What the Ankara Threat Was Really About

On July 8, President Trump boarded the older presidential Air Force One jet for his return journey from the NATO Summit in Ankara. During a stop in the United Kingdom, he quietly switched aircraft, boarding a Boeing 747-8 after Israeli intelligence warned the CIA that his life was at risk. The CIA, however, was skeptical.

A “Convenient” Threat

According to U.S. officials who spoke to The Washington Post, Israeli intelligence indicated that Iran was planning to shoot down Trump’s plane with a surface-to-air missile and had tracking precise enough to pinpoint his hotel floor in Ankara. But knowing Iran wanted Trump dead is not the same as knowing it would—especially on Israel’s word alone. The CIA saw it that way, too. Intelligence analysts told the Post that they believed the threat fit a broader pattern: Israel influencing, rather than merely informing, the president’s decision-making in the region.

The timing helps explain their concern. Erdoğan has repeatedly called Israel’s actions genocidal, supported International Criminal Court arrest warrants for Israeli leaders, and warned that Israeli operations in Syria and Lebanon now threaten Türkiye directly. At the same time, Trump has floated selling F-35s to Türkiye—jets that would modernize its air force and narrow the technological gap that gives Israel a military advantage in the region.

Netanyahu raised both issues directly in the days before the NATO summit. He called Trump and asked him to rein in Erdoğan’s rhetoric and delay the F-35 sale. Trump’s response, according to a U.S. official who spoke to Axios, was noncommittal: he might ask Erdoğan to “go a little easy on this,” but offered nothing more concrete. On the jets, there was no indication that he would budge. Days later, Trump flew to Ankara and stood beside Erdoğan.

Then the threat surfaced. It is impossible to know whether its timing was coincidental or convenient. What is clear is the weight behind it. Israel’s leverage has long rested partly on its intelligence operations inside Iran, which Washington relies on to track the regime’s weapons programs and leadership. That reliance is practical, not a matter of loyalty, and it is precisely why the United States could not dismiss the warning outright. The response underscored this point. The Secret Service used a high-stakes deception protocol, concealing Trump’s transfer to another plane with a catering truck used as a decoy. Those measures, taken even as the CIA questioned the threat, suggested that the warning succeeded in moving the president. Whether it shifted the alliance itself is another matter.

Preparations surrounding Air Force One before President Donald Trump departed from Ankara, Turkey, in July. (Alex Brandon/AP)

Relations Turning Cold

The strain between Washington and Jerusalem predates Ankara. On July 31, the Board of Peace proposed that Hamas disarm in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. The central disagreement was over sequencing: Israel insisted that Hamas fully disarm before any troop withdrawal, while Hamas wanted Israel to withdraw first.

On August 9, Netanyahu formally rejected the plan, insisting that Israeli forces would not withdraw until Hamas was, in his words, genuinely disarmed. The decision was not merely about policy. Multiple outlets interpreted it as an appeal to his right-wing base and hard-right coalition partners ahead of the October election—a domestic calculation but with a regional cost

Those costs surfaced quickly when eight foreign ministries, including the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt condemned Israel’s rejection, accusing it of undermining efforts to end the war and derailing Trump’s push for lasting peace. They called on the United States to secure Israel’s full compliance with the plan and hold it accountable for the consequences of continued rejection, obstruction, delay, or noncompliance. For a government already managing friction with Washington, such a broad rebuke signals how thin Israel’s regional insulation has become. Eight days later, Trump sent Kushner to meet with Netanyahu.

​The ensuing four-hour meeting produced two working groups: one on disarmament, the other on public health and reconstruction. Kushner cast the outcome as a win for Israel, arguing that if Hamas surrendered its weapons and tunnels within 60 to 90 days, a major security threat would be nearly eliminated. Yet the disarmament group rests on an untested assumption: that all parties agree on what disarmament means. They do not. The Board of Peace defines it broadly, encompassing all weapons and tunnels, light and heavy. Hamas, according to an official granted anonymity by Politico, understands its commitment more narrowly, as limited to storing heavy weapons. Ultimately, that gap—not the working groups themselves—will determine whether the agreement holds

Regional and international pressure on Israel is mounting, while Washington’s response has been to manage the relationship rather than discipline it. The Ankara threat may have captured Trump’s attention. Whether it recalibrates U.S. policy or tests the limits of American patience remains an open question, one with consequences for how Washington and its regional partners will assess risk going forward.

US Military Assistance to Israel & Turkey, 2019-2025

Bibliography

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David M. Halbfinger and Adam Rasgon. “Kushner, Netanyahu Make Little Progress on Advancing Gaza Deal After Meeting.” The New York Times, August 17, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/17/world/middleeast/kushner-netanyahu-gaza-peace-deal.html.

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