Weaponized Connectivity: Political Risk and the Security of Global Undersea Cables
The global internet relies on submarine cables that carry more than 95% of international data traffic (International Telecommunication Union [ITU], 2024). Between 2018 and 2025, these cables have become strategically contested assets (Chatain and Ghez, 2025). The vulnerabilities are revealed by the hybrid warfare tactics adopted by Russia and China having proven the numerous weaknesses in largely unprotected networks (Centre for European and International Affairs Studies [CEIAS], 2025; Solace Global, 2025). In this paper, the up-and-coming risks, such as state-sponsored sabotage, gathering of intelligence and its implication to the security of the west, are explored. It also highlights a shift toward a more contested maritime environment, where physical and cyber security become more intertwined, and urges to implement a preventative multilateral approach to the protection of this critical infrastructure (Global South Forum, 2026; BankInfoSecurity, 2025).
The Strategic Rise of Submarine Cables (2018–2025)
More than 1.4 million kilometers of undersea cables transmit over 99% of international communications and data (ITU, 2024). They are critical to world finance, and internet services as well as state communications. These networks are targets adopted as strategic infrastructure between 2018 and 2025 as opposed to being passive. This paper analyses the risks in the political sphere, such as sabotage, espionage, and gray-zone politics by great powers (Chatain and Ghez, 2025; CEIAS, 2025). Previous estimates suggested 100–200 cable interference incidents per year, most of which were accidental (CEIAS, 2025). Although the incidents of accidents are still widespread, the number of accidents associated with the activities of the state increases over the 2018-2025 perspective (Solace Global, 2025). The Baltic Sea and the South China Sea/Taiwan Strait are becoming hot spots. In November 2023, Lithuania and Sweden cut off their relations and it is claimed that the foreign vessels did it (Global South Forum, 2026). The presence of Chinese-flagged vessels offshore Taiwan indicates an intentional interference with offshore networks that show that cable disruption is a viable strategy of gain without achieving conflict (Chatain and Ghez, 2025).
From Accidental Damage to Deliberate Interference
The weaponized interdependence relies on submarine cables, in which states are using positioning in networks to gain both political and military benefits (Farrell and Newman, 2019). Russia and China are capable of locating, tracking, and even disrupting deep-sea cables, which they have the technical capability to do (Bueger and Liebetrau, 2021). Operations of grey-zone tactics below the levels of formal conflicts are extremely challenging. States engage commercial or research ships in contact with cables and keep them secret, which makes legal and diplomatic reaction difficult (Bueger and Liebetrau, 2021). Integrity of the cables is not the only issue. There are strategic risks of interpreting data. Though it is hard to tap deep-sea cables, they are more susceptible to landing stations and terrestrial connections (Sun, 2019). Chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal serve as major risk concentration points, which allows for a sophisticated actor to perform intelligence operations at a massive scale (Sun, 2019; ITU, 2024). Submarine cables are becoming privately owned. Google, Meta, and Microsoft are technology companies that leverage considerable market shares in international networks (Hurel and Raymond, 2023). Resilience and low latency, which are private priorities, can go against national security interests. The present international law, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is pre-digital and does not provide many options to dox cable security in the international waters, which is why it has a governance gap that allows enemies to play (Greenacre, 2023).
To ensure the safety of submarine cables, the reactive approach of repairs has to change to preventive actions. The emphasis should be placed on the international cooperation related to the cable protection zones and improvement of multilateral navigation surveillance. Digital sovereignty appeals to technical innovation as well as diplomatic settlement, and understands undersea cables as world commons. The protection of these networks helps a state to exist stably regardless of a hybrid threat and maintain economic stability and national security (BankInfoSecurity, 2025; Global South Forum, 2026). Submarine cables have become the Achilles heel of the digital economy and provide a fundamental and yet very delicate source of world connectivity. Having been an easy target due to accidental damage, they are becoming a large target of state-sponsored sabotage, espionage, and computer sabotage. The stiffening of geopolitical rivalry especially among the United States, China, and Russia as well as the monopolization of data streams through the major bottlenecks like the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz has plunged the world into a high-risk environment where passive security solutions are now inadequate. The recent events in the Baltic and the Red seas are a testimony to how widespread the use of covert gray-zone tactics has reached to take advantage of these networks.
Intelligence Risks and Cyber‑Physical Vulnerabilities
The growth of the cable infrastructure has outpaced the ability to conduct repairs which also resulted in the extended duration of the outage and predisposition. Major technology companies including Google, Meta, and Amazon, despite their large capacity of consumption globally, do not possess the capacity of states to uphold their security, and this means that a more robust alliance between the government and the corporate sector should be established. More resilience in the future should be built upon a tactical change: installation of hi-tech surveillance systems, cable route diversification, reinforcement of their capacity to recover data, and legal and physical security improvements. These important networks can be effectively secured only with the help of systems of international coordination.
Toward a Preventive, Multilateral Security Framework
Submarine internet cables have become a critical issue for global strategic infrastructure, increasingly exposed to geopolitical tensions that threaten digital connectivity and internet stability. The risks to these cables have intensified during the period 2018–2025, shifting from accidental damage to more complex threats, including state-sponsored sabotage, such as the alleged involvement of Russia in targeting undersea internet cables in the North Atlantic, where increased naval activity since 2018 has raised serious concerns about strategic disruption of global infrastructure, metropolitan competition, and cyber-physical vulnerabilities. Hence, there is a pressing need to enhance international cooperation, diversify cable routes, and implement advanced monitoring and security mechanisms to safeguard the world’s submarine internet cable networks.
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