and minimize the possible political and strategic losses. The growing divergences between the EU and Russia on the Belarus crisis might have serious geostrategic implications, by threatening to create another flashpoint in the shared neighbourhood of the EU and Russia.

Challenges and Opportunities for Russia

For Russia, the political situation in Belarus has created both tough challenges and certain opportunities. Russia has long been Belarus’s main economic and political ally, with the country’s economy being heavily dependent on Russia’s low-cost oil and gas supplies. The relations between two countries have significantly deteriorated earlier this year due to Lukashenko’s unwillingness to agree on deeper integration processes within the Union State, which resulted in Belarus cutting off subsidised oil and gas supplies from Russia.

For years Lukashenko has been resistant to long-standing demands for deeper integration with Russia, out of fear of surrendering his power. He even accused the Kremlin of engineering plots to disrupt the presidential election. However, the gravest political crisis of his 26 years in power and the fear of an imminent political downfall, have induced Lukashenko to ask the Kremlin for help.

Lukashenko’s appeal to the narrative of the Western interference in the situation in the county and his framing of the crisis in the country as a part of geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West have resonated well with the Kremlin. Playing on the concerns of the Russian authorities that in another neighbouring state, the pro-Western government might come to power, Lukashenko managed to receive Putin’s guarantee in ensuring the security of Belarus in the event of an external military threat. On 27 August 2020, he also announced the formation of a law enforcement reserve to assist Belarus by intervening if necessary in case the situation gets out of control. Belarus is viewed by Russia as the last remaining buffer shielding the country from hostile Europe. Thus seeking to avoid the repetition of the Ukrainian scenario in Belarus and fearing the formation of another pro-European and NATO-leaning bulwark on its border, Russia has warned the European countries and the U.S. against “unacceptable meddling” in Belarus’s internal affairs, including public support for anti-government demonstrations.

So far, the situation plays into the hands of the Russian authorities and their long-standing demands for deeper integration between two states, which might be the outcome of the September meeting between Putin and Lukashenko. In the aftermath of the meeting, Russia pledged to offer a loan of $1.5bn to Belarus to rescue the country’s struggling economy from imminent collapse. As all the implications of the September meeting are yet to be seen, there is a little doubt that the assistance from Kremlin intends some quid pro quo through demanding Lukashenko to accept a closer integration with Russia at the cost of a part of the country’s sovereignty.

Although the outcomes of the meeting between Putin and Lukashenko remain unclear, the meeting has proved that for now Russia will continue to prop up Lukashenko providing essential financial and political support. However, the Kremlin’s long-term approach to the Belarus crisis remains uncertain. Moscow appears still to be weighing different options: whether to tolerate the possibility of new elections and the forthcoming democratic transformation of the country or keep propping up Lukashenko providing all necessary financial and political, and possibly military support.

So far, Russia prefers somewhat more moderate opting to keep Lukashenko in power through less overt security assistance, influencing in traditional and social media, and providing financial support to ride out the popular uprising. As the Russian officials fell short of any concrete pledges of the direct military assistance to the embattled Lukashenko’s regime, despite Lukashenko’s publicly asked about the possibility to interfere militarily, Moscow is likely to avoid a large-scale military intervention in the long-term as leading to the disastrous consequences and resulting in another hotspot in the EU-Russia neighbourhood.

Nonetheless, Moscow also remains aware that the price of the victory of the pro-democratic popular uprising can be high for Russia. Apart from concerns about the potential loss of another ally on its Western border, the democratic transformation of Belarus might be likewise dangerous for Putin’s authoritarian regime.  The contagious example of Belarus, especially amid the unprecedentedly lasting protests in the Far East of Russia could have significant implications for the domestic political situation. The victory of the pro-democratic protests next door might signal to Russian society that the democratic transformation in the aftermath of the anti-government uprising is feasible, even in the long-standing authoritarian regimes.

The EU at a Crossroads

Although the EU countries have denounced the election fraud and brutal crackdown on protesters and refused to recognize Lukashenko as the legitimate president of Belarus, further attempts to respond to the events unfolding in the country have demonstrated the EU member states’ hesitant and divergent approach.

Following the emergency video conference of the European leaders held on August 19 on the situation in Belarus, the European Council has issued a statement rejecting the election result and announced a decision to impose sanctions on those involved in violence, repression, and election fraud. At the same time, the European Commission has decided to increase financial support to the people of Belarus in the amount of €53 million of extra funding to be provided to the country, of which, 2 million to assist the victims of repression and only 1 million to support civil society and independent media, and the rest for coronavirus emergency support for the health sector. However, some EU member states, particularly Lithuania, have criticized the EU’s lack of action and unwillingness to provide timely assistance to Belarusian people, which undermines the credibility in the EU’s commitment to the democratic values.

