Bangladesh at a Crossroads: Political Uncertainty, Elections, and India’s Strategic Calculus
Bangladesh is experiencing one of its most turbulent political phases in recent decades. What began as domestic unrest has significantly altered the country’s political landscape affecting governance, political stability, and public trust in institutions. Consequently, the country is preparing itself for its 13th parliamentary elections in February 2026, which will determine both the electoral landscape and the trajectory of democratic processes. Let us breakdown the series of events that led to domestic upheaval subsequently triggering the challenges surrounding Bangladesh’s upcoming parliamentary elections to understand its ramifications beyond borders in shaping or reshaping regional dynamics, especially India-Bangladesh relations.
Background
It all began with youth- led protests against job quota system, which reserve nearly one-third of public sector positions for descendants of freedom fighters. In response, then Bangladesh’s Prime Minister (PM) Sheikh Hasina enforced a nationwide curfew and suspended phone and internet access to curb the wave of protest across the country. Although Bangladesh’s Supreme Court later ordered that the disputed quota should be cut from 30% to 5%, with 3% reserved for veterans’ family, protests continued under the umbrella of the Students Against Discrimination movement. The prolonged unrest resulted in widespread violence, claiming more than 650 lives across the country.
The protests and subsequent violence intensified as claims surfaced that the government failed to ensure accountability for both the reform process and the resulting unrest. Protesters also questioned the legitimacy of the Awami League’s(AL) repeated electoral victories under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The 2014 elections saw an opposition boycott, resulting in 153 of 300 seats being uncontested. In 2018, the Awami League won a third term amid vote rigging allegations, while the 2024 elections again returned Sheikh Hasina to power following another opposition boycott. Resultantly, protestors demanded PM Hasina Sheikh’s resignation from the position. In the midst of such intense political turbulence, Prime Minister Hasina Sheikh resigned on August 5, 2024, and fled the country.
Consequently, an extra constitutional interim government was set up on 8 August 2024 under Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus (proposed by leaders of the Anti-Discrimination Student Movement) until a new Prime Minister is appointed after a snap general election.
Current Political Scenario in Bangladesh
The interim government led by Muhammad Yunus launched an ambitious reform agenda, establishing several reform bodies, including a Constitution Reform Commission (CRC), which submitted proposals for a new constitution in January 2025. Furthermore, a National Consensus Commission (NCC) initiated and facilitated dialogue with political parties and forces in order to build consensus around the adoption of reform proposals concerning the constitution, electoral system, judiciary, public administration, police, and anti-corruption frameworks particularly in light of the upcoming election to form a newly elected and accountable government. This process led to the July Charter of 2025 (July National Charter (Constitution Reform) Implementation Order 2025), which was approved by 24 political parties and included over 80 reform recommendations, nearly half of which are constitutional, despite substantial dissent from numerous parties. These reforms sought to address demands raised during the student-led uprising by strengthening democratic accountability.
However, the July Charter (JC) of 2025 is a source of contention among various political parties over a variety of issues, including the formation of a bicameral parliament with the upper house allocated by vote share and its role in approving constitutional amendments despite the lack of veto powers, the formation of independent bodies such as the Public Service Commission, Comptroller, Auditor General, and Anti-Corruption Commission, etc. by selection committees rather than ordinary legislation, selection mechanism of Chief advisor, etc.
On the other hand, a section of Bangladesh believe that institutional transformation is the responsibility of an elected government, and hence Muhammad Yunus should call elections soon and delegate the work related to reforms to the newly elected government. It has also been reported that the interim government has avoided committing to a specific date or schedule for elections. This led to criticism that Chief advisor Muhammad Yunus is keen to hang on to power and thus unwilling to commit to an election timeline prompting renewed protests amid an already fragile political environment of the country.
Alongside pursuing institutional reforms, the interim government also moved to address accountability for deaths during the July–August 2024 uprising. Calls for justice over alleged extrajudicial killings intensified, and the then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was tried in absentia (after being exiled in India) by Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), and sentenced to death on charges of crimes against humanity, including alleged atrocities during the student uprising. While several political parties and the interim government welcomed the verdict, the Awami League rejected it as politically motivated and called a two-day shutdown ahead of the ruling, during which violent incidents were reported. Such political fragility already indicated that the country was facing a looming risk of unrest.
Before the fragile political environment could deteriorate further, the interim government announced elections for June 2026. However, mounting pressure led to the timeline being advanced first to April and eventually to February 2026. As a result, forty months after fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government, Bangladesh officially announced the date for its 13th parliamentary elections, which would take place on February 12, 2026.
