Why China Does Not Want to Intervene in Iran
An analysis of China’s strategic neutrality in the Iran War of 2026.
The recent escalation of the Iranian crisis, culminating on Feb. 28 2026 in the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei by Israeli airstrikes (backed by the U.S.) has drawn several Gulf states into the conflict as part of Teheran’s retaliation. Iran launched successive waves of ballistic missiles and drone strikes targeting Israeli and American assets across the region, hitting Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Oman (Al Jazeera, 2026). In this delicate international context, a question arises: what is the role of China?
Following Western sanctions imposed to Iran in 2018 by the Trump’s administration and its Western allies, China capitalized and concluded a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement with Teheran, pledging $400 billion to the regime (Xuetong, 2021). As a result, China has secured a big portion of Iran’s oil exports. This might lead some to think, especially given Russia’s position weakened by the prolonged war in Ukraine, why China does not directly take action to help Iran?
In the West, we are used to perceive the concept of alliance as perceived by the U.S. So, when China does not react to certain events, some might think it doesn’t have a strategy. However, looking at Chinese politics and foreign relations doctrine can make the whole picture clearer. There is a common misconception in the West that Teheran and Beijing are allies only because they have economic relations. However, to paraphrase my professor at Peking University: if you asked a taxi driver in Beijing about China-Iran’s relations, they would probably say that they are not allies.
The difference lies precisely between the definitions of alliance and strategic partnership and China’s doctrine of building relations with other countries. Chinese foreign policy explicitly rejects NATO-style military alliances that could drag it into unnecessary wars caused by others, in which Beijing would be pushed to act (Xuetong, 2021, 44). The core of this doctrine is the willingness of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to keep the growth of the country steady, avoiding anything that might disrupt it. For these reasons, Beijing prefers to build a diplomacy of strategic partnerships, a flexible and non-binding economic framework that ensures China the freedom to autonomously decide if and how to act in case of a conflict.
The reason why Beijing has not, and will not, substantially help Teheran in the recent escalation is because it is not convenient for China. To back my hypothesis, I will use as an example of China’s posture towards the Russia-Ukraine conflict, exemplified by Xu and Zhao’s analysis (2025), the so-called discursive strategic neutrality. They argue that part of the reason why China did not completely align with Russia in regard to the conflict in Ukraine is because an excessively clear alignment with Russia “could trigger economic retaliation or trade disruptions with key Western economies” (Xu & Zhou, 2025). It’s more convenient for China to eventually lose Iranian oil than lose exports to Western economies.
In the case of Iran, this is even more pronounced. Despite the 2021 agreement, Teheran has yet to represent a marginal portion of Chinese trade markets. Many claim China-Iran ties in virtue of China’s purchases of Iranian sanctioned oil, however, the Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy notes that Iran represents a very small portion of China’s oil imports (Downs, 2025). Therefore, Beijing is more interested in preserving economic relations with the West and the Gulf, both of which represent a crucial output for China’s massive production.
Secondly, what emerges from the Chinese MFA is an emphasis on China’s initiatives, allowing China to enhance its role as a peaceful mediator and international peacemaker without taking any explicit side. This behavior is aimed at building the international image of China as a peaceful power that prefers business to conflict, opposed to U.S. interventionism. This pattern is visible in both situations where Beijing encourages diplomacy and dialogue without offering direct support to Moscow or Teheran.
Finally, the most striking point is represented by how discursive strategic neutrality allows China to be perceived as a reliable partner by both parties in almost every conflict with the collateral cost of abstaining from acting. As highlighted by Brookings, even the collapse of the Iranian regime would be manageable for Beijing. Despite recent surges in Iranian oil exports to China, Teheran does not represent a minor stake of Chinese oil imports and Beijing could promptly replace it with alternative strategic sources (Brookings Institution, 2026). This asymmetry explains that Iran needs China much more than China needs Iran.
As Xu and Zhou wrote about Russia, Beijing avoids a direct alignment to undermine its relations with the West. In Iran’s case the relation is so unbalanced that even without considering China’s national doctrine, the latter has no incentive in paying the political and economic cost of an explicit backing. The analysis suggests that China’s posture towards the conflict in Iran will align with the one pursued with Russia.
Bibliography
Brookings Institution. “How Is China Positioning Itself as Iran’s Regime Teeters?” Brookings Institution, January 27, 2026. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-is-china-positioning-itself-as-irans-regime-teerans-regime-teeters/.
Downs, Erica. “China’s Oil Demand, Imports and Supply Security.” Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University, May 6, 2025. https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/chinas-oil-demand-imports-and-supply-security/.
Yan, Xuetong. Becoming Strong: The New Chinese Foreign Policy. Translated by Joshua Eaton. New York: General Press, 2022.
Al Jazeera. “World Reacts to Killing of Iran’s Khamenei by US, Israel Forces.” Al Jazeera, 2026.
Xu, You, and Xiru Zhao. “China’s Discursive Strategic Neutrality Position in the Russo-Ukrainian War: Insights from China’s Strategic Narratives.” Journal of Contemporary China 34, no. 156 (2025): 1008–1025. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2025.2479019.
