Securing Their Own Path: Defence and Security Strategies of the Western Balkans in an Era of Great Power Competition

Navigating strategic hedging, defence modernisation, and differentiated integration in a multipolar landscape

In 2026, the Western Balkans are undergoing a quiet but important evolution in how they perceive and pursue their own security. Long regarded as consumers of external protection, several countries in the region are now actively working to strengthen their defence capabilities, diversify their partnerships, and exercise greater strategic agency in an increasingly competitive multipolar environment (Atlantic Council, 2026). This shift reflects a deeper recognition that lasting stability cannot depend solely on outside guarantees but must be built through pragmatic choices and internal resilience (ISAC Fund, 2026).

A Region Moving at Different Speeds

The Western Balkans are characterised by growing divergence this year. Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia (all full NATO members) are advancing more rapidly in both European integration and defence modernisation. Serbia, adhering to its policy of military neutrality, continues to invest heavily in building one of the region’s most capable forces. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, constrained by internal political complexities, are nevertheless increasing their defence efforts where possible (War on the Rocks, 2026; Institut Delors, 2026).

This two-speed reality carries real security implications. Uneven capabilities risk creating fragmentation in regional cooperation, widening deterrence gaps, and potentially fuelling security dilemmas between neighbours. In a multipolar environment shaped by overlapping interests from the EU, NATO, the United States, Russia, China, and Turkey, these divergences present both risks and opportunities for pragmatic engagement (New Eastern Europe, 2026; Clingendael Institute, 2025).

Rising Defence Budgets and Emerging Alignments

Defence spending has risen noticeably across the region, accelerated by the war in Ukraine and local asymmetries. Serbia leads in absolute terms, with its defence budget reaching approximately €1.9–2.7 billion in recent years (around 2.5% of GDP), focusing on air defence systems, artillery, drones, and a diverse procurement mix that includes French Rafale jets, Chinese missiles, and domestic production (War on the Rocks, 2026; Octopus Institute, 2026).

NATO members are responding in kind. Albania has pushed to meet or exceed the 2% GDP target, prioritising air defence and mechanised units while hosting important NATO infrastructure upgrades. North Macedonia and Montenegro are strengthening rapid reaction forces and interoperability, while Kosovo has recorded one of the largest relative increases in spending as it builds credible self-defence capabilities (ISAC Fund, 2026; Atlantic Council, 2026).

New alignments are also taking shape. The 2025 Joint Defence Cooperation Declaration between Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo, focusing on joint training, procurement coordination, and hybrid threat resilience, signals a growing interest in practical collective strength rather than confrontation (Institut Delors, 2026; CIDOB, 2025).

Visualizing the two-speed Balkans: Rising investment paired with varying degrees of Western alignment illustrates the region’s hedging strategies in practice.

Data sources: ISAC Fund (2026), War on the Rocks (2026), Atlantic Council (2026), and national defence reports.

The Practice of Strategic Hedging

Balkan countries are engaging in careful multi-vector diplomacy. Serbia maintains formal ties with NATO through the Partnership for Peace while sourcing advanced equipment from Russia, China, France, and Israel. Albania and Montenegro remain firmly anchored in Euro-Atlantic structures but selectively develop ties with Turkey and others for specific capabilities (Tzifakis and Vasdoka, 2025; Octopus Institute, 2026).

This hedging strategy brings tangible benefits like access to modern technology, investment in dual-use infrastructure, and greater negotiating leverage. Yet, it also creates challenges, including interoperability issues within NATO, risks of over-dependence, and difficulties in maintaining coherent long-term policies (New Eastern Europe, 2026; Clingendael Institute, 2025).

Differentiated Integration in Security and Defence

A more flexible integration model from NATO and the EU could help manage fragmentation risks. Graduated participation in programmes such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), European Defence Agency initiatives, joint procurement, and military mobility projects would allow frontrunners to move faster while keeping other countries constructively engaged. Montenegro’s steady progress and Albania’s hosting of NATO upgrades show how leading states can anchor broader regional stability (Institut Delors, 2026; EEAS, 2025).

