Can the Development Road Really Bypass the Strait of Hormuz?
The strategic limits and regional potential of the Iraq-Türkiye development road
Few maritime passages expose the fragility of global energy trade as clearly as the Strait of Hormuz. Oil flows through the chokepoint averaged 20.7 million barrels per day in the fourth quarter of 2025, before falling to an estimated 14.6 million barrels per day in the first quarter of 2026 during severe disruption. The latter estimate remains provisional because tanker-tracking data became less reliable after late February (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2026c).
Against this background, Türkiye has promoted the Iraq-Türkiye Development Road as a means of strengthening regional resilience and diversifying trade routes (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, 2026). Yet geography complicates this claim. Since Grand Faw Port lies inside the Gulf, can the corridor truly bypass Hormuz, or does it primarily provide an alternative to the Bab el-Mandeb-Red Sea–Suez route?
Figure 1: What does the development road actually bypass?
Source: Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure (2026a).
What is the development road?
At its core, the Development Road is an attempt to turn Iraq’s geography into a bridge between the Gulf and Europe. The planned corridor begins at Grand Faw Port near Basra and runs north through major Iraqi cities, including Baghdad and Mosul, before reaching Türkiye. Its Iraqi section will combine roughly 1,200 kilometres of new railway and motorway infrastructure, with onward connections to Türkiye’s Mediterranean ports and European markets (Öztürk, 2024, p. 197; Damirov, 2025, p. 228).
The project is also becoming more ambitious than a conventional transport route. Plans now envisage a broader infrastructure corridor carrying fibre-optic cables, electricity and, potentially, oil and natural gas pipelines. In July 2026, Türkiye announced that designs for the additional 500-kilometre connection to Gaziantep had been completed and entered into the investment programme. Yet the project remains at a pre-construction stage: the preferred border connection and financing model were still being finalised, despite the stated aim of beginning work during 2026 (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, 2026).
Does it actually bypass Hormuz?
The project’s geography exposes the central weakness in the claim that it can bypass Hormuz. Grand Faw Port is located at Iraq’s narrow maritime opening in the northern Persian Gulf, while the Strait of Hormuz connects the Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea (Hasan, 2024, p. 8). A vessel carrying goods from India, China or Southeast Asia must therefore pass through Hormuz before it can unload at Faw. For cargo that would otherwise travel directly across the Indian Ocean towards the Red Sea, using the Development Road could actually introduce exposure to a chokepoint that the conventional route avoids.
The corridor’s real geographical value begins after the cargo reaches Iraq. From Faw, containers could move overland through Iraq and Türkiye, avoiding Bab el-Mandeb, the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. The International Maritime Organization describes the Red Sea route as extending from Bab el-Mandeb to Suez, while the Suez Canal Authority identifies the canal as the principal maritime connection between the Red Sea and Mediterranean. The Development Road is therefore better understood as a potential alternative to the Bab el-Mandeb–Red Sea–Suez route, rather than to Hormuz itself—a distinction also reflected in studies presenting the project primarily as a Suez alternative (Yıldız, 2024, p. 63).
Figure 2: Hormuz cannot be easily replaced
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2025a, 2025b).
For containerised freight, the Development Road has its clearest commercial case. Ships could unload at Grand Faw and containers could continue by rail through Iraq and Türkiye towards Europe. This would replace the Red Sea–Suez leg, rather than Hormuz itself. Its competitiveness would still depend on efficient transshipment, customs coordination and predictable rail charges. Hasan (2024, p. 12) cautions that combining maritime and land transport creates extra handling costs, while sea transport between Asia and Europe is generally cheaper.
Oil presents a harder capacity test. Around 20 million barrels per day passed through Hormuz in 2024; roughly one-fifth of global petroleum-liquids consumption. Saudi and Emirati pipelines offered only about 2.6 million barrels per day of spare bypass capacity (EIA, 2025a). Rail cannot absorb oil flows on this scale. Iraq could reduce its exposure through new northbound pipelines, but existing routes remain constrained by damage, underinvestment and missing links between southern production and Mediterranean outlets (Collins, 2026, pp. 7–8). The Development Road therefore has no operational oil-bypass capacity.
Figure 3: Why additional overland routes matter
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2026c)
The constraint is greater for LNG. About 20 per cent of global LNG trade crossed Hormuz in 2024, including approximately 9.3 billion cubic feet per day exported by Qatar (EIA, 2025b). Rail cannot replace these specialised seaborne flows. Meaningful diversion would require major gas pipelines and terminal infrastructure, neither of which currently operates as part of the Development Road.
What changed in 2026?
The Development Road gained greater institutional and political weight during 2026, but the gap between preparation and implementation remained visible. In April, Iraq’s Ministry of Transport reviewed a dedicated draft law designed to establish the project’s legal framework, coordinate Grand Faw Port with Iraq’s road and railway networks, and create a more predictable environment for investors (Iraqi Ministry of Transport, 2026).
By late July, however, Türkiye was still speaking of laying the project’s “first stone” before the end of the year. Although designs for Türkiye’s proposed 500-kilometre connection towards Gaziantep had entered the investment programme, the financing model and final cross-border arrangements were still being settled (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, 2026).
