How Lebanon Can Dismantle Hezbollah’s Grip on Power

After fourteen months of war between Israel and Hezbollah that left nearly 2,800 people dead – the vast majority Lebanese civilians – and wrecked much of southern Lebanon and Beirut’s suburbs, a U.S.-brokered cease-fire has opened a rare window of opportunity. The November truce 2024, which ended the fighting, requires Israel to fully withdraw from Lebanese territory and Hezbollah to pull its forces north of the Litani River (Knipp, 2025). In essence, United Nations Resolution 1701 – long ignored – is being revived, stipulating that southern Lebanon must be free of any weapons outside state control (Reuters, 2024).

A U.S.- and French-led monitoring mechanism is in place to enforce these terms and prevent Hezbollah from rearming (Karam, 2024). With Hezbollah battered militarily and financially, Lebanon’s new leaders are cautiously hopeful that this time, the militant party’s parallel state can be curbed once and for all. The task ahead is daunting – weakening Hezbollah permanently has long seemed impossible – but for once the goal is attainable if Beirut is bold enough to shut off the group’s access to state resources and empower the national army to assert full sovereignty (Ghaddar, 2025).

A Weakened Hezbollah and a Resurgent State Ambition

Hezbollah today is reeling. Its long-standing leader, Hassan Nasrallah, was killed in an Israeli airstrike in late September 2024, shattering the aura of invincibility he had cultivated (Karam, 2024). Throughout the course of the war, Israel systematically decimated Hezbollah’s upper echelon, killing dozens of senior field commanders and even sabotaging the group’s communications networks with its famous “pager attack” of September 2024, rendering Hezbollah largely torpid (Mekhennet & Warrick, 2024). Israeli strikes also wiped out an estimated 80% of Hezbollah’s arsenal (Karam, 2024). Massive bombing campaigns targeted Hezbollah’s strongholds and infrastructure, including financial institutions linked to the group, to make rebuilding prohibitively difficult (Karam, 2024). Cut off from its usual supply lines through Syria and facing tighter international sanctions, Hezbollah is struggling to pay its fighters and procure new weapons (Valente, 2025). Hezbollah is now encircled, given that the northern and eastern borders with Syria are now effectively closed. Iran’s cash and arms shipments are disrupted, and even Beirut’s airport is no longer an easy conduit, as Lebanese authorities have suspended the frequent flights from Iranian cities to Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport (Times of Israel, 2025). In short, Israel’s blistering offensive delivered a devastating defeat that has crippled Hezbollah’s ability to impose its will on Lebanon as it once did.

For Lebanon’s long-paralyzed state, this turn of events offers a once-in-a-lifetime opening (Ghaddar, 2025). President Joseph Aoun – former commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces – and Prime Minister Dr. Nawaf Salam – a respected jurist and former President of the International Court of Justice (ICC) – have signaled their intent to restore Lebanese sovereignty and end Hezbollah’s state-within-a-state (Williams, 2025). The Lebanese public, including many in the Shia community, are exhausted by the destruction (Ghaddar, 2025). Hezbollah’s decision to drag Lebanon into war under the banner of “resistance” to Israel sparked growing anger among Lebanese who never consented to such a fight (Karam, 2024). Now, voices across the spectrum are calling for the complete disarmament of Hezbollah and for accountability for its years of political intimidation (Karam, 2024). Even Hezbollah’s base has been shaken: the group’s rank-and-file and supporters are grappling with grief and the devastation of their homes, which may undermine the long-term loyalty that Hezbollah once enjoyed (Ghaddar, 2025).

Capitalizing on a Fragile Cease-fire

The current cease-fire deal, brokered by Washington and Paris, was designed to be more robust than past agreements. It explicitly tasks the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with deploying up to 10,000 troops across the southern Litani area to enforce security (Livni, 2024). Critically, the Lebanese government is charged with regulating all arms imports, ensuring that no new weapons reach Hezbollah’s hands (Livni, 2024). An expanded UNIFIL (UN peacekeepers) mandate, now backed by U.S. and French oversight, aims to dismantle Hezbollah’s military infrastructure and prevent any clandestine rearmament (Reuters, 2024).

In essence, Lebanon is being strongly nudged to finally implement the 1989 Taif Agreement and fully assert the state’s monopoly on force. Taif, which ended Lebanon’s civil war, required all militias to disband and surrender their weapons to the state – something every faction did except Hezbollah, which was tacitly allowed to continue its Iranian-fashioned armed resistance against Israel. Now the international community is insisting that exception come to an end (Ghaddar, 2024). Most Lebanese, too, support replacing Hezbollah’s militia with the Lebanese Army as the sole defender of the nation’s sovereignty (Karam, 2024).

Hezbollah and its allies hold 53 seats of Lebanon’s 128-seat parliament, and they can still obstruct legislation (Ghaddar, 2025). There is a real risk that a heavy-handed campaign against Hezbollah could spark internal strife or drive the movement underground (Karam, 2024). Any bold confrontation with Hezbollah’s new leadership could revive a siege mentality among its militants and even turn their guns inward against fellow Lebanese. The goal, then, must be to dismantle Hezbollah’s parallel military power without igniting civil conflict. That requires a combination of firmness and finesse – and a clear strategy that uses all means available to the state. Key policy steps Lebanese authorities can pursue to weaken and ultimately eliminate Hezbollah’s grip include the following.