The divergences between the EU member states further deepened over the discussions of the sanctions to be imposed on the Belarus officials involved in the human rights violations and elections fraud. A list of 40 Belarus officials to be sanctioned with asset freezes and travel bans in response to the crackdown has initially failed to be approved unanimously. Despite Cyprus’ support for the EU action against Belarus officials, it refused to back the plan unless the pressure is exerted on Turkey amid the escalating tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean over Turkey’s maritime gas exploration activities in the region. The deadlock was finally overcome on 1 October throughout a long debate over the approach to take in terms of the Cyprus dispute with Turkey and resulted in issuing the statement of support for Cyprus and Greece and a warning to Turkey to apply punitive measures unless it stops its drilling activities. Nevertheless, such a protracted internal standoff, which caused a delay of the EU action, was criticized even inside the EU as “inappropriate” and compromising the bloc’s credibility when it comes to reinforcing democratic values and taking action against brutal human rights violations.

As the agreement on the sanctions has been finally reached, the more debate about the effectiveness of the new sanctions regime arises. Although nearly every election in the country since 1996 has entailed the restrictive measures from the EU, the repressive regime established by Lukashenko is yet in place with intensified political repressions and increased human rights violations. The targeted sanctions have not affected Lukashenko’s autocratic rule and have not impeded to further consolidate his power, as the country is no closer to democratization than in the 90s.

In the latest Democracy Index Report compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Belarus ranked 150th out of 165 with 2.48 points out of 10, having dropped by 13 positions compared to the previous year. The index takes into account five categories: electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties. Since 2016 the country has been downgrading its positions, having reached the lowest point ever recorded by the Economist Intelligence Unit.

The policy of “critical engagement” and the further lifting of sanctions announced by the EU in 2016 due to some progress in enhancing the rule of law and release of political prisoners, have not brought to a lasting positive change and were rather motivated by the concerns over the country’s rapprochement with Russia.

Even though some divergences exist over the effective response to the events unfolding in Belarus, the main complication for the EU remains the unwillingness to confront Russia and uncertainty over the Kremlin’s further steps and whether it is going to intensify the extent of its involvement in the crisis. On the one hand, the EU’s more active assistance might trigger Russia’s military engagement in the crisis to support Lukashenko, which has long been the Kremlin’s sphere of interest and it does not seem willing to hand over its strategic enclave. The unwillingness to confront Russia is compounded by the concerns over the repetition of the Ukrainian scenario and subsequent creation of another hotspot on the EU-Russia borders. On the other hand, the lack of action over the flagrant crackdown and violence against protesters and election fraudulent might question the EU’s commitment to safeguarding the fundamental principles of free and fair elections and respect for human rights.

Conclusion

 It is still hard to draw conclusions on how the situation will evolve. So far, different scenarios are feasible from those overly pessimistic, in which the protests might fizzle out without achieving a change of regime to those, in which the civil society continues to strengthen and some elements of the regime agree to open a dialogue with the opposition.

With the crisis becoming more polarized due to the increasing external involvement, third parties might play a prominent role in the further development of the situation. More leverages can be applied by the Western powers while remaining within the boundaries of the non-interference principle. First of all, a unified approach of all the EU member states is needed. While the approval of the targeted sanctions can be effective in terms of increasing incentives for the Belarus elites to take the side of the protesters, the tardiness of their approval, as well as controversies inside the bloc, undermine the EU’s credibility. Furthermore, more financial support should be directed to the civil society.

In order to break the political deadlock, the strategy on the engagement under the auspices of the OSCE can be invoked to promote the dialogue between the parties. Eventually, Russia should be encouraged to join the process, since it has significantly more leverages to influence Lukashenko’s decisions. As the only party who Lukashenko seems eager to maintain a dialogue with, Putin has more chances than anyone else to convince him that retirement in exile is not the worst option under the current circumstances. Despite Lukashenko wants the situation to look like a geopolitical struggle, the protests are anything but anti-Russian or pro-European. It is a domestic matter concerning the people’s resentment against the regime that lost its legitimacy. For that reason, reassuring the Kremlin that a smooth and negotiated transition of power is in Russia’s interest as well and does not necessarily intend drawing Belarus exclusively into the alliance with the West.

Nonetheless, the future of the Belarusian popular uprising against the regime remains primarily an internal affairs issue, rather than a foreign policy matter. Thus, much depends on Belarusians themselves and their ability to find their own way out of this internal crisis. Although it is difficult to predict whether the democratic aspirations of people in Belarus will eventually succeed in the near future, the recent developments have already demonstrated that people in Belarus are paving their unique path towards a free and democratic society.

References

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