Indo-Pacific Regional Architecture in Normative-Pragmatic Spectrums

By Angana Guha Roy

The Indo-Pacific is increasingly shaped by a hybrid order in which inclusive multilateralism coexists with faster, interest-driven minilaterals. While ASEAN-led frameworks preserve normative legitimacy, minilaterals like QUAD and AUKUS deliver more tangible security outcomes, but risk fragmenting regional governance.

The institutional landscape that defines the Indo-Pacific region’s evolving regional architecture is characterized by small and agile minilaterals alongside broad, consensus driven multilaterals. The mixed ecosystem offers complementarity, with smaller minilaterals feeding into the broader multilateral platforms. It simultaneously raises doubts about the scope and extent of cooperation and stability such a mixed approach can foster. While multilateralism ensures equal voice for all member nations, it remains non outcome oriented, leading to suboptimal results, as demonstrated in the case of the United Nations. Member countries have repeatedly demanded the restructuring and revitalization of the organization (Fulcrum, 2023).

ASEAN has remained the cornerstone of multilateralism in the region despite the conflicting national interests of the member countries. Even the subregional partnerships in action have not been completely effective in bridging the gap between national priorities and regional goals, as seen in the dispute cases of Myanmar and the South China Sea, which remain in a deadlock. Some of the most prominent minilateral initiatives within ASEAN, such as the Cambodia Laos Vietnam Trilateral Security framework, Malacca Straits Patrol, Our Eyes initiative, ASEAN Coast Guard Forum, and ASEAN Power Grid, are important in protecting subregional interests while strengthening regional interconnection (Fulcrum, 2023).

The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is focused on development, cooperation, and dialogue. Multilateralism lies at the heart of the AOIP (ASEAN, 2019). ASEAN is supportive of inclusive multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific, using its existing platforms such as ARF, EAS, ASEAN+ mechanisms, and ADMM Plus to engage with external partners. The ASEAN Outlook underscores ASEAN’s role in “building bridges” between competing powers, avoiding exclusive support for any particular power bloc. The ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Upholding Multilateralism (2021) links implementation of AOIP to broader multilateral efforts. Many external partners (US, Japan, Australia, India, EU, etc.) have expressed support for the AOIP (ASEAN, 2019).

Besides QUAD and AUKUS, which form part of a broader deterrence posture, the Indo-Pacific is now home to several other trilateral collaborations and engagements, such as the trilateral security dialogue between Australia, Japan, and the US, as well as the Australia, India, and Indonesia (AII) trilateral (Fulcrum, 2023). The Five Power Defence Arrangements between Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK are another example of minilateral consultative defence cooperation. The complementarity within these multilayered minilaterals helps balance the strategic assertiveness of adversarial powers.

The hybrid mechanism has been evident even in the cases of smaller coalitions like the G7 and NATO, owing to the increasing difficulty of reaching consensus through universal bodies like the United Nations. The formulation of such security configurations has multiplied in the backdrop of deepening US China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. The US practices strategic cautiousness by maintaining strong associations with alliance partners while participating in multilateral frameworks to retain maximum power and flexibility. China, over time, has launched prominent counter initiatives like the Global Security Initiative, while simultaneously strengthening economic partnerships with ASEAN and GCC countries. Purposively, participating countries have compartmentalized development led cooperation from strategic concerns emanating from major power rivalry in the region. QUAD is the most relevant example in this regard.

The broader consensus based multilateral platforms have been operational in accommodating interested countries within the emerging institutional flux of the Indo-Pacific. There has been little discussion about the expanding footprint of other CIVETS countries (an acronym for six emerging market economies: Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, that have high economic potential and investment appeal), such as Turkey, South Africa, Colombia, and Egypt, in the Indo-Pacific. These states are part of various minilaterals that have significant stakes in the region (Financial Management, 2012).

Turkey has actively expanded its multilateral footprint in the Indo-Pacific through its “Asia Anew” initiative, aimed at security cooperation, economic ties, and dialogue partnerships (MFA, Republic of Türkiye). Besides being a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN, it is involved in key multilateral platforms like the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), ASEAN Inter Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA), and other regional engagements. Simultaneously, Colombia (through the Pacific Alliance), South Africa (through BRICS, IORA, and ASEAN engagements), and Egypt (through strategic partnerships with BRICS) have facilitated interregional trade, security, and investment connections while deepening their presence in the Indo-Pacific.

The slowdown of the multilateral order has elicited concerns about its legitimacy from countries across the world. It has caused nations to adapt to new interest based cooperative approaches while embracing broader consensus based multilateral arrangements.

Minilaterals thrive where multilaterals fail. While minilaterals are quick in addressing shared concerns and challenges, they risk creating a fragmented global order. Instead of normative anchoring, they are indicative of the urgency of addressing immediate challenges spontaneously. Interest based minilaterals rely on rotating chairs, leadership summits, and working groups. Binding treaties or permanent secretariats, which govern broad consensus based multilateral structures, on the other hand, prevent the dismantling of structures when conflicts of interest arise between member states.

To conclude, the evolving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific persists within the normative pragmatic spectrum. Drawing on the emerging hybrid cooperative approaches across the world, the functional effectiveness of minilaterals is increasingly prevailing over the lowest common denominator deliverables of broad consensus-based multilaterals.

Bibliography

Fulcrum, ‘Minilateral Cooperation in ASEAN May Help it Overcome Challenges in Multilateralism’, March 2023.URL: https://fulcrum.sg/minilateral-cooperation-in-asean-may-help-it-overcome-challenges-in-multilateralism/

ASEAN,’ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’, June 2019. URL: https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf

Financial Management, ‘Succeeding in the CIVETS’, February 2012. URL: https://www.fm-magazine.com/issues/2012/feb/succeeding-in-the-civets/

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Türkiye, ‘Asia Anew Initiative’, August 2019,URL: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/asia-anew-initiative.en.mfa