The Politics of Natural Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean: Boom or Bust?

Recently gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean countries of Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Türkiye and Syria has transformed the region into a one of Europe’s most important energy sources. But offshore gas reserves are both increasing economic cooperation and intensifying some of the region’s decades-long political disputes.

Under United Nations law (UNCLOS), maritime states have an have a territorial sea extending 12 nautical miles from the shoreline, and a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with sovereignty over the zone’s geological resources (United Nations, 2019). Türkiye is not a signature to UNCLOS and does not recognise the EEZs of nearby island territories such as the Greek Aegean islands and Cyprus (Hokayem and Momtaz, 2024, P. 137).

Gas reserves of the Eastern Mediterranean countries

Türkiye’s Mavi Vatan (blue homeland) military doctrine recommends that its navy establish control over parts of the Greek and Cypriot EEZs (Gingeras, 2020). Türkiye could reduce its dependence on energy imports by exploiting the Greco-Cypriot offshore gas reserves plus the 710 bcm of gas in its own Black Sea EEZ (Siccardi, 2024). In 2011 Türkiye signed an agreement with the partially recognised Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) which expanded Türkiye’s claimed EEZ into northern and western areas of Cyprus’ EEZ that hold large gas deposits (MFA, 2011).

The Mavi Vatan strategy has worsened hostile Turko-Cypriot relations. Turkish demands that Cyprus must gain consent from the TRNC to grant gas development licenses have stalled development of Cypriot gas reserves (Hokayem and Momtaz, 2024, P. 56). Turkish activities in Cypriot waters include sending hydrocarbon research ships to areas of seabed within the Cypriot EEZ (Daily Sabah, 2018), whilst also sending the Turkish navy to disrupt and prevent exploratory drilling authorised by Cyprus (The Left, 2024).

Having supported the toppling of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad last year, Türkiye wants to deepen its economic relationship with Ahmad al-Shaara’s government (Shaffer, 2025). Syria’s proven gas reserves of 240 bcm are located in territory held by the Syrian Democratic Forces rebels and thus provide no revenue to the Syrian government (Shaffer, 2025). On the other hand, potential offshore gas reserves of 170 bcm in Syria’s Mediterranean EEZ could be developed if Assad-era sanctions were lifted (Hidropolitikakademi, 2025).

Türkiye’s position has strengthened because al-Shaara is reluctant to let Assad’s patrons, Iran and Russia, invest in Syria’s hydrocarbons (Watkins, 2025). An unresolved Turko-Syrian maritime dispute hinders prospective gas exploration, but if a deal demarcating the EEZs of Türkiye, Syria and the TRNC is reached, commercial exploitation will become viable (Acer, 2025). Cooperation between Türkiye and Syria could enable the transit of Syrian oil and gas to Europe through Turkish pipelines, or revive stalled projects bringing Egyptian and Iraqi gas to Türkiye through Syria. (Kamrava, 2017, P. 92; Turkish Minute, 2024).

Amid the weakening of Hamas’ and Iran’s military capabilities, multinational energy firms have restarted operations at Israeli offshore gas fields and plan to increase their investments (Cavcic, 2024; Kennedy, 2024). Israel’s 1087 bcm gas reserve is the second largest in the Eastern Mediterranean after Egypt (Chen, 2023). These reserves are mainly used for domestic consumption. If constructed, the hypothetical undersea EastMed pipeline will provide Israel and Cyprus with lucrative export revenues by transporting their gas directly to Europe (Landini, 2023).

The long running Israeli-Palestinian conflict extends to the 28 bcm Gaza Marine gas field located in Palestine’s EEZ (Reuters, 2023). Israel’s granting of exploration permits in the Palestinian EEZ since 2023 has added to Palestinian mistrust of Israel (Bajec, 2024). If Hamas and Hezbollah rebuild their capabilities and attack Israel, damage to offshore Israeli gas facilities would reduce exports to Egypt and Jordan which depend on Israeli gas to meet domestic demand (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2024).