Evolving Situation Ahead of 13th Parliamentary Elections in Bangladesh
The announcement of the election date marks a watershed moment in the country’s political landscape, as a national referendum on implementing the ‘July Charter’ will take place on the same day, marking the first time in Bangladesh’s history both will be held concurrently. Therefore, Holding February 2026 elections and referendum on state reforms at the same time is intended to increase turnout as it marks a critical juncture in Bangladesh’s political trajectory since they not only elect a new government but also restructure the nation’s institutions, mapping the country’s political and social landscape for the future. Approximately 127.6 million eligible voters across 300 constituencies are expected to cast their ballots, with over three lakh expatriate Bangladeshis set to vote via postal ballots for the first time.
However, political parties remain divided over conduct of elections and a national referendum on same day as well as neutrality of interim government over conduct of elections. The National Citizen Party (NCP)for instance agreed to either a simultaneous vote or a pre-election referendum and also welcomed election schedule but remains deeply suspicious not only about the process but also about the EC’s ability to remain neutral amid political pressure. Meanwhile, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), preparing to re-enter the political arena after the interim government revoked its ban has insisted that the referendum be held prior to the national elections to ensure that reforms are in place. Both parties criticised Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus for meeting with Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)’s acting chairman Tarique Rahman in London to discuss the election timeline, citing about neutrality.
Moreover, The Revolutionary Workers Party backed the timing but questioned the interim government’s authority to implement the reforms. Meanwhile, the Communist Party of Bangladesh and the Bangladesh Samajtantrik Dal (Marxist) criticized the referendum as extra-constitutional, alleging that dissenting views within the NCC were ignored.
The saga does not end there. The interim administration also banned the Awami League under the Anti-Terrorism Act, with the Election Commission also cancelling its registration, effectively barring it from political activity and electoral participation. It has also prohibited the Bangladesh Chhatra League (the Awami League’s student wing) in response to the Anti-Discrimination Student Movement’s demands. Consequently, Awami League has outrightly rejected the election schedule as illegal claiming that the existing administration cannot ensure neutrality, or a true reflection of the people’s will. Furthermore, Sajeeb Wazed, former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s son and a major party adviser warned of massive protests and potential confrontations by millions of supporters of Awami League if the party’s ban is not lifted in time for the February election.
With the Awami League banned, a political vacuum could lead to rivalries between the BNP and JI, whose power struggles and internal differences might further destabilize the scene further. The NCP has also blamed the BNP and JI, claiming that their rivalry might impede the implementation of the July Charter. Though it is widely expected that in the absence of Awami League, the BNP will return to power, with Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh’s largest Islamist party, emerging as the main opposition. However, experts had already warned that unresolved disputes, along with the exclusion of the country’s oldest political party from the elections, may trigger tensions on several fronts, including potential violence between the Awami League and law enforcement, as well as competing parties such as the BNP, JI, and NCP, particularly as BNP Acting Chairman Tarique Rahman returns to the country on December 25 after nearly 17 years in exile in London.
In the midst of a tense political climate, Sharif Osman Hadi, the Inqilab Mancha’s spokesperson and a key role in last year’s rebellion, was shot dead in broad daylight by unidentified gunmen while campaigning as an independent candidate in the Dhaka-8 constituency. Subsequently, the death of Osman Haidi and police alleging attackers fled to India triggered fresh violence, turning long-standing fears of political unrest into reality. Speculation arose about the possible involvement of Awami League members, as well as broader concerns about attempts to destabilize regional dynamics, including allegations linked to India, where former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is currently exiled. This incident has opened another front, unsettling not only Bangladesh’s domestic politics but also regional dynamics, particularly its long-standing friendship with India.
As Bangladesh approaches a highly contested election, interim government finding it difficult to balance the law and order as well as the an attempt to establish substantial as legitimate government in the country. At the same time, India being the closest regional partner and a key stakeholder in its political stability, now finds itself indirectly drawn into Dhaka’s internal turbulence, both through perceptions surrounding Sheikh Hasina’s exile and allegations linked to recent violence. These crisis has placed India–Bangladesh relations under renewed strain and therefore it is important to understand how both the countries navigate the situation while maintaining its diplomatic posture to maintain regional stability, and the future trajectory of bilateral relations.
Implications for India–Bangladesh Bilateral Relations
As Bangladesh’s closest neighbour and a reliable partner with deep political, economic, and security ties to Dhaka, India has closely observed developments since the July-August 2024 unrest. New Delhi has maintained its non-interference principle while treating the political turmoil as an internal law and order matter. However, the series of events, along with India’s actions and silences, are being closely interpreted by various political actors in Bangladesh, leading to strain and turbulence in bilateral relations across multiple fronts. Let us understand more about these various fronts while recognizing the gravity of the situation.
