The US-Brokered Lebanon–Israel Peace Deal and the Fragmentation of Southern Lebanon: Implications for Territorial Sovereignty and Regional Security
The US-led negotiations establish a framework for Israeli military redeployment and the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty in southern Lebanon. The agreement nevertheless remains contingent upon the resolution of outstanding security arrangements, including Hizballah’s military presence and the extent of Israeli withdrawal.
From 4 to 6 August, the next round of US-led Lebanon–Israel talks was held in Rome, following the 26 June Trilateral Framework signed in Washington. The framework aims to end “the conflict” and “ensure the sovereignty and security” of Lebanon (Office of the Spokesperson, 2026). However, the agreement has generated domestic political controversy in Lebanon. The Lebanese government, led by President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, has faced criticism over its decision to engage in direct negotiations with Israel, given Lebanon’s 1955 boycott law, which restricts such engagement (Yenişafak English AA, 2026).
The framework also links Israel’s “progressive redeployment” from southern Lebanon to “a clear and structured process to restore Lebanon’s sovereignty, disarm and dismantle its terrorist infrastructure” (Office of the Spokesperson, 2026). The latter provision primarily concerns Hizballah, the Lebanese Shia political and armed organisation that holds seats in the Lebanese Parliament. The group remains an influential political actor within Lebanon, while its armed presence continues to be a central issue in discussions concerning Lebanese sovereignty and security.
Since 8 October 2023, Israeli military operations in Lebanon have resulted in significant civilian casualties and displacement. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), more than 3,000 people were killed and approximately 870,000 displaced during the escalation covered by its November 2024 reporting (OCHA, 2024). Israeli forces also crossed the UN Blue Line and established military positions in parts of southern Lebanon. According to UN peacekeepers, more than 10,000 Israeli air and ground violations were recorded during the subsequent period covered by UNIFIL reporting (L’Orient Today Staff, 2025).
As hostilities between Hizballah and Israel escalated again in March 2026, Israeli military operations expanded further into southern Lebanon. Al Jazeera reported that Israeli forces had established positions extending across approximately 20 per cent of Lebanese territory and had crossed the Litani River, while casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure continued to increase (Al Jazeera, 2026). The Israeli government has subsequently stated that military positions and buffer zones in southern Lebanon are necessary for security purposes. In July 2026, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz stated that the Israeli military had destroyed 24 villages and approximately 20,000 homes in southern Lebanon and reiterated Israel’s intention to maintain buffer zones in the area (L’Orient Today Staff, 2026a).
These developments place the current negotiations within a longer history of foreign military intervention and political fragmentation in Lebanon. The Lebanese Civil War, which lasted from 1975 to 1990, emerged from a combination of political, sectarian, socioeconomic and institutional tensions, including divisions associated with the country’s confessional political system established following independence and the 1943 National Pact (Malley, 2018).
In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon as part of Operation Peace for Galilee, advancing as far as Beirut. Israel cooperated with elements of the Lebanese Armed Forces and Maronite political factions, while confronting the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and allied Lebanese and Palestinian groups (Shahid, 2002). Syria also intervened militarily in Lebanon, citing regional security concerns. Following the Israeli invasion, the PLO leadership and fighters were evacuated from Lebanon to Tunisia under an internationally negotiated arrangement (Shahid, 2002).
The Israeli intervention was followed by further violence, including the Sabra and Shatila massacres in September 1982, during which Palestinian and Lebanese civilians were killed in refugee camps in West Beirut. The massacres were carried out by Lebanese Phalangist forces while the area was under Israeli military control (Shahid, 2002). The events contributed to a further deterioration of Lebanon’s political and security environment.
Hizballah emerged during this period, developing from networks of Lebanese Shia Islamist groups opposed to the Israeli occupation. The organisation subsequently became both a political and military actor in Lebanon. Its armed confrontation with Israel contributed to Israel’s eventual withdrawal from most of southern Lebanon in 2000. Since then, Hizballah’s military capabilities and its relationship with the Lebanese state have remained central to debates surrounding Lebanon’s sovereignty, domestic political authority and relations with Israel.