Since Lebanon and Israel signed an agreement delineating their maritime border in 2023, Lebanon has granted several gas exploration licenses inside its EEZ. (Christou, 2023). Lebanon estimates its gas reserves at over 719 bcm, which if accurate would transform the country into a significant energy exporter (France 24, 2022). These hypothetical reserves would provide Lebanon with hard currency to fund its economic reconstruction. However, no commercially exploitable reserves have been found in Lebanon’s EEZ (EIA, 2023). Lebanon’s political instability, economic decline and potential for conflict also deter large investments (Todman, 2025).

Declining gas production in Egypt has weakened the Eastern Mediterranean’s largest gas producer, whose reserves of 2100 bcm are double that of Israel (Statista, 2023). Lowered output from the large Zohr field has contributed to Egypt’s total output falling from 70 bcm to 52 bcm between 2021-24 (Moore, 2024). Declining output has led to power blackouts and reduced exports, forcing Egypt to import American gas (Moore, 2024). Egypt’s finances have been strained by decreasing gas export revenues and a 60% decline in Suez Canal revenues since 2023 (Middle East Eye, 2024).

Closer Egyptian-Israeli ties could resolve Egypt’s energy crisis. Whilst President el-Sisi fears public backlash from cooperating with Israel, pipelines linking Egypt and Israel could help restore Egypt’s energy security. Egypt’s position as a gas hub that liquifies and exports Israeli gas to Europe has deepened economic interdependencies between Egypt and Israel (Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure, n.d.). If Jordan launches commercial licenses for its recently discovered gas deposits, Egypt and Israel could deepen regional cooperation by allowing the transit of Jordanian gas through their existing infrastructure (Global Flow Control, 2024).

The peaceful resolution of maritime and political disputes will enable the development of offshore natural gas deposits and increase the prosperity of the Eastern Mediterranean. Should maritime border disputes persist, the resources will remain undeveloped and hinder conflict resolution efforts in Cyprus and Gaza.

Bibliography

Acer, Y. (2025). The potential of a Türkiye-Syria maritime border agreement. [online] SETA. Available at: https://www.setav.org/en/opinion/the-potential-of-a-turkiye-syria-maritime-border-agreement

Bajec, A. (2024). Israel sets its sights on Gaza’s offshore gas. [online] The New Arab. Available at: https://www.newarab.com/analysis/israel-sets-its-sights-gazas-offshore-gas.

BNP Paribas (2023). Eastern Mediterranean: Natural Gas: A Regional Overview. [online] Available at: https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Eastern-Mediterranean-Natural-regional-overview-7/11/2023,48783

Cavcic, M. (2024). UK firm greenlights $1.2 billion gas project offshore Israel. [online] Offshore Energy. Available at: https://www.offshore-energy.biz/uk-firm-greenlights-1-2-billion-gas-project-offshore-israel/.

Chen, Y. (2023). Breakingviews – Israel’s fossil fuel boon becomes less clear-cut. Reuters. [online] 19 Oct. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/israels-fossil-fuel-boon-becomes-less-clear-cut-2023-10-19/.

Christou, W. (2023). Offshore gas rig arrives in Lebanon, experts warn of hurdles. [online] The New Arab. Available at: https://www.newarab.com/news/offshore-gas-rig-arrives-lebanon-experts-warn-hurdles.

www.eia.gov. (2023). International – U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). [online] Available at: https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/LBN.

France 24. (2022). Lebanon years away from gas riches despite Israel deal: analysts. [online] Available at: https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20221006-lebanon-years-away-from-gas-riches-despite-israel-deal-analysts

Gingeras, R. (2020). Blue Homeland: The Heated Politics Behind Turkey’s New Maritime Strategy. [online] War on the Rocks. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/blue-homeland-the-heated-politics-behind-turkeys-new-maritime-strategy/.

