Forged by Crisis, Fractured by Design: How Institutional Vulnerabilities in EU Decision-Making Undermine Collective Security

The unanimity trap, Hungarian obstruction, and the gaps in EU collective security

February 23rd, 2026, Hungary vetoed a €90 billion EU loan to Ukraine and, alongside Slovakia, blocked the 20th sanctions package targeted at Russian oil exports. The next day marked 4 years of the full scale invasion of Ukraine, and the EU aimed to show their support. This was not the first time EU member states could not reach a consensus on this particular matter, Hungary alone wielded its veto 19 times since 2011, proving that unity is conditional. This reveals institutional vulnerabilities in the EU decision making that individual members and external actors learned to exploit.

Collective action in crisis

In February 2022, Russian aggression sent shockwaves around Europe, triggering an ideological shift across all 27 EU members. Statements recognising Russian aggression as a collective threat were voiced by a large number of key EU decision makers, “Russia is grossly violating international law and undermining European and global security and stability” (European Council, 2022). 13 consecutive sanction packages were unanimously implemented between 2022 and 2024, targeting individual actors, limiting trade, binding limits on imports of Russian energy, and eventually phasing out imports of Russian crude oil and petroleum products (European Council, 2025). This represents a significant institutional shift and an unprecedented level of diplomatic and economic cohesion for an entity historically paralysed by diverging national interests. This collective effort led to a decrease in energy dependency on Russian natural gas, dropping from 153,226 mcm in 2021 to 33,403 mcm in 2023 (Eurostat, nrg_ti_gas, 2026). Yet the unanimity that produced this unexpected response gives any single state the power to obstruct it from within.

Chart 1

Energy dependency as strategic choice

The effect of sanctions and self limitations was visible by the end of 2022. While the majority of European states have collectively witnessed a measurable decrease of almost 50% in gas imports from Russia, Hungary has slightly raised it from 7,105 to 7,671 mcm. Budapest chose to maintain close economic ties with Moscow and subsequently raised its oil dependency from 61% pre war, up to 86% in 2024, while having clear alternative supply options (Atlantic Council, 2025). Since the start of the war, Hungary became one of the largest importers of Russian fossil fuels in Europe, spending around $6 billion and indirectly financing Moscow’s military capabilities (CREA, 2024). Through deliberate strategic choice Hungary moved in the opposite direction from its European colleagues and despite the collective phase out opted to strengthen its energy dependency on Russia (DW, 2026). This trajectory cannot be explained simply by Hungary’s geographic constraints or pipeline dependency alone. It suggests a deeper political connection, ironically symbolised by the Druzhba, or Friendship pipeline, connecting gas trade between countries.

Chart 2

Political alignment

Orban and Putin have built a documented and systemic relationship over the years. Orban visited Moscow in July 2024, making him the first EU leader to visit Putin after almost 2 years since the Union isolated Russia (BBC, 2024). This particular visit reflects a consistent pattern of documented institutional obstructions, as Hungary has wielded veto 19 times between 2011 to 2025, with one third occurring in the past year and a half, making it historically the most of any other country in the EU (CER, 2025). The Commission found Hungary insufficiently addressed rule of lawbreaches in December 2024 (EC, 2024), while the European Parliament sounded alarms over Hungary’s worsening rule of law crisis in November 2025 (Europarl, 2025). With elections coming up on the 12th of April and Fidesz trailing by 20 points behind the opposition party Tisza, Orban is raising stakes, framing the EU and Ukraine as threats to national security and placing the February veto, making it a useful scenario in a domestic political landscape. According to reports by VSquare and the Financial Times, a Kremlin advisory developed a plan to flood Hungarian media with propaganda supporting Orban ahead of the elections (VSquare, 2026; Financial Times, 2026). This suggests that Hungary’s structural obstructions serve Moscow’s interests regardless of whether coordination is direct or ideological. Budapest provides a stress test revealing the limits of EU institutional architecture when political and economic interests diverge from collective security commitments.

Institutional design as security risk

EU sanctions require unanimous approval of all member states, giving an institutional window for any single government to overpower the collective security decisions. This is not an issue exploited by Hungary alone, being an architectural feature of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Schäffer, 2025; Duval, 2025). Clear evidence of institutional failure is the deliberate exemption of the Druzhba pipeline for Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia from 2022 oil sanctions, allowing time for diversification (CSIS, 2022). However the EU had no enforcement mechanisms and although being a temporary measure, Hungary used the opportunity and chose to deepen dependency (Atlantic Council, 2025). The problem extends beyond Orban. In April 2024, the 2024/1226 directive was passed to criminalize sanctions violations across the bloc; member states including France, Germany and 16 others have since missed that deadline. Acknowledging the gap, the European Commission opened an infringement procedure 3 months later, against states who failed to transpose the Directive (Paul Hastings, 2025). All 3 cases form connected and compounding vulnerability that any state can exploit within, and that hostile state actors can leverage from outside.

