The Russia-Ukraine War and The Energy and Political Implications in Moldova and Transnistria
Moldova, Transnistria and Russia: A Quick History
The small nation-state of Moldova borders Ukraine to its north and east, with Romania sitting to its west. Since its independence in 1991, this land-locked state of only 2.4 million people has been of great intrigue and strategic importance to Russia due to their natural geographical closeness, as well as their cultural and historical ties (Buckmaster and Hitchins, 2025). The state of Moldova was previously a part of the Soviet Union and was considered a technological centre of innovation for the larger empire of the USSR (Männi and Kaukvere, 2024). Moldova was the third-largest supplier of electronic equipment within the Soviet bloc, and the industry brought the most revenue to the annual state budget (Männi and Kaukvere, 2024). However, since the collapse of the USSR, the state of Moldova was unable to maintain its competitive advantage within the technology industry, and this, alongside losing the benefits of a stable trading block, has meant that Moldova has become one of Europe’s poorest countries (BBC, 2024).
However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the ever-present state of Russia has been able to maintain their interest and oversight on the country due to a separatist movement in the Moldovan region of Transnistria. Transnistria is located in the East of Moldova, between the Dniester River and the Moldova-Ukraine border with its capital and largest city being Tiraspol (Buckmaster and Hitchins, 2025). The region of Transnistria descended into conflict with Moldova in the early 1990s, with their army being heavily assisted by the Russian military (Humphrey & Forbes-Mewett, 2024). The region has been stuck in what is called a ‘frozen conflict’ with Moldova ever since, the region of Transnistria claims they are an independent state, while Moldova, and largely all other sovereign states, do not recognise the state as independent (BBC, 2024).
But why is Transnistria of interest to Russia? There are a few reasons as to why Russia has been increasingly interested in influencing the decisions that are made in the region. The first reason is geographical: Moldova and Transnistria sit on the western border with Ukraine. The natural geography of the country is unsurprisingly of strategic interest to Russia, as the country would be able pose a threat from the west of Ukraine, rather than their continued attacks from the east. Secondly, the cultural and historical connection between Russia and Transnistria is ever-present, the self-proclaimed, sovereign state has always been described as a ‘Russian Outpost’. With Russia continuously supporting the region, it is evident that Russia wants to maintain their political, cultural and economic ties to the region (Solovyov, 2025).
Thirdly, Russia is increasingly worried about the threat of NATO and the increased integration of European states into the military alliance (Place, 2024). The government inside Moldova has increasingly voiced their interest in joining the EU, as the country acknowledges the challenges that come as a result of being increasingly economically and energy dependent on Russia. However, since Moldova is currently not part of NATO, the country is of extreme interest to Russia as they could imagine that the former USSR state may potentially align themselves with Russia, rather than moving further towards European integration. However, this is unlikely following the 2024 elections, but more of that further down.
Energy Policies and Their Implications
Since the start of 2025, the region of Transnistria has been under the geopolitical lens due to the changes in gas and electricity policies related to the war between Ukraine and Russia. Historically, Transnistria received Russian gas which transited through Ukraine without the need of a direct payment, rather the quasi-Russian enclave was accumulating substantial debts to the government-backed gas provider Gazprom (Rainsford, 2025). Moldova, and as a result Transnistria, has been energy-dependent on gas and electricity supplies from Russia via Ukraine, The Gas Transmission System (GTS) has been supplying Moldova with gas from Russia since the Soviet regime (Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine, 2025). Figure 1 shows the gas pipelines that are connected from Russia to Eastern Europe, Russian gas enters Ukraine from the Eastern Soyuz pipeline and is transported south through the Southern transit corridor to Tiraspol and the rest of Moldova (Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine, 2025).
Since the start of the Ukraine-Russia war, the gas and electricity prices in the neighbouring country of Moldova have been considerably affected. Figure 2 highlights the impact that the war between Russia and Ukraine has had upon the gas prices in Moldova. As the figure shows, with the escalation of war at the start of 2022, the gas prices in Moldova rose dramatically as a result. This was followed by a small decrease in the price of gas towards the end of 2023 and beginning of 2024. However, with the recent news of the termination of Russian gas through Ukraine, countries like Moldova and the region of Transnistria in particular, are expected to be particularly affected.
Moldova itself is able to respond to the crisis through a more holistic formulation of an energy security plan by integrating with the European Union and receiving gas from the neighbouring country of Romania and an influx of monetary support from the EU. However, due to the political, cultural and economic nature of Transnistria, the impact of the decision to deny the gas to enter the region through Ukraine has significant damage on the region. The immediate consequence for Transnistria was a severe energy shortage, with the halting of gas supplies, the region’s main power plant which supplied electricity to the region ceased to be operational (Associated Press, 2025). This led to widespread electricity and gas outages in the region with only hospitals and critical infrastructure being able to use any forms of heating (Rainsford, 2025).
Wider Political Implications
Due to the intense nature of the war between Russia and Ukraine, alongside the historical and cultural situation in Moldova and Transnistria, the Ukrainian decision to cut off gas to the region has led to a number of political outcomes between Moldova and the separatist state. The 2024 elections in Moldova whereby the pro-EU candidate, Maia Sandu, was re-elected was shrouded in controversy, with her rival, Alexandr Stoianoglo, having called for Moldova to increase their connection to Russia, as well as a number of claims of political interference from Moscow (BBC, 2025). Naturally, Russia denies these claims. However, it does go to highlight the fragility of the nation and the cultural and political divide between the West and Europe on one side versus Moscow and Russia on the east.
The region of Transnistria sits between this cleavage, on the one hand the region is highly dependent on Moldova and life would potentially improve if the region was be re-integrated into Moldovan politics, however Moldova itself highlights the economic challenge this would bring to the country (Brzozowski, 2025). Yet, on the other hand, the region has historically, and is currently highly culturally and politically linked to Russia, from the economic and military support during the civil wars, to Gazprom’s continued acceptance of not charging Transnistria for the gas they consume (Solovyov, 2025).
With the addition of Ukraine’s decision to not allow gas to enter Transnistria and Moldova, the region is going to be facing the largest political and cultural divides and challenges since their separation in 1992. The region to the east of the Dnieper has found itself at the centre of the political games played by both those in Chisinau and Moscow, with Russia claiming to those in Transnistria that they have been ‘left out to dry’ by the Moldovan government, while Moldova themselves claim that Russia is trying to destabilise Moldova from the inside (Rainsford, 2025).
The relationship between Transnistria, Moldova and Russia has been ever-present since the collapse of the USSR in 1991, but 2025 may see tensions rise to an all-time high. Whilst the implications of Ukraine’s decision to cease the transfer of gas south to Transnistria and further to Moldova has only just started to come into fruition, the region is certainly an area for the geopolitical arena to keep an eye on in the coming months.
Bibliography
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On January 1st 2025, the Ukrainian government officially ceded all Russian gas transit through the country. This marked a pivotal moment in the energy politics in Eastern Europe as Ukraine’s refusal to extend the transit agreement with Gazprom highlights their strategic aim to hit back at Russia through the revenues received by the state-owned gas giant. While the decision’s main aim is to weaken Russia’s position in the war, it has had significant repercussions for Moldova, and more importantly, Transnistria.