Global Flow Control. (2024). Jordan Reports Promising Natural Gas Discoveries at Risha Field – Global Flow Control. [online] Available at: https://globalflowcontrol.com/newsroom/jordan-reports-promising-natural-gas-discoveries-at-risha-field/

Hokayem, E. and Rym Momtaz (2024). Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Taylor & Francis.

Hidropolitikakademi.org. (2025). Lebanese and Syrian offshore reserves gas: an untapped energy eldorado. [online] Available at: https://www.hidropolitikakademi.org/tr/news/20522/lebanese-and-syrian-offshore-gas-reserves-an-untapped-energy-eldorado

Mehran Kamrava (2017). The great game in west Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kennedy, C. (2024). Chevron Restarts Gas Production in Israel After Brief Halt During Iran’s Attack. [online] OilPrice.com. Available at: https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Chevron-Restarts-Gas-Production-in-Israel-After-Brief-Halt-During-Irans-Attack.html.

Landini, F. (2023). EU keeps EastMed gas pipeline on new list of priority projects. Reuters. [online] 28 Nov. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/eu-keeps-eastmed-gas-pipeline-new-list-priority-projects-2023-11-28/.

Mfa.gov.tr. (2023). No: 216, 21 September 2011, Press Statement On The Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement Signed Between Turkey And The TRNC / Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [online] Available at: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-216_-21-september-2011_-press-statement-on-the-continental-shelf-delimitation-agreement-signed-between-turkey-and-the-trnc.en.mfa.

Middle East Eye. (2024). Suez Canal revenues plunge by 60 percent as Egypt faces economic and political turmoil. [online] Middle East Eye. Available at: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/suez-canal-revenues-plunge-60-percent-egypt-faces-economic-and-political-turmoil.

Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure. (n.d.). Export. [online] Available at: https://www.energy-sea.gov.il/home/export/.

Moore, M. (2024). Egypt’s journey from gas bonanza to power blackouts. [online] Financial Times. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/b86c9f85-715e-4b12-a19a-9776c6251c9e

Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. (2024). East Mediterranean Gas: a triangle of interdependencies – Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. [online] Available at: https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/east-mediterranean-gas-a-triangle-of-interdependencies/

Israel gives nod to Gaza Marine gas development, wants security assurances. (2023). Reuters. [online] 18 Jun. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/israel-gives-nod-gaza-marine-gas-development-wants-security-assurances-2023-06-18/

Sabah, D. (2018). Turkey sends frigate to East Med to protect seismic vessel Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa. [online] Daily Sabah. Available at: https://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2018/10/24/turkey-sends-frigate-to-east-med-to-protect-seismic-vessel-barbaros-hayreddin-pasa

Shaffer, B. (2025). Syria’s energy sector and its impact on stability and regional developments. [online] Atlantic Council. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/syrias-energy-sector-and-its-impact-on-stability-and-regional-developments/

Siccardi, F. (2024). Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy. [online] Carnegie. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/02/understanding-the-energy-drivers-of-turkeys-foreign-policy?lang=en&center=russia-eurasia.

Statista. (2023). Egypt: natural gas reserves 2000-2023. [online] Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1324720/natural-gas-reserves-in-egypt/

The Left. (2018). Turkish obstruction in Cypriot waters violate EU territorial integrity. [online] Available at: https://left.eu/turkish-obstruction-in-cypriot-waters-violate-eu-territorial-integrity/

Todman, W. (2025). Lebanon Finally Elects a President. [online] Csis.org. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/lebanon-finally-elects-president.

Turkish Minute (2024). Turkey seeks expanded cooperation with Syria on oil and gas – Turkish Minute. [online] Available at: https://turkishminute.com/2024/12/27/turkey-sought-expanded-cooperation-w-syria-oil-gas/

United Nations (2019). PREAMBLE TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA. [online] Un.org. Available at: https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm.

Watkins, S. (2025). Snubbed in Syria, Russia Now Makes a Move on Syrian Oil. [online] OilPrice.com. Available at: https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Snubbed-in-Syria-Russia-Now-Makes-a-Move-on-Syrian-Oil.html