July 25, 2026

MENA Demographic Pivot: Falling Fertility & Rising Age Costs

By Pierce Leslie

As the Middle East and North Africa region faces an aging population, this trend has important political and economic indications that will affect the region into the middle of the 21st century.


The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region now faces an urgent and profound demographic shift. After decades of rapid population growth, fertility rates across MENA have plummeted below replacement level (UN, 2024). According to UN data, more than half of the world’s countries now have a fertility lower than 2.1 births per woman, which is a milestone reached or approached by many MENA states (UN, 2024). For example, Egypt’s fertility has fallen from over 5 in 1990 to around 3 today, and even war-torn states like Iraq and Syria have seen sharp declines (UN, 2024; World Bank, 2024). Lower fertility means far fewer young people will be entering the workforce in the 2030s and 2040s, which may potentially threatening economic stability (OECD, 2024). Meanwhile, as MENA’s population is getting older, the region’s working-age population is projected to expand significantly through mid-century as the share of retirees climbs sharply (UN, 2024). The crisis of this is a surging old-age dependency with more elderly people to support with relatively fewer workers. This will place increased strain on public budgets and severely slow growth unless urgent action is taken.

MENA is experiencing what is typically seen as a long-term “slow-moving” story. However, today it has acute policy relevance as economic forecasts are already adjusting for these trends. For instance, the World Bank projects regional GDP growth to rise modestly from 2.3% in 2024 to around 3% (pre-Iran War figures) in 2025–26. However, these headline gains mask underlying capacity constraints (World Bank, 2025b). Both the IMF and World Bank note that harnessing the “untapped” MENA workforce by boosting female labour participation is the region’s most effective growth lever (World Bank, 2025b, IMF, 2025). In other words, demographics are increasingly framed as a macroeconomic risk in recent IMF and World Bank analyses. In addition, the implications for housing demand, consumer markets, and fiscal balances must be considered in the next business cycle and in decades from now (World Bank, 2025b; IMF, 2025).

Since 2024, countries like Lebanon and Morocco have fallen well below 2.3 (global average) while Yemen and Afghanistan remain higher (around 3–4) on a timeline chart. Nearly every MENA country’s fertility rate has fallen sharply since 2000. Even fast-growing Gulf economies, such as the UAE and Qatar, are approaching the replacement fertility (2.1) (UN, 2024). Meanwhile, the old-age dependency ratio (population 65+ per 100 working-age adults) has risen across the region. In the 1990s, MENA’s old-age dependency was under 5%; but by 2024, it averaged about 8–10% (World Bank, 2024). UN projections show this accelerating. For example, Lebanon’s dependency is expected to more than double by 2050, and Iran and Tunisia are on track to add 10–15 points each by the middle of the 21st century (UN, 2024). In short, the “ageing lift-off” is approaching and countries with historically young populations will soon have significant numbers of pensioners (UN, 2024).

Why Does This Matter?

This demographic transition has direct implications for labour markets and fiscal sustainability that are increasingly highlighted in recent World Bank analysis (World Bank, 2025b). Rapid fertility declines mean that demand growth for schools, housing, and new workers will moderate sooner than many models assume. Additionally, countries that were once endowed with high birth rates can no longer count on the endless demographic dividends (World Bank, 2025b; UN, 2024). In practical terms, sectors that rely on demographic momentum, particularly residential real estate, private education, and mass-market retail, face a medium-term deceleration risk that has yet to be fully priced into forward projections.

Low fertility also slows workforce growth, especially in non-Gulf economies that rely more heavily on domestic labour. In these economies, employers may face upward pressure on wages, especially in lower- and mid-skilled segments unless they are offset by productivity or immigration (OECD, 2024; World Bank, 2025b). In contrast, Gulf economies with flexible migration regimes retain a partial buffer; but even there, policy tightening or localisation could reintroduce constraints (IMF, 2013). For financial markets, ageing means higher age-related spending on health care and pensions, potentially causing higher taxes or deficits at a time when revenue bases in many MENA economies remain volatile or commodity dependent (OECD, 2025). As such, it is essential for MENA countries to begin prioritising labour market reforms that expand participation, particularly among women and younger cohorts, alongside targeted migration policies to offset slowing workforce growth.

Indicators Watch

Three concrete metrics provide early signs. First, the old-age dependency ratio trend from World Bank/UN data is the clearest harbinger. For instance, a noticeable year-on-year uptick in a country’s ratio rising several points would confirm the ageing pivot (World Bank, 2024; United Nations, 2024). Second, reforms that unlock labour have the ability to mitigate the shock. For example, female labour force participation reforms, such as those implemented in Saudi Arabia, can partially offset demographic pressures because rising participation can help to blunt the dependency impact (World Bank, 2025a; IMF, 2025). Third, migration policy shifts function as indicators, as many MENA economies rely on guest workers to boost supply. Stricter immigration rules or crackdowns would signal concern that native labour supply is insufficient (IMF, 2013). Conversely, any liberalisation of work visas or naturalisation for skilled migrants can be seen as a deliberate response to current labour supply issues (OECD, 2023).

Conclusion

The MENA demographic story is shifting from what had long been observed as that of youth to that of elderliness. This transition carries macro-critical implications, as fewer workers per retiree means slower GDP growth as well as potentially higher burdens on welfare systems. Policymakers must prioritise labour market reforms that increase participation, particularly among women and younger cohorts, and targeted migration policies to offset slowing workforce growth. The Middle East and North Africa are quickly approaching this demographic pivot, one whose effects on markets and governments will be felt within this decade.

Bibliography

International Monetary Fund (IMF), (2013) Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Labor Market Reforms to Boost Employment and Productivity in the GCC. 13 November. Washington, DC: IMF. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/policy-papers/issues/2016/12/31/gulf-cooperation-council-gcc-labor-market-reforms-to-boost-employment-and-productivity-in-pp4829
International Monetary Fund (IMF), (2025) Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia – Resilience amid Uncertainty: Will It Last? October. Washington, DC: IMF. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/reo/meca/issues/2025/10/21/regional-economic-outlook-middle-east-central-asia-october-2025
OECD, (2023) International Migration Outlook 2023. Paris: OECD. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/international-migration-outlook-2023_b0f40584-en.html
OECD, (2024) Declining fertility rates put prosperity of future generations at risk. Press release, 20 June. Paris: OECD. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/about/news/press-releases/2024/06/declining-fertility-rates-put-prosperity-of-future-generations-at-risk.html
OECD, (2025) Ageing populations, their fiscal implications and policy responses. OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 21 October. Paris: OECD. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/ageing-populations-their-fiscal-implications-and-policy-responses_6aec03b3-en.html
United Nations (UN), (2024) World Population Prospects 2024. New York: United Nations. Available at: https://population.un.org/wpp/downloads
World Bank, (2024) Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population). World Development Indicators [dataset]. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND.OL
World Bank, (2025a) Report: Investments in People can Help Future-Proof the Middle East & North Africa for Global Megatrends. Press release, 15 September. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/09/15/report-investments-in-people-can-help-future-proof-the-middle-east-north-africa-for-global-megatrends
World Bank, (2025b) Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan & Pakistan Economic Update – October 2025. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/publication/middle-east-north-africa-afghanistan-and-pakistan-economic-update

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