A Future of Contribution, Not Just Consumption

The Western Balkans are at a pivotal moment in history. Rising defence budgets, innovative new partnerships, and determined modernisation efforts reveal a region no longer content to remain a peripheral security concern. By thoughtfully combining strategic hedging with smarter, more differentiated integration frameworks and stronger regional ownership, these countries have a genuine opportunity to transform geopolitical complexities into lasting stability and prosperity (Atlantic Council, 2026; Institut Delors, 2026).

The road ahead is not without obstacles. Historical sensitivities, domestic political challenges, and resource limitations persist. Yet, the visible determination across Balkan capitals, from increased spending to new cooperative initiatives, suggests a growing readiness to secure their own path. In doing so, the region may evolve from a consumer of European security into a meaningful contributor, helping strengthen the broader European defence architecture in an uncertain era.

Policy Recommendations

To translate current momentum into sustainable resilience, both regional and international actors should take deliberate steps. Western Balkan governments could strengthen transparency in defence planning by regularly publishing procurement plans and military exercise schedules, while reinforcing parliamentary oversight of major acquisitions (ISACFund, 2026). They should also expand intra-regional cooperation through joint training programmes, coordinated procurement efforts, and enhanced intelligence sharing, building upon existing trilateral initiatives with a spirit of broader inclusivity (Institut Delors, 2026). Investing in dual-use capabilities such as cyber defence, critical infrastructure protection, and military mobility would serve both national interests and wider European security goals (Clingendael Institute, 2025). Finally, leveraging diaspora expertise and fostering private sector partnerships could help nurture a more robust local defence industry and innovation base (CIDOB, 2025).

For the EU and NATO, adopting differentiated security integration models would be highly effective. This could involve offering faster-tracked access to PESCO projects, European Defence Agency initiatives, and joint procurement programmes for countries demonstrating stronger alignment and reform progress (EEAS, 2025). Pre-accession funding could be linked more directly to dual-use infrastructure projects that simultaneously advance economic development and military mobility (Institut Delors, 2026). Expanding security and defence partnerships with clear milestone-based incentives tied to governance, reconciliation, and transparency would help maintain constructive engagement across the entire region (Atlantic Council, 2026). Encouraging greater Balkan participation in European defence industrial projects would also recognise the region’s emerging potential to contribute to European supply chains (CIDOB, 2025).

Broader international partners, including the United States and Turkey, could support minilateral formats that give Balkan countries a stronger voice in discussions and promote transparent, high-standard cooperation (Clingendael Institute, 2025). Coordinated efforts in this direction would help countries diversify partnerships responsibly while avoiding the creation of new dependencies.

Bibliography

Atlantic Council (2026) 2026 will be a big year in the Western Balkans. Here’s what to watch. 23 January. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/2026-will-be-a-big-year-in-the-western-balkans-heres-what-to-watch/ (Accessed: 26 May 2026).

CIDOB (2025) The Risks of a Reinvigorated EU-Western Balkans Defence Cooperation. December. Barcelona: CIDOB.

Clingendael Institute (2025) Security and Stability Scenarios for the Western Balkans. March. The Hague: Clingendael.

EEAS (2025) EU-Western Balkans Summit: Strengthening Security and Stability Together. 18 December. Brussels: European External Action Service.

Institut Delors (2026) Enlargement to the Balkans, Crucial for Europe’s Security. Policy Brief. February. Paris: Institut Delors.

ISAC Fund (2026) Western Balkans – New Alliances, Old Suspicions and the Security Dilemma. Policy Study. January/February. Belgrade: ISAC Fund.

New Eastern Europe (2026) ‘The Balkans in the multipolar moment’, 3 March. Available at: https://neweasterneurope.eu/2026/03/03/the-balkans-in-the-multipolar-moment/ (Accessed: 26 May 2026).

Octopus Institute (2026) ‘Serbia’s Militarization: Security Dilemma in Western Balkans’, 30 April. Available at: https://octopusinstitute.org/serbias-militarization-security-dilemma-in-western-balkans/ (Accessed: 26 May 2026).

Tzifakis, N. and Vasdoka, E. (2025) ‘Great Powers and Gatekeepers in the Western Balkans: Serbia’s Strategic Hedging’, Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 1/2025.

War on the Rocks (2026) ‘A Worrying Military Build-up in the Western Balkans?’, 19 February. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/a-worrying-military-build-up-in-the-western-balkans/ (Accessed: 26 May 2026).