Political and Diplomatic Front
India maintained its non-interventionist stance while engaging in quiet diplomacy over political unrest in Bangladesh, but New Delhi was drawn into the matter indirectly when former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled to India. While New Delhi’s neutrality has been interpreted in different ways, India clarified that allowing her stay was guided by humanitarian principles and civilizational ethos, not by support for any particular regime.
New Delhi maintained that former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India had no impact or constraint on India-Bangladesh relations. India’s Foreign Secretary underscored this position during his official visit to Dhaka in 2024 December to discuss the full spectrum of bilateral cooperation. Moreover, Bangladesh’s interim government has sought the extradition of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina following the declaration of a death sentence against her while expressing concerns over India allowing her to engage with her supporters aimed at disrupting the forthcoming national elections. In response, New Delhi maintained its quiet diplomacy on the verdict against former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, reaffirming its commitment to the best interests of the Bangladeshi people, and stating its intention to engage constructively with all stakeholders.
Moreover, New Delhi clarified that former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s communications are conducted through her personal devices, and that India has not provided her with any political platform or space to engage in political activity from Indian territory against a third country. Rejecting Dhaka’s assertions, India reiterated its support for free, fair, inclusive, and credible elections in Bangladesh conducted in a peaceful environment.
Furthermore, New Delhi firmly rejected narratives alleging India’s involvement in Sharif Osman Hadi’s murder dismissing them as interim government has neither conducted a thorough investigation nor shared meaningful evidence without naming specific incidents while summoning the Bangladesh High Commissioner to discuss deteriorating security environment in Dhaka.
Overall, the situation indicates increasingly fragile political relations between the two countries, with India attempting to strike a balance between quiet diplomacy to manage delicate issues and maintain bilateral ties, and public remarks that are only essential to
clarify its core positions.
Security and Border Management
India shares a 4,096 km border with Bangladesh, about 3,231 km of which is fenced, while the rest remains unfenced due to terrain and riverine challenges. The border runs through West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram (majority of the Northeast region) which plays a crucial role in shaping India’s approach towards Bangladesh due to their geographic proximity, cultural ties, and cross-border socio-economic linkages. Therefore, New Delhi responded firmly to recent security-threatening remarks on the Northeast by student-led NCP leader Hasnat Abdullah, while expecting Bangladesh’s interim government to ensure law and order, including the conduct of peaceful elections.
New Delhi recognized that disinformation and anti-India statements in certain sections of Bangladeshi media and internet platforms have caused perception issues with security consequences. However, India has designated the Ministry of External Affairs as the nodal body for addressing perceptions and narratives in Bangladesh, rather than passing information through media channels, in order to avoid media distortion, which can lead to the wrong narrative.
Collectively, New Delhi recognizes that Bangladesh’s fragile political situation could be exploited by groups hostile to India’s Northeast security and may worsen illegal migration in border states. As a result, India has prioritized national security and domestic stability through firm responses.
Trade, Infrastructure and Connectivity
Bangladesh is India’s largest South Asian trading partner, while India is Bangladesh’s biggest export market in Asia and a key source of raw materials, energy, and transit. Despite tensions, bilateral trade stood at $13.46 billion in 2024–25 with Indian exports largely supporting Bangladesh’s export industries and inflation management.
Infrastructural cooperation includes rail, road, waterways, energy, and digital connectivity, and India has granted $8-10 billion in concessional credit (during the last decade) while offering duty-free market access, building cross-border rail linkages, and supplying oil and LNG. Energy ties have deepened further, with over 2,000 MW of electricity supplied from India in 2024, valued at about $1.08 billion, highlighting that a relationship neither side can easily disengage from.
However, India has raised concern about delays in critical projects such as crucial rail links, inland port expansions, and EPC (Engineering, Procurement and Construction) construction. New Delhi also noted that many Indian personnel returned after August 5, 2024, and has sought assurances from Bangladesh on security for project sites and staff.
Given the circumstances, experts observe that, while diplomatic and political ties may fluctuate with changes in government, economic, cultural, and sporting relations tend to be stable. Even less India-friendly governments do not always impede trade, as demonstrated between 2001 to 2006, when trade increased despite the BNP-Jamaat-e-Islami government in office.
