The Rise of Far-Right Parties in Europe: Causes, Trends, and Implications
Introduction
The rise of far-right parties in Europe has become one of the most consequential political developments of the twenty-first century. Since being confined to the political periphery following the aftermath of World War Two, this political movement has re-gained significant traction within Western Europe and more generally worldwide. This article focuses on the recent historical development of ‘far-right’ political parties in Europe, aiming to understand some of the reasons as to why such a Zeitgeist has redeveloped within the political sphere. The data which has been collated for this article aims to highlight the change in the number of seats far-right political parties have captured within European parliaments, this will be shown as an overall percentage share of the seats gained, in comparison to the share of votes.
Before moving forward, it is important to define what is categories as a ‘far-right’ political party, and the political parties which have been included within this analysis. The nature, categorisation and definition of far-right political movements vary across studies, publications and discourses. Some terms found to describe far-right parties have also extended to ‘populist’, ‘extreme right’, ‘anti-establishment’, ‘anti-immigration’, ‘nationalism’, ‘Eurosceptic’. For the purpose of this article, and due to the nature of the piece, a deep dive into the historical development, as well as the discourse around far-right parties will not be undertaken, however, see the works of Aktas (2024) to better understand the nuances of the topic. This article categories far-right political parties as any party which campaigns and uses rhetoric around aforementioned themes, running on issues which are ‘populist’ in nature, with ideologies of ‘nationalism’, ‘anti-immigration, and ‘anti-establishment’.
The success of this political movement within Western Europe has been driven by a variety of different social, economic, and political factors. From the rise of public anxiety over increasing immigration, a growing dissatisfaction with traditional political status quo, and a number of communities feeling increasingly left behind due to an ever-interconnected world in which they are the ‘losers’ of globalisation. On this note, it is important to highlight that this article does not base the rhetoric around those who are ‘winners or losers’ in the globalisation cleavage through an economic lens but rather through ‘socio-structural’ characteristics, such as education, or occupational classes, which then develops into a self-categorisation as a ‘winner or loser’, this in turn develops into political voting choices for individuals and attitudes on globalisation issues, e.g: immigration, EU sceptic, nationalism (see Steiner, Mader & Schoen, 2024).
The electoral gains of these far-right parties in Europe are varied across European nations in recent elections, however the broader trend, of which will be highlighted through the following data, is a general deepening of nationalist and populist sentiment which has threatened to redefine the European political landscape. This article would go as far as stating that the European political landscape has already been redefined. Examining the data on far-right electoral support across multiple elections reveals both the extent of this transformation and the patterns that underlie it. This essay explores the key drivers behind the far-right’s rise, analyses the trends in electoral support, and considers the broader implications of this shift for democracy and governance in Europe.
Understanding the Surge in Far-Right Support
The growing political appeal of far-right parties can be attributed to a complex set of factors that have reinforced nationalist and populist sentiments. One of the major issues which far-right parties’ comment on is immigration. Immigration has been a particularly significant issue, with many parties capitalising on public concerns about the socio-economic and cultural impact of migration. The 2015 ‘migrant crisis’ in Europe, which saw an influx of refugees from the Middle East and Africa, intensified anxieties about national identity, economic competition, and national security (Steinmayr, 2017). Parties such as the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany and the National Rally (RN) in France were able leveraged these fears to position themselves as defenders of national sovereignty, advocating stricter border controls and policies aimed at preserving what they frame as ‘traditional European values’ (Steinmayr, 2017).
Economic discontent further fuelled support for far-right movements. Many voters, particularly in deindustrialized and rural regions, feel left behind by the increasing interconnectedness of globalisation. The economic crises of the past two decades, including the 2008 financial crash and subsequent austerity measures, exacerbated inequality and deepened resentment toward mainstream political parties. Far-right parties exploited this dissatisfaction by presenting themselves as a champion of economic nationalism, promising to prioritise the needs of native citizens over international institutions and free-market internationalist policies (Rodrik, 2021). In Italy, for example, the rise of Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) was largely driven by its rejection of EU-imposed economic constraints and its emphasis on protecting domestic industries.
A broader distrust of political elites also played a crucial role in the rise of the far-right political parties. Across Europe, there has been an increasing perception that traditional parties, more commonly seen as centre centre-left or centre-right, have become detached from the concerns of ordinary citizens. Far-right leaders have successfully harnessed this frustration by positioning themselves as outsiders willing to challenge the political establishment. The Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom exemplified this dynamic, as the Leave campaign, bolstered by the rhetoric of figures associated with the far-right such as Steven Yaxley-Lennon (Tommy Robinson) or Nigel Farage, framed the EU as an unaccountable bureaucracy that undermined British sovereignty. Although the UK’s Reform UK party has struggled electorally in recent years, due to a variety of factors, such as a first past the post electoral system, or a general lack of ability to trust individuals, the broader anti-establishment sentiment that fuelled Brexit remains a powerful force in European and UK politics, this can be seen through a number of Eurosceptic campaigns from European Union member states.
Another key driver of the far-right’s ascendance is the increasing scepticism toward the European Union. Many nationalist parties argue that EU governance undermines national sovereignty and imposes policies that do not align with the interests of individual member states (Vasilopoulou & Zur, 2022). This sentiment has been particularly strong in Central and Eastern Europe, where governments such as Poland’s and Hungary’s have clashed with Brussels over issues related to judicial independence, immigration, and national governance. In Western Europe, parties such as the Netherlands’ Party for Freedom (PVV) and Belgium’s Vlaams Belang (VB) have also capitalised on Eurosceptic sentiments through advocating for policies that prioritise national decision-making over increased European integration. The increasing electoral influence of these parties suggests that opposition to the EU is no longer a fringe position but rather an integral part of the broader right-wing political agenda.