A test the EU must not fail

No matter who wins in the Hungarian April 12th elections, the systemic issues will still exist. Although Magyar victory will likely end the immediate obstruction, results in other upcoming European elections may lead to more challenges within the Union’s order. Qualified majority voting on sanctions implementation is an immediate security requirement, under which a single state’s individual interest would no longer paralyze collective sanctions decisions (CER, 2025). Today the EU’s most urgent concern is not external pressure from Moscow, but the internal architecture that allows pressure to influence decision making inside the bloc.

Bibliography

Atlantic Council (2025) Hungary Has Alternative Energy Options but Chooses to Rely on Russia. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/hungary-has-alternative-energy-options-but-chooses-to-rely-on-russia/ [Accessed 27 March 2026].

BBC News (2024) Orbán Makes First Visit by an EU Leader to Putin Since Ukraine Invasion. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cml29r8d2zxo [Accessed 27 March 2026].

Centre for European Reform (2025) Does EU Enlargement Require Voting Reform? Available at: https://www.cer.eu/insights/does-eu-enlargement-require-voting-reform [Accessed 27 March 2026].

Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) (2024) April 2024 Monthly Analysis of Russian Fossil Fuel Exports and Sanctions. Available at: https://energyandcleanair.org/april-2024-monthly-analysis-of-russian-fossil-fuel-exports-and-sanctions/ [Accessed 27 March 2026].

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2022) European Union Imposes Partial Ban on Russian Oil. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/european-union-imposes-partial-ban-russian-oil [Accessed 27 March 2026].

Deutsche Welle (2026) Report: Hungary Using More Russian Oil Despite EU Phase-Out. Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/report-hungary-using-more-russian-oil-despite-eu-phase-out/a-76487750 [Accessed 27 March 2026].

Duval, G. (2025) The EU Could and Should Put an End to Unanimity When it Comes to Sanctions. Jacques Delors Institute, 25 March. Available at: https://institutdelors.eu/content/uploads/2025/06/BP_250325_Sanctions_Duval_EN.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2026].

European Commission (2024) Commission Considers that Hungary Has Not Sufficiently Addressed Breaches of the Principles of the Rule of Law, Press Release IP/24/6465. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6465 [Accessed 27 March 2026].

European Council (2022) European Council Conclusions on Russia’s Unprovoked and Unjustified Military Aggression Against Ukraine, 24 February. Available at:https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/24/european-council-conclusions-24-february-2022/ [Accessed 27 March 2026].

European Council (2025) EU Response to Russia’s Military Aggression Against Ukraine. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-solidarity-ukraine/ [Accessed 27 March 2026].

European Parliament (2025) Parliament Sounds the Alarm over Hungary’s Deepening Rule of Law Crisis, Press Release, 20 November. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20251120IPR31492/parliament-sounds-the-alarm-over-hungary-s-deepening-rule-of-law-crisis [Accessed 27 March 2026].

Eurostat (2026) Imports of Natural Gas by Partner Country [nrg_ti_gas], extracted 25 March 2026. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg_ti_gas__custom_20695848/default/table [Accessed 25 March 2026].

Financial Times (2026) ‘Kremlin-Linked Consultancy Drew Up Plan to Boost Orbán Ahead of Hungarian Election’. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/34df20f9-487b-4cb6-9dc9-d676d959d1ed [Accessed 27 March 2026].

Paul Hastings LLP (2025) Addressing Gaps and Inconsistencies in the EU Sanctions Enforcement: The Commission Urges Member States to Transpose Directive (EU) 2024/1226. Available at: https://www.paulhastings.com/insights/client-alerts/addressing-gaps-and-inconsistencies-in-the-eu-sanctions-enforcement-the-commission-urgers-member-states-to-transpose-directive [Accessed 27 March 2026].

Schäffer, J. (2025) ‘EU Sanctions and the Mirage of Unanimity: Overcoming the Hungarian Veto One Step After Another Under the Letter of EU Law’, Verfassungsblog, 8 October. Available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/eu-sanctions-and-the-mirage-of-unanimity/ [Accessed 27 March 2026].

VSquare (2026) Putin’s GRU-Linked Election Fixers Are Already in Budapest to Help Orbán. Available at: https://vsquare.org/putins-gru-linked-election-fixers-are-already-in-budapest-to-help-orban/ [Accessed 27 March 2026].