More importantly, the project began to evolve beyond a conventional road-and-rail corridor. Iraqi ministries agreed to integrate fibre-optic infrastructure, while officials discussed electricity transmission and possible oil and natural-gas pipelines alongside the transport network. Türkiye and Iraq also linked the project to broader negotiations over gas cooperation and Iraqi energy exports to Europe (Iraqi News Agency, 2026).
This strategic shift became clearer on 1 August, when the two countries signed a one-year agreement covering up to 750,000 barrels per day through the existing Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. The agreement is not formally part of the Development Road, but it demonstrates Iraq’s growing search for northbound export routes following disruption at Hormuz (Al Jazeera, 2026). The agreement supported northbound Iraqi energy diversification, but added no operational capacity to the Development Road, as no dedicated pipeline had been funded or scheduled. Figure 4 also suggests that demand could exceed multimodal capacity by 2050, supporting phased expansion based on proven traffic.
Figure 4: Capacity and demand on the Development Road
Source: The Development Road (2024), “Traffic and economic data”.
Policy recommendations
The Development Road should be developed as an integrated regional corridor, rather than merely as a railway linking Grand Faw with Türkiye. Iraq and Türkiye should establish a joint corridor authority, clarify financing and ownership responsibilities, introduce a single-window customs system, and coordinate common technical and security standards across the route.
The project could also become an important component of the wider Türkiye-Iraq strategic partnership. Future bilateral defence and security cooperation could include the protection of ports, railways, pipelines and border crossings, alongside intelligence-sharing against sabotage, terrorism and organised crime. This framework should protect commercial infrastructure without turning the corridor into an exclusively military project.
Participation should gradually be widened to other regional actors. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states could be incorporated as investors, energy suppliers and logistical partners, strengthening the corridor’s financial base and regional legitimacy. Rather than treating IMEC solely as a rival, policymakers should also explore interoperability between the two corridors through shared ports, railway connections, energy networks and digital infrastructure. Such an approach could transform the Development Road from a bilateral project into a broader platform linking the Gulf, Türkiye and Europe.
Türkiye’s Mediterranean ports should remain central to this strategy, providing a reliable European gateway and supporting Türkiye’s ambition to become a regional logistics and energy hub. However, infrastructure alone will not generate trade. The project’s success will depend on predictable customs procedures, competitive transit costs, political coordination, infrastructure security and long-term commitments from shipping, logistics and energy companies.
References
Al Jazeera (2026) ‘Turkiye and Iraq sign one-year oil pipeline deal amid global shift’, 1 August. Available at: Al Jazeera (Accessed: 4 August 2026).
Collins, G. (2026) Wars and Pipelines: How Armed Conflict Has Driven Oil Logistics Diversification. Working Paper. Houston: Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.
Damirov, F. (2025) ‘Iraq Development Road Project and Corridor Politics’, Akademik Tarih ve Düşünce Dergisi, 12(6), pp. 224–234. doi: 10.5281/zenodo.18096716.
European Commission (2023) ‘2023 State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen’, 13 September. Available at: European Commission (Accessed: 4 August 2026).
Hasan, H. (2024) Iraq’s Development Road: Geopolitics, Rentierism, and Border Connectivity. Beirut: Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center.
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2016) Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Turkey 2016 Review. Paris: International Energy Agency.
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2026) ‘Turkiye – Energy Supply Security 2023’. Available at: International Energy Agency (Accessed: 4 August 2026).
Iraqi Ministry of Transport (2026) ‘Transport holds a workshop to discuss the draft law of the Development Road Project’ [in Arabic], 26 April. Available at: Grand Faw Port official project website (Accessed: 4 August 2026).
Iraqi News Agency (2026) ‘Iraq and Türkiye discuss bilateral relations and ways to strengthen in various fields’, 22 June. Available at: Iraqi News Agency (Accessed: 4 August 2026).
Öztürk, B. (2024) ‘The Development Road Project (DRP): Transforming the Nature of Türkiye–Iraq Relations’, PERCEPTIONS: Journal of International Affairs, 29(2), pp. 196–213.
Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure (2026a) ‘Kalkınma Yolu’nda çalışmaların bu sene başlaması hedefleniyor’, 25 July. Available at: Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure (Accessed: 4 August 2026).
Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure (2026b) ‘Mersin limanları, Orta Koridor’a ve Kalkınma Yolu’na yüksek hızda bağlanacak’, 26 May. Available at: Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure (Accessed: 4 August 2026).
The Development Road (2024) ‘Traffic and economic data’. Available at: The Development Road project website (Accessed: 4 August 2026).
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2025a) ‘Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint’, 16 June. Available at: U.S. Energy Information Administration (Accessed: 4 August 2026).
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2025b) ‘About one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade flows through the Strait of Hormuz’, 24 June. Available at: U.S. Energy Information Administration (Accessed: 4 August 2026).
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2026c) ‘Global Energy Security Data’, Short-Term Energy Outlook, 13 May. Available at: U.S. Energy Information Administration (Accessed: 4 August 2026).
Yıldız, M. (2024) ‘Türkiye’s Strategic “Development Road” Project: Geopolitical Impacts and Regional Opportunities’, Anasay, 29, pp. 63–73. doi: 10.33404/anasay.1503772.
