The Salient Impact of the Iran War on the African Continent
The Iran war is a brutal reminder that in a hyper-connected world there is no such thing as a “local” war. This article examines the multidimensional impacts of the war on the African continent. Despite the geographical distance of the conflict, African nations are experiencing systemic shocks across the economic, security, and diplomatic domains.
The analysis highlights the critical vulnerability of net oil and fertilizer importers (Kenya, Egypt, Sudan) following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the rerouting of maritime trade via the Cape of Good Hope. Furthermore, the study explores the reactivation of Iranian-backed proxy networks, notably Hezbollah, as an asymmetric security threat within West African territories. Finally, it addresses the “diplomatic turmoil” faced by African states within multilateral organizations (UN, OPEC, OIC), arguing that the 2026 conflict serves as a catalyst for a necessary shift toward African strategic autonomy in a fragmented global order.
The present conflict between Iran and the US and Israel officially commenced on the 28th of February 2026 with a substantial wave of coordinated airstrikes against Iranian territory. The United States and Israel initiated large-scale offensives targeting Iranian missile infrastructure, nuclear facilities, and military leadership in Tehran and throughout the nation (Britannica Editors, 2026). This course of action follows Washington and Jerusalem’s resolution that diplomatic efforts had reached an impasse, and that Iran’s nuclear program represented an imminent global threat.
In response, Iran has effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, precipitating widespread energy crises. The price of Brent crude has surpassed $105 per barrel, representing the highest price since July 2022. This 2026 conflict follows a brief direct confrontation in June 2025, known as the Twelve-Day War, which ended in a US-brokered ceasefire that collapsed in early 2026 (Voss, 2026).
Despite the geographical distance of this conflict from the African continent, its implications are global in scope and have a direct effect on African nations. Here, it is posited that there are three main areas susceptible to impact: the economic, security, and diplomatic domains.
Economic
In terms of economic implications in Africa, the Iran war is likely to result in significant energy shocks, a surge in living costs for oil-importing nations, and the potential for a windfall for the continent’s primary oil producers (Olaoluwa Ògúnmọ́dẹdé, 2026).
The impact of this phenomenon is not uniform among major importers and exporters. The following is an overview of the ways in which some of these countries are affected.
Net Importers
Since early 2023, cooperation between Iran and Africa has been increasing, especially in the economic sector. Products such as iron, cement or bitumen, urea, and industrial oil are the most traded to Africa from Iran (Therme, 2022), and according to various sources Iranian exportations to Africa reached up to 675 million US dollars in the first half of 2025 (TV Brics, 2025). The main market is composed of countries such as Kenya, South Africa, Ghana and Somalia. To illustrate, prior to 2013 Iranian oil fulfilled 25-30% of South Africa’s needs (Campbell, 2016). Even though US sanctions have greatly reduced Iranian oil exportations, it has not ceased entirely. Some African countries still import Iranian oil products and are thus likely to be affected by the present war in the Middle East. South Africa, Kenya, and Egypt especially are confronted with substantial escalations in prices. Notably, the cost of energy and transportation constitutes between 15% and 25% of their consumer price indices, a phenomenon that has been described as “catastrophic” by some observers (Obudho, 2025).
The conflict has a significant impact not only on direct importers of Iranian oil products, but also on countries which depend not on Iran but on other countries in the Middle East for oil and other products. This is due to the instability that the conflict has caused in the region, especially the attacks undertaken by Iran towards US allies and strategic trade routes in the Middle East. Countries such as South Africa, and Congo are already experiencing an increase in the price of fuel of about 25% and this will have a negative impact on the wider economy (Awambeng, 2026).
Net Exporters
It is anticipated that major oil-producing nations such as Angola and Nigeria will experience an increase in export revenues. However, Nigeria’s economic resilience remains contingent upon its substantial reliance on imported refined petroleum. In addition to the oil disturbances, we take into account disruptions with regard to shipping and trade. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the ongoing tensions in the Red Sea have compelled vessels to seek alternative routes, such as the Cape of Good Hope. The aforementioned circumstances have precipitated an escalation in freight costs and insurance premiums for African trade. The revenue of the Suez Canal, owned and operated by Egypt, is at risk as vessels circumvent the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The continent will also experience a reduction in financial pressures and debt obligations. A global “flight to safety” has occurred, which has resulted in the strengthening of the US dollar, the weakening of African currencies, and the increase in the cost of servicing dollar-denominated debt.
An examination of financial indicators reveals a notable increase in bond yields in both Kenya and South Africa, indicating a potential tightening of financial conditions in these regions. This situation also has an impact on investment and remittances (Obudho, 2025). Regarding investment, wealthy Gulf nations (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar) may reevaluate or delay over $100 billion in planned African investments in order to focus on domestic repairs and security (Schaer, 2026).
On remittances, a considerable number of African migrant workers in the Gulf are confronted with the challenge of job insecurity, a situation that has the potential to disrupt the vital income flows to countries such as Kenya and Uganda. Analysts have identified several countries as particularly at risk due to high import dependence or existing economic strain: Sudan, The Gambia, Central African Republic, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe (Al-Awsta, 2026).
The food production of numerous African countries is contingent upon the importation of fertilizers from the Gulf via the Strait of Hormuz. According to commentators, African countries that rely on imported fertilizers and allocate a significant portion of their household income toward food expenses are particularly susceptible to supply chain disruptions resulting from the war in the Middle East. The conflict has had a substantial impact on trade through the Strait of Hormuz, a critical shipping route not only for oil and gas but also for fertilizers, which are produced in substantial quantities in the Gulf region.