Enforce the Border Security Arrangement

Move swiftly to assert full state control in the south. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) should aggressively patrol the southern border region alongside UN peacekeepers, preventing any Hezbollah fighters from returning or rebuilding bunkers. Hezbollah’s military outposts near Israel must be dismantled, with the army taking over key positions. This fulfills the cease-fire terms and signals that the era of Hezbollah acting as an autonomous border guard is over. Crucially, Lebanon must implement UNSC Resolution 1701 to the letter, disarming any non-state actors in the south and ensuring only official forces carry weapons there. The message should be that Lebanon’s frontiers are the sole domain of the Lebanese state, not any party militia.

Confiscate Hezbollah’s Armed Capabilities

Beyond the south, the Lebanese government must aim to fully demobilize Hezbollah’s military wing nationwide. This means enforcing the 1989 Taif Agreement’s long-delayed mandate that “exclusive state control of weapons” be restored in Lebanon. In practice, Hezbollah’s vast arsenal of rockets, missiles, and arms should be inventoried and placed under state lock and key (or removed from the country under international supervision).

Cut Off Iranian Support and Funding

Lebanon’s security forces must seal the illicit arms pipeline from Iran via Syria. For decades, convoys through Syria – and flights into Beirut’s airport – kept Hezbollah’s missile warehouses stocked (Williams, 2025). Now, the army should tighten control at the Syrian border and ports, deploying scanners and checkpoints to intercept smuggled missiles or precision parts. Western and Arab partners can assist with intelligence and technology to monitor these routes. Syria’s new transitional government is so eager to cut off Hezbollah’s supply routes that they raided a Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese village inside Syria near the Syrian border in early February (Carroll, 2025).

Financially, Beirut should continue to weed out Hezbollah’s influence in the banking sector and state institutions. The group’s charity-turned-bank, al-Qard al-Hassan, and other front organizations must remain under sanctions and scrutiny. Any revenue streams Hezbollah enjoys – from smuggling, public contracts, or Iran’s patronage – should be squeezed by coordinated enforcement. Just 3 days ago, Lebanese authorities detained a man at Beirut’s airport carrying $2.5 million in cash allegedly intended for Hezbollah (Norman, 2025). Such efforts must be continued and embedded in Lebanese airport security protocol.

Assert Political Authority and Unity

On the political front, Lebanon’s leaders should formalize the end of Hezbollah’s exceptionalism. The new government has already dropped the doctrine that the “Army, People, and Resistance” together defend Lebanon (El Jammal, 2025). Parliament should go further by passing an unanimously supported resolution affirming that only the state may decide on war and peace. Any agreements or understandings that gave Hezbollah latitude to act independently (such as past “defense strategy” ambiguities) need to be nullified. Going forward, Lebanese institutions – from the cabinet to the army – must operate on the principle that no political party can maintain a private army. Enforcing this may require tough love with Hezbollah’s political wing: they should be told plainly that they can continue to participate in politics only if they relinquish their guns.

Rebuild and Win Hearts in Shia Areas 

Hezbollah has entrenched itself not just with guns, but by providing social services, healthcare, and protection to many in the Shia community – functions often neglected by the Lebanese state (Ghaddar, 2022). To convince Lebanon’s Shia that they no longer need Hezbollah as their guardian, the government (with international aid) must step up and fill the void. That starts with massive reconstruction and relief in the war-torn regions of the south, the Bekaa Valley, and Beirut’s Dahiya suburbs. An estimated 1.3 million Lebanese – predominantly Shia – were displaced from these areas during the conflict (Karam, 2024). Many returned to find homes and villages in ruins. The World Bank has put initial recovery costs at $8.5 billion (World Bank, 2024).

Beirut should spearhead an equitable rebuilding campaign – repairing infrastructure, compensating families, and restoring livelihoods – so that ordinary Shia see the Lebanese state delivering for them. Schools, hospitals, and utilities in Hezbollah-dominated districts should be rebuilt better than before. In tandem, urgent economic reforms are needed to pull Lebanon out of collapse and alleviate the poverty that Hezbollah has often exploited for recruitment (Karam, 2024). If people have jobs, electricity, and security provided by their government, Hezbollah’s narrative of “only we can protect and serve our community” will lose resonance. It is also vital to avoid sectarian score-settling in this process. Retaliatory rhetoric or policies targeting the Shia for the sins of Hezbollah would be dangerously counterproductive. Instead, an inclusive approach must be taken – one that assures the Shia population that they are full citizens of Lebanon, not pawns in Iran’s regional games (Karam, 2024).

Toward a Lebanon Free of Parallel Armies

The post-Nasrallah chapter has begun – one in which Hezbollah’s mystique has been shattered and its “Resistance” rhetoric rings hollow amid the rubble of Lebanese towns. Now, it falls on the Lebanese state to ensure this chapter ends with Hezbollah’s weapons permanently silenced and its political influence normalized under the rule of law. This will require uncommon courage and unity at home, and steadfast support from abroad. But the alternative – a return to the destructive cycles of proxy conflict and internal paralysis – is untenable. By acting decisively now, Beirut can finally wrest back control of the country from Hezbollah and steer Lebanon toward a more stable and sovereign future.

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