Ethiopia After Pretoria: Why Tigray’s “Peace” Remains Fragile

The Pretoria Agreement—the Agreement for Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities signed on 2 November 2022 between Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF—set out commitments on cessation of hostilities, humanitarian access, disarmament arrangements, and implementation modalities under African Union facilitation (African Union, 2022). Yet developments since 2023 indicate that while large-scale conventional warfare has ended, the political and material drivers of instability remain unresolved, producing what can be described as managed instability: violence is constrained, but the settlement is incomplete (Crisis Group, 2022; ACLED, 2026).

Ceasefire without a comprehensive settlement

Pretoria achieved what many peace processes prioritize first: stopping major fighting and reopening political space for negotiation (African Union, 2022). However, expert assessments have emphasized from the outset that the agreement left several of the hardest issues—territorial disputes, transitional justice, and the reintegration of armed actors—politically contentious and operationally difficult (Crisis Group, 2022). In practice, this has meant that the post-agreement period has been characterized by negotiation and partial implementation rather than a clean transition to post-conflict recovery (Crisis Group, 2023).

Quantitative scale of conflict legacy and recovery burdens

The costs of the war’s legacy help explain why “post-conflict recovery” has been uneven. Ethiopia’s Damage and Needs Assessment (prepared with World Bank technical support) estimated total damages exceeding US$22.6 billion, economic losses of about US$6.0 billion, and recovery/reconstruction needs around US$19.7 billion for conflicts occurring from November 2020 to December 2021 (World Bank, 2022). These figures capture the structural reality: recovery is not only a humanitarian or technical problem—it is a distributive political economy question about who controls reconstruction resources, territory, and administrative authority (World Bank, 2022).

The destruction of public services, especially health systems, further illustrates how conflict reshaped state capacity and civilian welfare. A peer-reviewed study estimating the economic damage to Tigray’s public health system from war-related looting and vandalism in 2021 documents extensive losses and argues that the scale of destruction created long-term constraints for service restoration (Gufue et al., 2024). Such institutional damage feeds into post-war grievance and mistrust, complicating stabilization even in the absence of large battles (Gufue et al., 2024).

Persistent humanitarian stress and displacement pressures

National humanitarian planning continues to treat conflict and displacement as central drivers of vulnerability. UNICEF’s Humanitarian Action for Children 2026 appeal notes that Ethiopia’s children and women face heightened protection risks due to “ongoing armed conflict” and “large-scale population displacements,” and states UNICEF will require US$401.5 million in 2026 for its humanitarian response targets (UNICEF, 2025). These figures do not, by themselves, prove renewed war in Tigray—but they show that conditions associated with conflict-related vulnerability remain significant nationally and in northern Ethiopia’s crisis geography (UNICEF, 2025).

For displacement monitoring, IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) remains a core, publicly accessible source for assessing internal displacement patterns and trends in Ethiopia (IOM, 2023). While estimates vary by round and geography, the continued reliance on DTM reporting underscores that displacement remains a structural feature of Ethiopia’s post-2022 landscape rather than a short-term wartime anomaly (IOM, 2023).

Post-Pretoria tensions and renewed clashes: evidence from event data and AU statements

The post-agreement period has also been marked by recurring political and security tensions. ACLED’s Ethiopia Peace Observatory analysis (October 2024) argues that internal political disputes and fragmentation within Tigrayan politics posed a threat to the durability of peace and could fuel renewed instability even without a return to nationwide war (ACLED, 2024). This is precisely the “managed instability” pattern: bargaining continues, but underlying disputes persist (ACLED, 2024).

In early 2026, ACLED’s expert commentary documented fresh clashes and warned that fighting raised concerns about renewed armed conflict in northern Ethiopia (ACLED, 2026). The African Union Commission Chairperson responded publicly on 30 January 2026, calling for “maximum restraint” and expressing deep concern over unfolding developments in parts of the Tigray region—an unusually direct signal that regional institutions viewed the situation as fragile (African Union, 2026). Together, these sources provide verifiable evidence that the peace has been contested and periodically destabilized, even while large-scale war has not resumed (ACLED, 2026; African Union, 2026).

Mortality evidence: the war’s shadow over peace

Academic work on conflict-attributable mortality helps clarify why post-war politics remain brittle. A peer-reviewed study in BMJ Global Health estimates conflict-attributable mortality in Tigray using a diaspora survey design and reports a significant elevation in all-cause mortality during the war period, largely driven by intentional injuries (McGowan et al., 2025). Even where ceasefires hold, such mortality legacies shape political memory, fear, and distrust—factors that complicate disarmament and reintegration and increase sensitivity to renewed violence (McGowan et al., 2025).

Food insecurity as a continuing structural risk

Food insecurity assessments also point to continuing structural risks in Ethiopia through 2026. FAO and WFP’s Hunger Hotspots report for the November 2025–May 2026 outlook identifies acute food insecurity risks and emphasizes that conflict and insecurity remain key drivers in several high-risk contexts, situating Ethiopia within a broader regional pattern where violence, market disruptions, and humanitarian access constraints interact (FAO and WFP, 2025). FEWS NET’s Ethiopia analyses and projections for late 2025 into 2026 provide publicly downloadable classification maps and outlook reporting, including warnings that Emergency (IPC Phase 4) conditions were likely to emerge in early 2026 in parts of the country under certain scenarios, highlighting persistent vulnerability even outside active frontlines (FEWS NET, 2025).