The Strait of Hormuz
It is noteworthy that African countries are among the most reliant on sea-based fertilizer imports from the Middle East. According to a recent report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 54% of Sudan’s fertilizer is transported via this method. The figures for Somalia and Kenya are 30% and 26%, respectively (United Nations, 2026). It is estimated that approximately one-third of seaborne trade in fertilizer, a vital agricultural input for productivity improvement, is transported through the Strait of Hormuz.
According to UNCTAD, African economies are particularly vulnerable and face elevated levels of uncertainty during periods of significant economic downturns. The underlying factors contributing to this phenomenon include a high degree of reliance on foreign markets, the volatility of commodity exports, substantial debt levels, and the inadequacy of national infrastructure.
Rama Yade, the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and former French Minister, has asserted on X that the rise in oil prices poses “serious economic challenges” for numerous governments across the African continent. This has the potential to prompt governments to either increase subsidies or pass on the associated costs to consumers, a scenario that could give rise to social and political pressures.
Security
With respect to the realm of security, infrastructures and individuals of Western interest or provenance may become targets of terrorist groups or other entities with ties to Iran. These groups have expressed a willingness to retaliate against the United States and those they perceive as collaborating with them. One such group that has its roots in African soil is Hezbollah, a Shiite militant group and political party that functions as Iran’s most powerful proxy.
The African continent, particularly the regions south of the Sahara, are distinguished by a considerable prevalence of political instability. Hezbollah capitalized on the available opportunity to establish a more robust organizational presence in Africa, a strategy that would ultimately prove instrumental in achieving its broader geopolitical objectives. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps has established a strategic alliance with Hezbollah, leveraging the vast expanse of the African continent to advance the interests of Iran. In light of the United States’ increasing engagement in the African continent in pursuit of international Salafi jihadists affiliated with Al-Qaeda, it is imperative to consider the historical role of Hezbollah and the recent activities of both Hezbollah and Iran on the African continent.
Hezbollah was established in 1982 with backing from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Iran provides substantial funding (estimated at $700 million–$1 billion annually), weapons, and training, with Hezbollah pledging loyalty to Iran’s Supreme Leader (CFR Editors, 2026).
Hezbollah drill in Aaramta, Lebanon
While technically operating in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s leadership is closely tied to Iranian interests, with Iran playing a role in its restructuring from 2006. The Lebanese Hezbollah has been present in Africa for decades. During this time, the group has engaged in a variety of terrorist activities, including hijackings, assassinations, kidnappings, and bombings, which have occurred sporadically throughout the continent (CFR Editors, 2026).
The Hezbollah Foreign Relations Department (FRD) have been known to raise funds in Africa, as noted in an October 2013 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) report on “Terrorist Financing in West Africa.” The report in question exposed the illicit fundraising activities of several Hezbollah FRD officials in Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Côte d’Ivoire. These activities included the solicitation of donations, some of which were purportedly amassed through the use of intimidation and mafia-style extortion. The network also facilitated the transfer of funds to Hezbollah in Lebanon, leveraging businesses owned by the network to raise funds for the group. Furthermore, the network was implicated in the coordination of travel for Hezbollah officials on fundraising trips to the region. In one particular instance, the FRD representative in Senegal was also implicated in leading clandestine meetings aimed at devising strategies to augment “Hezbollah’s fundraising endeavors.” (Levitt and Lechner, 2025).
Diplomacy
Presently, the UN General Assembly has not yet passed a definitive resolution on the Iran war. However, advocacy groups are currently urging the Assembly to demand an end to what they describe as an illegal conflict.
We have seen that Europeans and Americans are divided on the conflict. The first group shows reluctance to be fully involved in the war, which causes the second group’s wrath. The usual Western foes, China and Russia, have reacted similarly. The Kremlin strongly condemns the US-Israeli military actions, yet Russia has refrained from direct military intervention. Instead, Russia assumes the role of a “backstage partner”, providing intelligence and technical assistance. Beijing has repeatedly criticized the US and Israel’s military strikes, characterizing them as violations of international law and Iranian sovereignty. It has maintained a cautious and officially neutral stance, prioritizing economic stability and energy security while avoiding direct military involvement.
Concomitantly, African nations may be confronted with the prospect of adopting both official and unofficial diplomatic positions regarding the war, akin to the circumstances that prevailed during the second Iraq war. While numerous countries on the continent tend to adopt a non-partisan stance, the weight of their voice could be used to exert leverage in support for one side or the other. In such circumstances, the phenomenon under consideration has the potential to engender both direct and indirect economic or political pressure. In the coming days, the UN General Assembly may find itself in a position to vote on resolutions that will indicate the ideological leanings of African countries. The potential for the use of hallway diplomacy as a means of manipulating the actions of other nations is a salient concern.
What makes this situation a diplomatic nightmare is in part due to some African countries being in multiple regional organization groups, such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and The League of Arab States (Arab League).
To conclude, although the conflict may appear to be a direct confrontation of the ideas proposed by Samuel Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations, the conflict between the US, a Western superpower, and Iran, a limited actor in the Middle East, has the potential to have far-reaching consequences. The ramifications of this conflict will be significant in the African continent, and repercussions will likely extend to the political, economic, and diplomatic domains.
Ultimately, the 2026 conflict is a brutal reminder that in a hyper-connected world, there is no such thing as a “local” war. For Africa, the fallout is a complex mosaic of crisis and opportunity: while oil-producing giants may see their coffers swell, the average citizen faces the suffocating weight of an energy-driven cost-of-living crisis. Beyond the balance sheets, the shadows of proxy militancy and hallway diplomacy threaten to turn the continent into a secondary theater for foreign agendas. As the United Nations debates and the Gulf’s investment flows freeze, African leaders face a defining moment. They must decide whether to remain pawns in a wider geopolitical game or to leverage this turmoil to forge a more self-reliant, unified continental stance. In the face of this 2026 upheaval, silence is no longer a sanctuary; it is a risk.
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