Policy Recommendations
The current negotiations therefore present Lebanon with a complex policy dilemma. The Lebanese government must balance the objective of restoring state authority over its territory with the need to maintain domestic political cohesion. Lebanon’s political system remains highly sectarian, while prolonged institutional instability and economic difficulties have weakened public confidence in state institutions.
A sustainable approach to sovereignty would require greater domestic political consensus alongside clearer state authority over security and foreign policy. This includes addressing the concerns of communities affected by military operations and displacement while developing a framework for the future role of non-state armed actors. Political reconciliation would therefore be an important component of any longer-term strategy for strengthening state legitimacy.
The implementation of the current agreement will also depend on the sequencing of Israeli military withdrawal, the restoration of Lebanese state authority and arrangements concerning Hizballah’s military infrastructure. The framework’s linkage between Israeli redeployment and the disarmament and dismantling of Hizballah creates a significant implementation challenge, particularly given the organisation’s political representation and social support within parts of Lebanon.
Israel’s continued military presence in southern Lebanon further complicates this process. Despite the establishment of a proposed “pilot zone”, Israeli forces reportedly remain in or around several villages from which they were expected to withdraw, including Zawtar al-Gharbiya, Froun and Srifa. Israeli forces have also reportedly fired on civilians and members of the Lebanese Armed Forces (Al Jazeera, 2026).
For Lebanon, the central policy challenge is therefore not simply whether to pursue negotiations with Israel, but whether the resulting agreement can establish conditions for the restoration of territorial sovereignty without generating further domestic fragmentation. The effectiveness of the agreement will ultimately depend on the implementation of its provisions, the extent of Israeli withdrawal, the capacity of the Lebanese state to exercise authority throughout its territory, and the ability of Lebanon’s political actors to reach a sustainable domestic consensus.
References
Al Jazeera (2026) ‘Israel obstructing takeover of pilot zones in Lebanon’s South: Military’, Al Jazeera. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/26/israel-obstructing-takeover-of-pilot-zones-in-lebanons-south-military (Accessed: 2 August 2026).
L’Orient Today Staff (2025) ‘UNIFIL says it has recorded over 10,000 Israeli air and ground violations in the past year’, L’Orient Today. Available at: https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1486505/unifil-says-it-has-recorded-over-10000-israeli-air-and-ground-violations-in-the-past-year.html (Accessed: 2 August 2026).
L’Orient Today Staff (2026a) ‘Katz says Israeli army completely destroyed 24 villages in Southern Lebanon’, L’Orient Today. Available at: https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1543366/katz-says-israeli-army-completely-destroyed-24-villages-in-southern-lebanon.html (Accessed: 4 August 2026).
L’Orient Today Staff (2026b) ‘Mapped out: Israeli army formalizes expansion of its “operations zone” in South Lebanon’, L’Orient Today. Available at: https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1538591/mapped-out-israeli-army-formalises-expansion-of-its-operations-zone-in-south-lebanon.html (Accessed: 2 August 2026).
Malley, M. (2018) ‘The Lebanese civil war and the Taif accord’, The History Teacher, 52(1), pp. 121–159.
OCHA (2024) ‘Lebanon: Flash update #41 – escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 4 November 2024’, ReliefWeb. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanon-flash-update-41-escalation-hostilities-lebanon-4-november-2024 (Accessed: 3 August 2026).
Office of the Spokesperson (2026) ‘Trilateral Framework Between the United States of America, the State of Israel, and the Republic of Lebanon’, U.S. Department of State. Available at: https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/trilateral-framework-between-the-united-states-of-america-the-state-of-israel-and-the-republic-of-lebanon (Accessed: 1 August 2026).
Shahid, L. (2002) ‘The Sabra and Shatila massacres: Eyewitness reports’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 32(1), pp. 36–58.
Yenişafak English AA (2026) ‘US, Israel push Lebanon to repeal law banning talks with Tel Aviv’, Yeni Şafak. Available at: https://en.yenisafak.com/world/us-israel-push-lebanon-to-repeal-law-banning-talks-with-tel-aviv-3717463 (Accessed: 1 August 2026).