Electoral Trends and the Growth of Far-Right Parties
Firstly, it is important to indicate the data that has been used in this article, the data visualised in Fig.1 is taken shows the percentage share of seats that a far-right party has achieved in the past three election cycles across Europe. The most recent elections vary from as recent as 2025 to 2023, while the elections two terms ago can be as long ago as 2013. The definition of a far-right political party has been taken from the aforementioned political rhetoric or seen during the political campaigns of such parties. It may be seen that within one country there may be two or more parties that are categorised as a far-right party, or there has been a development of different far-right parties throughout the election cycles. This can be seen from a ‘rebranding’ of a party, seen in France with Marine Le-Pen aiming to move away from the rhetoric around her father’s ‘Front National’ party and rebranding into National Rally (NR). Or the development of Fratelli d’Italia from the Coalition Lega in 2018 and the Centre-Right Coalition in 2013. Or on the other-hand a complete development of parties that have dissolved and with that came a creation of new parties, seen in Czechia through the development of Úsvit to the Freedom and Direct Democracy Party (SPD). This development of different political parties rebranding was also seen in Poland and Slovenia, with Kukiz’15 to Law and Justice (PiS) or the New Slovenia (NSi) & Slovenian National Party (SNS) developing into the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) in their respective countries.
The structure of all the parliaments used in the dataset are bicameral legislatures, all countries are members of the European Union, and they have some formatting of proportional representation. It is for this reason that a major actor, such as the United Kingdom, and any potential analysis on the Reform Party has been excluded due to their first past the post electoral system which presents difficulties in analysing the influence of the party within the UK parliament. However, as mentioned above it is worth mentioning that the far-right party has certainly had an impact on the political Zeitgeist of the United Kingdom. A further caveat of the data is to highlight that the data taken from the ‘Last Election’ in Spain is from the second election in 2019, from November 2019, due to the 1st election in April 2019 being seen as void due to the inability to form a coalition of all the parties and therefore the necessity for a second election.
The electoral performance of far-right parties over successive elections illustrates both the extent of their rise and the variations in their support across different political contexts. In Austria, the Freedom Party (FPÖ) experienced fluctuations in its vote share but made a significant comeback in the most recent election, securing 31.15% of the vote. In Germany, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) doubled its support from 11.28% in 2021 to 24.13% 2025, this reflects the party’s increasing legitimacy as a political force within Germany despite controversies surrounding its leadership and rhetoric. The AfD party were mainly successful in east of Germany, this is constant with the understanding that the east of Germany suffers more economically in comparison to the west.
The rise of Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) in Italy was one of the most dramatic surges seen in Western Europe, with the party growing from a marginal 1.43% in previous elections to an overwhelming 59.25% of the parliamentary seats, a transformation that underlines the extent to which nationalist conservatism has been reshaped within Italian politics over the past decade. France presents a case of steady far-right normalization, as Marine Le Pen’s National Rally expanded its vote share from 1.39% in 2017 to 21.66% of the vote in 2024. The party has increasingly positioned itself as a mainstream alternative to both centrist and left-wing political parties by appealing to working-class voters who have become increasingly dissatisfied with the traditional parties in France.
While the degrees to which far-right political parties have been successful in capturing parliamentary seats varies, it is important to highlight the general trend which is shown through this data. Prior to the elections two terms ago, only four of the twelve far-right parties included in this data set had over 25% of the parliamentary seats, with six parties being below 10%, and five below 2% of the parliamentary share of seats. However, in the most recent elections, eight of the twelve parties have above 20% of share, eleven parties have over 10%, with only Vox in Spain a little below 10% at 9.4% of the electoral seats. The mean percentage share of far-right political parties at their most recent respective elections is 27.6%, this is up a staggering 13.1% from an average of 14.5% since their respective elections two terms ago. While an average of 27.6% may not seem like a high share of the vote, it is important to highlight the fragmented nature of proportional representation and that a political party with any share above 10 or 15% clearly highlights a significant success for the party.
Implications for European Politics and Governance
The continued rise of far-right parties has profound implications for European politics, governance, and society. One of the most immediate consequences is the increasing fragmentation of political landscapes, this makes coalition-building more complex especially in political systems found in Europe whereby it is common to form coalitions to form a government. As traditional centre-left and centre-right parties struggle to maintain dominance, the presence of strong far-right contingents in national parliaments forces mainstream parties to either engage in uneasy alliances or risk political instability. This has been seen most recently in Germany, as while the AfD won an estimated 24% of the votes, the winningest party of the Christian Democrat Party (CDU) and their sister party in Bavaria the Cristian Social Union (CSU) gained an estimated 28% of the vote. The CDU/CSU have stated from the outset that they will not aim to form a coalition with the AfD, rather opting to try and form a government with the Social Democrats (SPD).
Beyond institutional politics, the rise of the far-right raises concerns about civil liberties and minority rights. Many of these parties’ advocate policies that restrict immigration, challenge multiculturalism, and promote nationalist historical narratives, potentially exacerbating social divisions. At the same time, the growing visibility of far-right movements has prompted counter-movements from progressive and centrist forces, suggesting that the political landscape remains fluid and subject to continued ideological contestation.
Conclusion
The rise of far-right parties in Europe represents a significant transformation in Europe’s political order. Due to concerns over immigration, economic discontent, political distrust, and Euroscepticism, this political movement has established themselves as formidable forces in multiple national contexts over the past decade or so. The electoral data presented in this article demonstrates the rapid gains made by far-right parties across Europe, and, as these parties continue to shape the narrative of European politics, addressing the root causes of their rise, particularly economic inequality, political alienation, and cultural anxieties, will be crucial in determining the future of democratic governance in Europe.
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