Tackling Europe’s Overreliance On Energy Imports and the Threat of War-Induced Energy Insecurity
Europe’s dependence on imported energy has once again exposed the fragility of its economic and political stability. As tensions around the Strait of Hormuz threaten another oil shock, the EU faces mounting pressure to balance energy security, affordability, and the long transition towards a more resilient domestic energy mix.
Overseas energy sources have been the foundation of most challenges in Europe in the twenty-twenties. Following Russia’s military advancement into Ukraine, the EU made concerted efforts to pull away from Russian oil and gas sources, which was the primary driver of inflation. We now sit at the precipice of another crisis, driven by the US-initiated conflict in the Strait of Hormuz. Oil prices have reached over $100 in recent days, and Europe is slated to be one of the biggest casualties, even if a ceasefire ensues. “Because of another war beyond Europe’s control, leaders are scrambling to find a response.” (Politico, 2026) This article examines the EU’s coordinated strategy against this exogenous shock.
One of the largest challenges for the EU is that member states control their own energy supplies. This leaves the Commission with a limited toolkit to insulate itself from external threats. For instance, the appetite for decarbonisation is undermined by the need for long-term horizons. This makes it challenging to get compliance with directives in a speedy manner. As a result, the EU target date for net-zero is set for 2050. This has left 30 years requiring a bridge.
Setting emergency oil and LNG stock levels therefore has been the favoured strategy for countries to react to oil shocks. The EU’s Oil Stocks Directive (2009/119/EC) dictates “emergency stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products equal to at least 90 days of net imports or 61 days of consumption, whichever is higher.” (European Commission, 2026). This policy coexists with the International Energy Agency but gives the Commission more influence on the release of these reserves, creating a coordinated response.
Through Eurostat’s dataset on days of emergency oil stock, taking annual averages, we can see that states were unable to take any meaningful advantage of a low-cost oil environment post-Covid. Although we see a small increase in days of reserves, which helped to shelter states from the impact of the 2022 conflict, the reduction in oil as an EU energy source and the failure to increase reserves in a low-cost environment such as the oversupply during Covid have meant that the EU has become more vulnerable to shock.
This is likely to be driven by a lack of storage capacity, which should have been in place for nations with reliance on imports. With alternative routes for oil to enter Europe, such as through the US, the reserves are likely to have some ability to last, but overall oil prices put Europe in a precarious situation with a limited arsenal to draw from.
While France has created resilience through a shift in its energy mix towards nuclear, Germany faces a much greater challenge. Hebda highlights that Germany’s decision to shift from coal towards LNG as a more efficient source created new sensitivities (Hebda, 2026, p.133), which stem from the same challenge of insufficient storage.
France is one of the better-positioned EU countries to weather an energy shock. Its ability to shield itself is supported by a diverse energy mix with strong nuclear production. “Nuclear power has the dual benefit of both fulfilling growing energy demands and decreasing dependency on foreign sources of power.” (Ridwan et al., 2023, p.12) This strategy is important because it highlights the need for diversification as more states understand that they can exert pressure through a globalised energy structure responding to localised price shocks.
Alongside nuclear sources, renewable energy provides additional security. “Renewables are primarily associated with mitigating climate change, but there is increasing recognition of their role in energy security.” (Aylett et al., 2020, p.61) Rather than reliance on pipelines and particular refineries, renewables, for all their issues, have been overlooked as a source of stability in favour of traditional forms, after surging borrowing costs created an unfavourable environment for investment into the sector. Instead, the focus has been on the green credentials which have lost appeal in a highly inflationary environment.
This loss of appeal is partially due to the pressure on the consumer. Research on energy poverty in Europe found that “renewables and biofuels final energy consumption in households per capita is found to be a driver of arrears on utility bills” (Halkos & Gkampoura, 2023, p.9). With the energy mix transformation being a slow and expensive process with a target date of 2050, the political will for energy security has been trumped by near-term affordability challenges.
Governments are unlikely to impose strict regulations on usage when businesses and individuals are facing greater threats, as it would be politically unwise to present this mandate. Unfortunately, it has also resulted in greater weakness to externalities.
Europe’s energy reserves are an important tool to combat pressures emerging from the Strait of Hormuz, but they highlight the limited influence that nations have over their own infrastructure in an increasingly globalising world. Underlying this, two strategies are imperative for oil-sparse nations to aspire to. The first is a shift towards a more domestic energy mix. While the consumer is still subject to shocks, electrification can localise generation, keeping risks closer to home and offsetting some of the challenges.
With such a shock creating higher non-renewable prices, “leaders may seize the opportunity … to steer their economies away from fossil fuel dependency.” (Van de Klippe, 2026) However, the inability to insulate against such a shock may make it politically challenging to enact these measures as financial challenges compound. The second strategy would be to develop a better foundation for bridging the gap. Developing the necessary infrastructure for increased storage is an expensive endeavour, but this could have helped protect the EU over a 30+ year time horizon for the transition towards net zero. The EU must now consider how it can weather future shocks and what can be done to localise the mix quickly.
Bibliography
- Aylett, C., Van Rij, A. and Bradshaw, M. (2026) Why renewables and electrification hold the keys to EU energy security: Using the low-carbon transition to improve resilience, mitigate geopolitical risks and lower costs. London: Chatham House, pp. 1–66.
- Cooper, C., Leali, G., Munster, B., Goury-Laffont, V. and Faggionato, G. (2026) ‘“Spillover”: Iran energy shockwaves hit Europe’, Politico, 9 March. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/spillover-iran-energy-shockwaves-hit-europe/
- European Commission (2026) ‘Security of oil supply’. Available at: https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-security/security-oil-supply_en#related-links
- Eurostat (2026) ‘Emergency oil stocks in days equivalent – monthly data [nrg_stk_oem__custom_21293095]’, 30 April. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg_stk_oem__custom_21293095/default/table
- Halkos, G. and Gkampoura, E. (2023) ‘Assessing fossil fuels and renewables’ impact on energy poverty conditions in Europe’, Energies, 16(560), pp. 1–16.
- Hebda, W. (2026) ‘The fossil fuel market in Germany and Poland in the aftermath of the Russian-Ukrainian war’, Gospodarka Surowcami Mineralnymi – Mineral Resources Management, 42(1), pp. 119–140.
- Ridwan, M., Raihan, A., Ahmad, S., Karmakar, S. and Paul, P. (2023) ‘Environmental sustainability in France: The role of alternative and nuclear energy, natural resources, and government spending’, Journal of Environmental and Energy Economics, pp. 1–16.
- Van De Klippe, W. (2026) ‘Escaping Europe’s oil straitjacket with decarbonization’, Center for International Policy, 22 April. Available at: https://internationalpolicy.org/publications/oil-strait-jacket/
