African Nation Number 55? Exploring the Potential for Somaliland Independence

In recent years, Somaliland has been accelerating its claims for territorial sovereignty, and hopes to secure legal recognition with the inauguration of U.S. President Donald Trump for a second term in the White House. Somaliland’s desire for Somali secession has existed since 1991, and the breakaway region has secured all but de jure independence. Following the November 2024 election of President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullani (Sheikh and Rao, 2024), who campaigned on a platform advocating for international recognition, political stability, and internal cohesion, and the return of President Trump to U.S. leadership, Somaliland’s seat in the United Nations is considered to be within reach.

Somaliland’s Push for Sovereignty 

For Somaliland, sovereignty matters for a variety of reasons. It finalises a struggle for secession over thirty years in the making, and legalises a widely-believed right to self-determination by Somalilanders. In recent years, the would-be nation has enjoyed far more political and economic stability than Somalia, and formal independence would guarantee its access to international bodies and the associated diplomatic and economic benefits.

On 1 January 2024, Hargeisa reached a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Addis Ababa that would provide a 50-year lease of 12 miles of Somaliland coastline along the Gulf of Aden, around the port city of Berbera, in exchange for Ethiopia becoming the first UN member state to grant Somaliland official sovereign recognition (Yibeltal, 2024). This move deepened tensions in the Horn of Africa, with Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia aligning in an ‘axis against Ethiopia’ in an effort to counter growing influence by Addis Ababa in the region (Reporter, 2024). Whilst Turkey-brokered talks between Ethiopia and Somalia in December 2024 alleviated hostilities, it remains unclear whether the MoU and its provisions were discarded, and it did nothing to minimise Somaliland’s drive for complete independence.

With the election of Donald Trump, it is widely assumed that the United States will, at some point, commence the official mechanisms for Somaliland sovereignty. Republican lawmaker Scott Perry introduced the Republic of Somaliland Independence Act to the 118th Congress in December 2024, whereby the United States would recognise Somaliland as a ‘separate, independent country’ (118th Congress, 2024). This follows propositions for ‘the recognition of Somaliland statehood’ in the Project 2025 document (Harper, 2025), considered the policy manifesto for the second term of the Trump presidency. Though guaranteeing recognition for the Sub-Saharan territory is far from a top priority in the White House, its inclusion as a proposed policy highlights the increasing likelihood of an independent Somaliland.

Benefits to Recognising Somaliland 

Several factors animate American support for Somaliland and illustrate the wider benefits of its official independence. Strategically, Somaliland is prime real estate along the Gulf of Aden. Bashir Good, Somaliland’s representative to the United States, has already expressed that the prospective nation would be willing to allow the United States to establish a military base in the port city of Berbera (Joseph, 2024). Yemeni Houthis continue to attack maritime trade and U.S. ships in the Red Sea, and having recently re-designated the group as a ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisation’ (Gritten, 2025), the United States appears likely to accept the opportunity to enhance its military presence in the region. This remains a real possibility as the Israel-Palestine situation continues unresolved and U.S.-Iran tensions persist. Somaliland becomes evermore enticing as Djibouti strengthens relations with China. Whilst the U.S. operates 4,000 troops out of Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti (ASP, 2021), China began construction of a naval outpost several miles from the site in 2016 (Page, 2016), and continues to finance public infrastructure projects in the nation as part of its wider Belt and Road Initiative. Though American withdrawal from Djibouti is a remote possibility, the trend of warmer China-Djibouti relations increases the security and intelligence risks, and shifting the focus to Somaliland reduces U.S. dependence on a potentially hostile partner. China maintains a strict One-Somalia policy, and has refused to establish relations with Somaliland.

Obstacles to Somaliland Sovereignty

Of course, official recognition of Somaliland sovereignty by the United States comes with challenges. Whilst supporting secession will enhance the U.S.-Ethiopia partnership, it will strain relations with other key actors in the region. The United States has previously provided Egypt with military and economic assistance, and their relationship is built on counterterrorism and regional security objectives. American support for an independent Somaliland will embolden Ethiopia and detriment U.S.-Egypt relations, already strained following comments by President Trump suggesting the country should house displaced Palestinian citizens (Al Arabiya, 2025). However, U.S. President Trump and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Sisi have a close relationship (Webb, 2024), and the American leader will likely rely on Egyptian support for a quick resolution to the Israel-Hamas conflict, a higher priority on the administration’s agenda. Likewise, Somalia remains an important U.S. partner on the continent. Under the first Trump administration, U.S. activities in Somalia focused on counterterrorism efforts against al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab (Williams, 2024). Following his return to this presidency, Trump, with the support of Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, initiated strikes against ISIS in February 2025 (Wright and Iqbal, 2025). Official recognition of Somaliland in Trump’s second term will impact further American counterterrorism efforts. Establishing Somaliland sovereignty could also complicate U.S. relations with the African Union. The continental bloc has long adhered to a policy of respecting colonial-era borders (Ferragamo and Klobucista, 2025), and concerns exist that formal recognition of Somaliland will encourage other African secessionist movements, such as Biafra from Nigeria or Western Sahara from Morocco, to push for complete independence. It should be noted that Somaliland has enjoyed autonomous governance since 1991 and is far more developed in its economy, stability, and infrastructure than other claimants for independence (ibid).

Conclusion 

Official recognition of Somaliland independence is far from the top priority on the White House’s agenda. That being said, it seems all but inevitable. President Trump might push for Somaliland recognition to fulfil another promise of the Project 2025 agenda as he continues his personal vendetta against the ‘deep state’ (Politi et al., 2025), or he might favour its secession due to the strategic importance of another ally along the Gulf of Aden. Re-designating the Houthi movement as a ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisation’ demonstrates that his administration still considers them a genuine threat, and President Trump has consistently expressed his optimism that his administration will resolve the conflict in the Middle East (Hernandez, 2024). Establishing an independent Somaliland and its associated benefits might be a part of that puzzle.

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