Italy and the Russian Dilemma: A Return to Ostpolitik Pratica di Mare
How the return to the Pratica di Mare introduces a new dilemma for Italy and their potential position as a broker of peace in Russia-European Union relations.
Introduction
Italy, along with Germany, was considered one of Western Europe’s most pragmatic countries toward Russia before the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Italy’s realistic strategy, focused on energy security, was based on an awareness of material interdependence, infrastructural vulnerability, and balance-of-power calculations. Until the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, the EU, led by the Franco-German axis, had often restrained the aggressive positions of the United Kingdom, the Baltic states, and Poland. This strategy was replaced by adherence to the U.S. Democratic Party and Brussels during the 2022 Ukrainian crisis, which contrasted with an independent approach prioritizing pragmatism over a deterrence-oriented policy adopted by Hungary, Slovakia, and NATO member Turkey. The new U.S. administration strategy, along with the limits and risks from sticking to institutional rigidity or even the hawkish Franco-British coalition of the willing, challenges the Italian approach post-2022.
Market Realities and the Costs of Decoupling
Post-WWII European coal, steel, and energy markets have undergone profound destabilization in recent decades due to the decarbonization strategy that undermined the traditional coal and steel sectors by opting for renewable energy sources, which gained prominence especially after the decision to decouple from Russian gas following 2022. Italy has been left dealing with the search for new providers and the mitigation of side effects that expose the limits of European integration without a common European energy market.
From a realistic perspective, the Nord Stream project was built to provide affordable gas for Germany and Europe, support living standards, and connect Russia’s economic prosperity with Europe through stable trade, thus limiting the risk of a return to Cold War times. The project, however, drew criticism from the United States for strengthening Russian influence despite boosting, undoubtedly, the European energy and industry. Politically speaking, Italy’s Pratica di Mare agreement reflected its willingness to cooperate with Russia on energy, security, and political issues wherever possible, thus promoting a meaningful relationship among neighbors.
After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Italy’s domestic response was chaotic. Letta’s government aligned itself with EU and U.S. sanctions. In contrast, the League sought to preserve economic ties, while Berlusconi’s Forza Italia maintained personal relations with Putin. Brothers of Italy and the Five Star Movement emphasized the potential economic fallout of sanctions, while the Democratic Party supported the EU and U.S. strategy. However, internal divisions persisted within the Democratic Party as well, becoming more visible under the 2018 M5S-League coalition government, which sought to preserve cordial relations with Moscow, facilitated by the election of Donald Trump in 2016 that prioritized the need to mitigate the Chinese threat.
This cautious Italian response ended following the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022. Mario Draghi’s administration adopted an unequivocally pro-U.S. Democratic, pro-Ukrainian position, fully implementing allied directives and promoting a narrative of the conflict devoid of broader strategic discussions or shared responsibilities.
Before 2022, Russian energy supplied approximately 40% of Italy’s gas imports. Western sanctions and decoupling have led to higher energy costs for households and businesses, contributing to inflation and temporary industrial slowdowns in key sectors. Italy diversified its imports by striking deals with Algeria, Azerbaijan, and Qatar at higher costs. Moreover, exports to Russia have considerably declined due to banking sanctions and disrupted payment systems. Companies have accelerated energy efficiency measures and switched to alternative energy sources. Medium-term challenges exacerbated Italy’s socio-political vulnerabilities, thus the need to ensure stability.
The U.S. Peace Plan: What Role for Italy?
During Trump’s second term, U.S.-Russia-Ukraine negotiations intensified, including the 2025 Anchorage meeting and a tentative 28-point peace plan. This plan proposed neutrality in Ukraine as more stabilizing for the country itself than normative alignment, such as NATO membership and exceeding military build-up, decried by Moscow, which agrees to enshrine a non-aggression clause for both parties. Contrary to the hawkers, the plan recognizes Ukrainian sovereignty (point 1) but admits that structural constraints such as the constitutional neutrality provision rejected and the war experience, along with the consent to function as a mere tool under great-power rivalry, do not represent a viable plan for democratizing, war on corruption, and prosperity.
Since its independence in 1991, Ukraine has struggled with corruption, institutional weakness, and a multilayered national identity, making rapid EU integration challenging without a proper nation-state process. The plan limits U.S. guarantees to carefully weighed security assurances, emphasizing gradual accommodation over rapid escalation, such as in 2014 and 2022. Thus, the peace plan as such posits that stability is more likely to emerge from neutrality in Ukraine (point 7) than from NATO alignment (point 3). Meanwhile, as points 3 and 8 seem to imply, U.S. involvement—particularly among liberal interventionist policy circles—would not go beyond carefully weighed security guarantees and preventive measures contained in the whole plan to be supervised with Moscow.
In this hypothetical scenario, Italy has tentatively voiced the need for dialogue with Moscow, refusing to seize Russian assets (as proposed by the peace plan, point 14) as some EU hawks proposed. This approach distances Italy from the Franco-British ‘coalition of the willing’, emphasizing arming Ukraine and excluding Russia, which is, however, often contrasted by leaders within the constitutional framework, such as President Mattarella, and within the government itself, such as Defence Minister Crosetto, and Foreign Minister Tajani. Yet this misaligned posture diverges from U.S. intentions for a comprehensive deal (points 2 and 13) before a ceasefire (point 28) and Russia’s re-admission to the G8 as implied by the second component of the coalition government, Matteo Salvini. Italy, if Brussels as such remains unavailable, could join as a guarantor, provided the opening of diplomatic channels with Moscow replaces the current lack of them.
The U.S. peace plan signals a possible return to Ostpolitik/Pratica di Mare by resuming ad hoc cooperation between Russia and the U.S., with the EU likely to follow once the reluctance to engage with the Russian neighbor is replaced by the awareness that security guarantees for Ukraine cannot exclude Russia (point 4, 15, 17, 27). Italy tries to balance the increasing conviction that the European refusal to engage is relegating it to the margin of the negotiations over Ukraine, with the need not to break ranks with Brussels. However, this unclear approach does not take the need for a return of Pratica di Mare with Russia into consideration, along with the legal dilemma over decoupling and the risks related to energy security and the strained relations with the U.S. The return to the Pratica di Mare would propel Italy once again to the level of broker of peace.
Conclusion: The Estonianization of the Italian Approach?
Italy’s approach to Russia and European energy security reflects the tension between pragmatism and alignment with Brussels. Historically grounded in realist, energy-focused calculations, Italy sought to balance interdependence with geopolitical responsibilities while diving through internal political divisions and EU pressures to conform with the anti-Russia approach. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine forced a decisive pro-Dem alignment, yet strategic considerations suggest cautious engagement with Moscow that the new U.S. administration seems to privilege over Ukraine.
Europe’s fragmented energy architecture, decarbonization, Russian gas decoupling, and strained U.S. relations expose vulnerabilities that reinforce Italy’s need for diversification and strategic foresight regarding a return to Pratica di Mare. To conclude, Italy’s dilemma suggests that in an era of energy shocks/dilemmas, geopolitical competition, and economic interdependence, effective foreign policy would require pragmatism and the will to engage with Russia on such issues that go beyond dogmatic resistance over opting for peace in Ukraine rather than prolonging the conflict with Russia, as the U.S. seems now aware of it.
