Youth Unemployment in Spain: The Fault in Our Degrees
On the back of significant economic challenges brought about by the Eurozone crisis, Spain experienced consistently strong economic growth, with an annual GDP growth rate of approximately 2.6% between 2014 and 2019, making it the fastest growing economy in Europe in 2019 (Romei and Arnold, 2020). However, contrary to this unanticipated growth in GDP and apparent strengthening of the Spanish economy, annual unemployment has remained significantly higher than the European Union (EU) average for the past decade (see Figure 1).
Source: Eurostat, 2021
More concerningly, youth unemployment is considerably higher than the EU average, a trend which has persisted since the onset of the crisis, despite that fact that Spain had consistently low youth unemployment in prior periods (Eurostat, 2021). Figure 2 highlights that Spain’s high youth unemployment extends beyond the transitional 15-24-year age bracket where unemployment is typically above national average, lingering well into the mid 20s. Although it is widely recognised that the crisis did lead to increased unemployment, other strong EU performers such as France and Germany did not experience such sustained unemployment, with measures, such as providing affordable vocational courses, targeting the youth unemployment figures (Young, 2018). This exposes a worrisome trend, indicating the possibility for structural concerns which will impede economic growth, especially in the wake of Covid-19.
Source: Eurostat, 2021
The most significant concern for youth is the egregious and often painstaking road to tertiary qualifications in Spain, which is no guarantee for employment. Degrees are the longest in the EU, typically taking 4 years to complete (European Commission, 2018). Further challenges for Spain’s tertiary education system include perpetual legal revisions which have accomplished little. Evidently, Spain is not currently generating the expertise it requires or may use in its current environment, simply because of the outdated teaching methods and failure to promote objective analysis and evaluation over memorisation. A large proportion of positions demand either a very limited education or multiple degrees, creating significant challenges for recent graduates.
Moreover, wages remain low, often encouraging individuals to seek informal internships or continue to study in the hopes of improving future employment prospects (Gros and Alcidi, 2019). Worse still, graduates are being left with no choice but to seek work in other EU countries when Spain is offering them little else than false promises. Whilst the governments so called 2019 ‘Return Plan’ aimed to encourage expatriates to return to Spain for secure work, this never eventuated, and even if it had, it is arguably too little too late. Furthermore, the persistence of other structural flaws in the labour market such as low wages and the reliance on the public sector for stable employment will continue to push applicants to look elsewhere for opportunities (Gros and Alcidi, 2019).
Evidently, significant structural problems persist, and administrations continue to fail to initiate the necessary changes to the economic, political and educational environments in order to force real change to the working culture of Spain. The persistent nature of youth unemployment in Spain has direct effects on other economic indicators. Although the labour market and wage concerns remain at the forefront, economic diversity compounds the current issues for youth. Whilst changes to distribution of Spain’s GDP occurred, the lack of diversity in the economy has created increased economic hardship and Covid-19 only reinforced this, proving that Spain’s heavy reliance on tourism and construction was detrimental during the crisis, highlighting that there is room to shifts towards a further, serviced based growth in line with other developed economies (Oxford Analytica, 2020).
However, there are larger issues at play. The endemic nature of youth unemployment can foster political instability in the next decade for Spain. This creates the possibility of causing disenfranchisement for youth and a general disregard for education. In an arguably already fragile political system, the current government cannot afford to further erode trust in the political process, or in the ability of leaders to make real change. The issue of confidence in parties and politicians in Spain is broader than unemployment, however, deep rooted issues such as this will affect the overall perception of the government.
It is highly apparent that Spain is facing the effects of yet another economic crisis as a result of COVID-19 which has the ability to irrevocably shape youth unemployment in Spain for the next 5-10 years. With the NextGenerationEU fund, the Spanish administration has the chance to implement significant reform across business, creating incentives to employ those graduates under 30 in jobs which they are qualified for, whilst also redefining the parameters of tertiary education, seeking to align the timeframe of degrees with that of their European counterparts. The willingness to provide an enticing business environment for the establishment of increasingly formal employment channels will be essential in increasing the efficiency, profitability and longevity of employment, and, in turn, contributing to a much-needed increased quality of life and reduced reliance on state-funded pensions as the working population ages.
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