These sources do not reduce the Tigray question to hunger alone. Rather, they show why post-war stabilization cannot be separated from livelihood recovery, market access, and service restoration—dimensions that remain fragile when governance and security arrangements are contested (FAO and WFP, 2025; FEWS NET, 2025).

What “managed instability” means for Ethiopia (and why it matters)

The evidence above supports a cautious conclusion: Pretoria ended large-scale fighting, but post-2023 realities fit neither a clean post-conflict transition nor a simple relapse into war. Instead, Ethiopia’s northern settlement has operated under conditions of managed instability—where political disagreements, humanitarian stress, and periodic clashes persist within an overall constraint on major warfare (ACLED, 2024; ACLED, 2026; African Union, 2026).

For policy audiences, the implication is practical. Stabilization efforts that focus only on “maintaining the ceasefire” risk missing the structural drivers that can repeatedly destabilize the settlement: recovery burdens of wartime destruction, deep institutional damage (especially in health), unresolved political disputes, and continuing humanitarian pressures (World Bank, 2022; Gufue et al., 2024; UNICEF, 2025). Turning ceasefire into durable peace requires not only restraint, but credible progress on governance arrangements and social recovery pathways that reduce the incentives and fears that sustain armed hedging (Crisis Group, 2022; African Union, 2022).

References 

ACLED (2024) ‘Two years after the Pretoria agreement, unrest still looms in Tigray – October 2024’, ACLED Update (8 November). Available at:
https://acleddata.com/update/two-years-after-pretoria-agreement-unrest-still-looms-tigray-october-2024 (Accessed: 2 February 2026).

ACLED (2026) ‘Ethiopia: Fresh clashes renew fears for a return to conflict — Expert comment’, ACLED Expert Comment (2 February). Available at:
https://acleddata.com/expert-comment/ethiopia-fresh-clashes-renew-fears-return-conflict-expert-comment (Accessed: 5 February 2026).

African Union (2022) Agreement for Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities (Pretoria Agreement), 2 November. Available at:
https://igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Download-the-signed-agreement-here.pdf (Accessed: 4 February 2026).

African Union (2026) ‘Chairperson of the African Union Commission calls for maximum restraint in Tigray region, Ethiopia’, Press release (30 January). Available at:
https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20260130/auc-chairperson-calls-maximum-restraint-tigray-region-ethiopia (Accessed: 4 February 2026).

Crisis Group (2022) ‘Turning the Pretoria Deal into Lasting Peace in Ethiopia’, International Crisis Group (23 November). Available at:
https://www.crisisgroup.org/stm/africa/ethiopia/turning-pretoria-deal-lasting-peace-ethiopia (Accessed: 23 January 2026).

Crisis Group (2023) Ethiopia (January 2023), International Crisis Group (10 January). Available at:
https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2023-02/ethiopia-jan-2023.pdf (Accessed: 27 January 2026).

FAO and WFP (2025) Hunger Hotspots: FAO–WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity: November 2025 to May 2026 outlook. Rome: FAO/WFP. Available at:
https://www.fightfoodcrises.net/sites/default/files/resource/file/CD7310EN.pdf (Accessed: 2 February 2026).

FEWS NET (2025) ‘Ethiopia Acute Food Insecurity Classification (October 2025–May 2026)’, FEWS NET. Available at:
https://www.fews.net/ethiopia-acute-food-insecurity-classification-october-2025-may-2026 (Accessed: 1 February 2026).

FEWS NET (2025) ‘Emergency (IPC Phase 4) likely to emerge in early 2026…’, Food Security Outlook: Ethiopia (October 2025). Available at:
https://fews.net/east-africa/ethiopia/food-security-outlook/october-2025 (Accessed: 26 January 2026).

Gufue, Z.H., Haftu, H.K., Hailu, Alemayehu, Y., Mengesha, M.B., Tsegay, E.W., and Dessalegn, B. (2024) ‘Damage to the public health system caused by war-related looting or vandalism in the Tigray region of Northern Ethiopia in 2021’, Frontiers in Public Health, Vol. 12.  https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2024.1271028 , Available at:
https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/public-health/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2024.1271028/full (Accessed: 25 January 2026).

IOM (2023) Ethiopia — Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM). International Organization for Migration. Available at:
https://dtm.iom.int/ethiopia (Accessed: 26 January 2026).

McGowan, C.R., Cassidy-Seyoum, S., Ekoriko, P., Alhaffar, M., Cassini, L., Palmer, J., Warsame, A., and Checchi, F. (2025) ‘Conflict-attributable mortality in Tigray Region, Ethiopia’, Population Health Metrics, Vol. 23, No. 19. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12963-025-00380-2 . Available at:
https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12096794/pdf/12963_2025_Article_380.pdf  (Accessed: 6 February 2026).

UNICEF (2025) Humanitarian Action for Children 2026: Ethiopia (Appeal). Available at:
https://www.unicef.org/media/176976/file/2026-HAC-Ethiopia.pdf  (Accessed: 4 February 2026).

World Bank (2022) Ethiopia Damage and Needs Assessment – Volume A (December 2022). Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at:
https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099062223114085580/pdf/P178696097971c07308d95048b3da36454d.pdf  (Accessed: 26 January 2026).