The Ideational Forces that Constitute the ‘China Threat’ to Asia-Pacific Stability

The literature that deals with a ‘rising China’ has been asymmetrically focused on material gains over the last 40 years and the subsequent threat to the status quo of international geopolitics. However, ideational forces (norms, ideas and perceptions) also have a great influence on the construction of the China threat. Even when discussing China as threat to the ‘Asia-Pacific’ we can see the influence of ideational forces. The term ‘Asia-Pacific’ was coined in the 1970s as an attempt by the U.S. to emphasise the increasing economic integration of East-Asia and North-America and to provide additional justification for continued regional U.S. security involvement (Bisley, 2013). This article will look at how other perceive China and contrasts that with China’s views of itself.

How others perceive China

Emotional attitudes towards foreign countries crystallize earlier than the assimilation of factual knowledge about them; thus, adversarial powers like China are expected to be hostile. There is a tendency to view others’ behaviour in line with these expectations. China’s capabilities are attributed to pre-conceived notions of China which produce a threatening identity, regardless of benign intentions. This has as much to do with the qualification of China as the absolute strategic other in U.S. and Japanese discourses as it does with Chinese actions (Pan, 2004).

This argument is further illustrated with the comparative case of India. The growth of India, like that of China, has disrupted the regional security status-quo, yet it has not been constructed as a security threat in American security discourses (Turner, 2016). China’s authoritarian government structure and verbal opposition to certain aspects of the liberal international order aid in the construction of it as the juxtaposed opposite.

How China perceives and presents itself

Chinese exceptionalism is starting to cause suspicion and alarm among major powers, coupled with a defence of cultural particularism to justify continued authoritarianism and rejection of democratic ideals. Chinese elites are quick to point out the benevolent and harmonic aspects of their Confucian influenced ideology to quell the fears of those who view China’s rise as threatening. However, the stridently anti-democratic, authoritarian, paternalistic tone of some of the prominent ‘harmony’ literature in China does not help to assuage these fears (Buzan, 2010).

These narratives have been contemporarily articulated by president Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese dream’ that calls for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Xi has moved quickly to promote his vision of the central role military power plays in China’s rise as a great power through his promotion of a ‘strong China dream’ that goes hand in hand with a ‘strong military dream’ (Saunders, 2015). With this militaristic framing, it is understandable how regional and global powers could see this sort of ideational rhetoric as threatening to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific.

Structurally imbedded ideational forces in the Chinese political system

Several structurally embedded ideational forces act as a multiplier for regional instability. These include PLA (People’s Liberation Army) primacy in crises and the oligarchic nature of China’s current leadership system. This leadership structure can result in delayed responses as leaders convene to obtain information, deliberate and find a consensus position This lag time enables nationalist forces and interests to impact the policy process, potentially shifting it in a more hawkish direction.

The 2010 case of the U.S./ South Korean joint naval exercise in the Yellow Sea offers the most salient example of this dynamic. China initially didn’t oppose the exercises; however, it changed its policy in response to pressure from public opinion. The ardently nationalistic military academic commentator and deputy chief of staff Ma Xiaotian helped shape this public opinion (Saunders, 2015). This demonstrates how structurally embedded ideational forces of the Chinese political system cause delayed decision making and produce conflicting signals. Chinese strategic ambiguity and a decision-making system vulnerable to domestic ideational nationalist forces threatens the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific.

This dynamic is also reinforced by a weak MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) where, in times of foreign policy crises, China lacks a unified message and established diplomatic nuances. For example, there is no coordination for PLA activities that may impact foreign policy. This lack of communication can make Chinese military posturing look very threatening to its neighbours. Norms of ineffective communication go even further to never admitting fault and routinely blaming others when strains occur in foreign relations, which also contributes to the ‘China threat’ narrative (Shambaugh, 2018). These combined forces have great explanatory power for why China is seen as threatening to the stability of the Asia-Pacific.

To conclude the China threat is both externally constructed and internally projected.

China’s rigid structural political factors give it fewer tools with which to assuage its neighbours fear of its threatening rise. A rigid political system characterised by a strong PLA coupled with an institutionally weak MFA further exacerbate China’s threatening perception. The fact that the government must also carefully consider and respond to domestic nationalist sentiments when making foreign policy decisions harms their image of a ‘peaceful’ power. These structurally imbedded ideational forces greatly contribute to China being seen as threatening to Asia-Pacific stability.

References:

Bisley, Nick & Phillips, Andrew, 2013. Rebalance To Where?: U.S. Strategic Geography in Asia. Survival (London), 55(5), pp.95–114.

Buzan, B., 2010. China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible? The Chinese journal of international politics, 3(1), pp.5–36.

Kingston, J., 2016. Nationalism in Asia, Hoboken: WILEY.

Pan, C., 2004. The “China Threat” in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics. Alternatives: global, local, political, 29(3), pp.305–331.

Saunders, Phillip C & Scobell, Andrew, 2015. PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

Shambaugh, D., 2018. U.S.-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia: Power Shift or Competitive Coexistence? International security, 42(4), pp.85–127.

Turner, O., 2016. China, India and the U.S. Rebalance to the Asia Pacific: The Geopolitics of Rising Identities. Geopolitics, 21(4), pp.922–944.