Force Design 2030 and the Philippine Crossroads
Force Design 2030 and interoperability with the Philippines remain deeply integrated with the U.S. Marine Corps’ amphibious wartime contingencies. Manila’s geographic position makes the country a prime target of aggression, particularly by Beijing, as seen in the South China Sea. With Marine Littoral Regiments having a significant rotating presence along the Luzon Strait, FD2030 will continue to progress and enhance alliance cooperation and unit cohesion
Introduced in March 2020, Force Design 2030 (FD2030) is the ongoing restructuring and adaptation of the United States Marine Corps as a way to adapt to new security challenges—particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. With China rapidly militarizing its capabilities and enacting hybrid and diplomatic coercion in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. military is not only adapting to new security challenges but also heading back to its amphibious roots with the Marine Corps (USMC).
Force Design 2030 with the reconstituted Marine littoral units will play a critical role in seaborne operations, especially in the South China Sea around the Philippines, where China’s maritime expansion could lead to armed conflict. With a focus on maritime movements with amphibious roots reminiscent of the Pacific Theatre of World War II, the Marines and, in part, the Philippine Armed Forces will become a frontline force in the First Island Chain containment strategy.
Progression of Force Design 2030
In 2017, former Marine Commandant General Robert Neller stated the Marine Corps was not ready to face peer-reviewed adversaries—particularly China, as the USMC diverged from its original amphibious roots with two long-standing land wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Another former Commandant, General David H. Berger, would introduce Force Design 2030, which enhances relations with the U.S. Navy and makes Marines more agile and amphibious to meet challenges in the Asian Pacific region.
Now in its sixth year of integration, the U.S. Marine Corps has implemented various aspects of FD2030 in new unit designations and current Indo-Pacific deployments. Littoral warfare is a key component of FD2030, which includes surveillance along small islands and denying the enemy freedom of movement during amphibious operations.
Currently, the Marine Corps has designated 3rd and 12th Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs based out of Hawaii and Japan, respectively) for FD2030 movements and operations. Each of the littoral regiments includes a combat team (originally an infantry battalion), an anti-air battalion, a logistics battalion, and a communications and headquarters company.
The 3rd and 12th Marine Littoral Regiments have taken part in several deployments and exercises in the South China Sea—particularly with the Philippines, a treaty ally of the United States whose islands would be a crucial staging ground if a wider Indo-Pacific war were to take place.
Intertwining the Philippines
The Philippines will be crucial for littoral warfare as Manila’s islands sit strategically along the First Island Chain. With Beijing’s navy (PLAN) and Coast Guard (CCG) being more assertive in the South China Sea, the need to have a strong American presence along a potential powder keg remains a top priority for Indo-Pacific affairs.
Both the Spratly Islands and Luzon Strait represent a major flashpoint of PLAN hybrid warfare against the Philippine navy, and with over $3 to $5 trillion in trade annually passing through the South China Sea, a future armed conflict could see the global economy put in a stranglehold akin to the 2026 Iran war. Exercise Balikatan 2025 has started to address how the Philippines and FD2030 would intertwine if a contingency were to take place along the flashpoint islands. During Balikatan 2025, the Littoral Rotational Force-Luzon was introduced to integrate the MLRs into the Philippine archipelago with a focus on coastal defense and enhanced defensive relations with Manila.
Supplementing the Littoral Rotational Force-Luzon is the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Interdiction System anti-ship missile, known as NMESIS. The NMESIS missile system can engage naval targets up to 100 nautical miles, which can help defend U.S. forces, the Philippine islands and other allied nations’ coastlines from PLAN threats and coercions.
China’s Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Indo-Pacific Shortfalls
Amid the interoperability between America and the Philippines comes China’s coercion and force projection. Beijing’s hybrid warfare and coercive warfare on the Philippines has made Manila hesitant to directly support broader regional defenses, such as a Taiwan contingency, without a fully concrete American posture.
Within the South China Sea, the Spratly and Paracel islands and Luzon Strait represent the major flashpoint locations that could lead to a broader regional war as the PLAN and CCG have invested heavily in forward force projection. Starting in the early 2010s, China’s naval posture in the South China Sea became more aggressive, with the PLAN and CGG deploying water cannons, utilizing distorting sounds, and frequently ramming Filipino maritime and civilian vessels.
A major conflict occurred in the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, in which Beijing would gain control over the shoal at Manila’s expense, which only led to heightened U.S. support under former President Obama’s Asia pivot strategy. Two other confrontations, the 2024 ramming in the Second Thomas Shoal and the 2025 collision of the PLAN and CCG vessels, only showed the need for a concrete American-Philippine alliance in the South China Sea.
Continuing strong ties the Obama and Biden administrations cultivated with the Philippines during the pivot strategy, the second Trump administration has also cultivated concrete measures with Manila amid Beijing’s assertiveness. The aforementioned Balikatan exercises are essential for not only deterrence but also allied cooperation, as Manila can be reassured of a continuous Marine littoral presence in the Luzon flashpoint.
Simultaneously, economic investments such as Pax Silica have not only enhanced relations between Manila and Washington but also brought Tokyo into the fold economically and militarily as a way to divest from Beijing. Alongside the Marine Littoral Regiments, the Japanese Self-Defence Forces also signed a landmark mutual defense pact with the Philippines that allows the JSDF to deploy troops on the islands as a supplementary force.
Can FD2030 Progress Without the Filipino Islands?
However, with the strategic location of the Philippines and its archipelago, Manila would ultimately need to intertwine its defense with FD2030. Manila’s Mavulis Island in the Cagayan province, near the Batanes archipelago, is situated in the vicinity of Taiwan, and any PLAN and CCG naval blockade would directly affect the economy of the Philippines.
The Philippines President Marcos Jr. has acknowledged that due to the geographic position of the country, Manila would need to prepare for all possibilities and contingencies, as staying idle is not an option. Interoperability with FD2030 allows the Philippines to have several options between allowing surveillance, humanitarian evacuations, logistical assistance, or potential direct intervention alongside the Marine Littoral Regiments.
Force Design 2030 and interoperability with the Philippines remain deeply integrated with the U.S. Marine Corps’ amphibious wartime contingencies. Manila’s geographic position makes the country a prime target of aggression, particularly by Beijing, as seen in the South China Sea. With Marine Littoral Regiments having a significant rotating presence along the Luzon Strait, FD2030 will continue to progress and enhance alliance cooperation and unit cohesion