External Influence and Changing Regional Dynamics
New Delhi is closely monitoring China’s expanding footprint in Bangladesh across infrastructure, ports, and defence projects such as Mongla Port, Lalmonirhat Airbase, and the Pekua submarine base. While acknowledging Bangladesh’s sovereign right to diverse partnerships, India remains committed to protecting its strategic interests, particularly in the Siliguri Corridor and the Bay of Bengal, to avoid any unfriendly military presence. India has also raised concerns that Bangladesh’s interest in joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) may offer Chinese goods indirect access to the Indian market, given Bangladesh’s considerable duty-free access.
The interim government’s evolving stance on Bangladesh’s foreign policy, with a strategic lean toward Beijing, Islamabad, and even Ankara, while also renegotiating Indian energy deals and stalling India-led connectivity projects, is raising concerns in India.
However, Bangladesh is not economically positioned to disengage from India. Despite strong GDP growth over the past two decades, momentum has slowed since the pandemic. The country has minimal natural resources and imports all of its energy, primarily from India. Its recent tilt toward China, Pakistan, and Turkey therefore signals a risky strategic shift, giving New Delhi leverage to recalibrate ties with a politically fragile and economically dependent Dhaka.
Taken together, Bangladesh’s protracted situation poses a significant challenge to India. Issues with apparent neutrality, sensitivities around former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s exile, and threats to border stability underline the current situation’s fragility. At the same time, uncertainty threatens to disrupt trade, connectivity, and energy cooperation, while also allowing for increasing participation by non-regional actors. How India navigates these interconnected challenges will be essential not only for defending its immediate interests, but also for maintaining its neighbourhood-first policy and ensuring long-term stability in the subcontinent.
India’s Approach and Forward-Looking Measures
Subtly and silently, New Delhi has pointed out that while Bangladesh’s internal political upheaval may appear to be a minor concern, it is likely to worsen and become more significant. Amid Dhaka’s generational discontinuity, shifting political order, and a potential strategic realignment away from India, New Delhi has taken a non-interventionist stance, closely and quietly monitoring developments and clarifying its national and strategic interests only when absolutely necessary.
However, India and Bangladesh have a complex interdependence, relying on each other for water, energy, and other resources. Not only that, but due to the cultural and geographical proximity of India’s northeastern states and that of West Bengal, the Indian government has maintained that its policies are people-oriented rather than political regime-specific. While pursuing neighborly diplomacy that respects sovereignty, New Delhi agreed not to interfere with the internal political process or the will and choices of the Bangladeshi people.
Indian government has also clarified that there is no change in our overall approach in relations with Bangladesh following the events of August, 2024 and New Delhi remains interested in a constructive, pragmatic, mutually-beneficial, and forward-looking relationship with Bangladesh. It also favors a constructive engagement with the interim government based on mutual trust,
respect, and sensitivity to each other’s concerns and interests.
However, New Delhi has repeatedly stated its support for free, fair, inclusive, and credible elections in Bangladesh, noting that a continued ban on the Awami League would harm electoral inclusivity. Resultantly, New Delhi has struck a balance by neither favoring any regime nor compromising on the need for inclusive and peaceful elections.
The collapse of the Awami League’s dominance, the rise of youth-led nationalism, the re-entry of Islamists, and increasing Chinese and Pakistani influence all marked a watershed moment, and if India fails to recalibrate now, it risks losing strategic space in Dhaka not to political instability or war, but to irrelevance. As a result, Delhi’s task is not only managing a fallen friend in exile, but also preserving a neighbour who is critical to its security, from counterterrorism and border management to access to its restive north-eastern area. As a result, whoever wins the election in Bangladesh should be met with the same level of openness in New Delhi. Therefore, the wisest course for New Delhi is to avoid both endorsement and condemnation, interact across the political spectrum, and demonstrate its willingness to collaborate with any administration that emerges from a legitimate democratic process.
Way Forward
The February 2026 elections and state reform referendum have the potential to change Bangladesh’s political landscape. However, multiple levels of dispute – between parties, within parties, and across political boundaries – may destabilize Bangladesh as the election date approaches. Political divides are deepening, and the Awami League’s threat of confrontation adds to the volatility. As a result, the interim government’s capacity to mediate between conflicting factions and oversee a peaceful voting process will be critical in keeping the situation from spiraling out of control. If these tensions are not carefully controlled, they could disrupt the elections and jeopardize Bangladesh’s long-term stability.
Therefore, the upcoming elections is one of the major challenges faced by Dhaka in its democratic journey. Whether this election will generate renewed trust or create yet another chapter of controversy remains uncertain.
