Who Speaks for America? Presidential Preference, Congressional Power, and the Midterms 

Foreign governments usually look to the White House to understand American foreign policy. In November, they should be watching Capitol Hill just as closely

The wrong election gets all the attention

American presidential elections are treated as global political events. Midterm elections receive far less international attention and are more often presented as a domestic judgement on the sitting president.

That distinction can obscure their wider significance. On 3 November 2026, Americans will elect the entire House of Representatives and roughly one third of the Senate, determining control of Congress for the final two years of Donald Trump’s current term (USAGov, 2026). The result will shape the political environment in which U.S. foreign policy is made at a time when U.S. commitments abroad remain politically contested.

For governments that depend on Washington, congressional elections therefore deserve closer attention than they usually receive. A change in congressional control can alter the conditions under which the administration pursues its foreign-policy agenda and affect how securely American commitments are anchored in the broader political system (Blanchard et al., 2024).

After November, the international question will be what the new balance of power means for the United States’ ability to sustain its commitments abroad.

The myth of a single American foreign policy 

The language of foreign affairs often compresses the United States into a single political voice, captured in phrases such as ‘Washington’s position’ or ‘American policy’. Authority over foreign policy is divided across institutions. The president occupies the most visible position and exercises substantial influence through diplomacy and the commander-in-chief role, while Congress possesses its own constitutional authority over the framework within which foreign policy is carried out. The Senate also retains a distinct role in treaties and senior appointments (U.S. Const. art. II; Glassman, 2016).

The consequence is a foreign policy shaped through interaction between institutions. The degree of institutional support behind a presidential initiative helps determine how durable that policy becomes. The Congressional Research Service describes this process as iterative, with Congress able to support, amend or seek to reverse executive initiatives (Blanchard et al., 2024).

Foreign governments therefore have to read Washington institutionally. The White House may provide the clearest public signal of American intentions, but those intentions exist within a political system where authority is dispersed and where institutional agreement can shape how firmly a policy is embedded over time.

The machinery of congressional influence

Congressional influence becomes most tangible when policy has to be funded and implemented. Much of U.S. engagement abroad depends on appropriations passed by Congress, giving lawmakers influence over the scale and duration of American commitments (Brown and McCabe, 2022). Congressional influence also extends to arms transfers. Under the Arms Export Control Act, many proposed sales must be reported to Congress before they can proceed, creating opportunities for lawmakers to scrutinise or attempt to block them (Kerr, 2026).

Congress also shapes the legal environment in which foreign policy operates. Sanctions and security assistance can be structured through legislation, allowing lawmakers to establish conditions that remain relevant after the political moment that produced them has passed (Collins-Chase, 2022; Blanchard et al., 2024). Congressional committees reinforce that influence through oversight of the executive. These mechanisms can expose disagreements over implementation and place sustained political pressure on the executive (Blanchard et al., 2024).

The effects of these powers extend far beyond Washington. For governments that rely on U.S. support, congressional control shapes the conditions under which presidential priorities become policy and how long those policies can endure.

The election from outside America 

The international significance of the midterms becomes clearer when viewed from capitals that depend on Washington for security. In Kyiv, the concern is the continuity of U.S. support when congressional preferences shift. The war has already shown how strongly assistance depends on repeated decisions in Congress. The 2024 Ukraine supplemental provided $60.78 billion, while later funding has been more limited, underscoring the importance of congressional control for the scale and continuity of support (McGarry, 2024; Special Inspector General for Operation Atlantic Resolve, 2026).

For Taipei, the issue is how firmly U.S. security support is anchored in legislation. Congress has used its legislative authority to shape military financing and arms transfers to Taiwan. The Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act expanded mechanisms for supporting Taiwan’s defence, while congressional oversight continues to influence the broader security relationship (Campbell, Arabia and Lawrence, 2024).

Brussels raises the question of how much legal protection surrounds an American alliance commitment. Congress has placed limits on a president’s ability to withdraw the United States from NATO without legislative involvement, giving the alliance a degree of institutional protection beyond the preferences of a single administration. Congress also remains involved in funding and overseeing the U.S. military presence and deterrence posture in Europe (Sokol, 2025; Fink, 2026).

Seen from these capitals, the midterms become a test of the institutional depth behind American commitments.

The real issue: commitment versus preference 

For allies, the crucial question is whether a position expressed in Washington can survive changes in American politics. Presidential statements reveal the priorities of the current administration. Credibility increases when reversing that position would require broader political and institutional change. Congress helps create that staying power through legislation, appropriations and oversight (O’Rourke, 2021).

International-relations scholarship helps explain why this matters. Michaela Mattes argues that democratic governments can increase the reliability of alliance commitments by creating institutional arrangements that constrain future governments. Lisa Martin similarly shows how institutions can raise the political costs of abandoning an international commitment. In both accounts, institutional constraints can make international commitments more credible (Mattes, 2012; Martin, 2005).

That logic matters most where governments must plan beyond a single U.S. administration. Defence planning and alliance strategy extend well beyond a single presidential term, so allies must assess how deeply a policy is rooted in the wider American political system. The midterms therefore offer a measure of how much staying power current U.S. policy possesses.

Conclusion: read institutions, not personalities 

After November, the key question for foreign governments will be what the result changes beneath the surface of American foreign policy. Presidential statements will continue to shape the immediate signal from Washington; the institutional response will reveal how much staying power that signal possesses.

In Washington, the president may speak for America. Congress helps decide how long America can keep its word.

Bibliography 

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2005.00259.x

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McGarry, Brendan W. 2024. Department of Defence Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: A Summary. Congressional Research Service, IN12107, updated 23 October 2024. Available at: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12107

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