Changes in Public Desire for a Democratized Tunisia in the Post-Arab Spring Period

Introduction 

The 2011 Arab Spring brought about a widespread push for democratization and political optimism throughout the Arab World. Tunisia is credited for the initial spark of political dissent, and often remarked as the most successful outcome of the series of protests. However, public desire for democracy has significantly fluctuated since 2011 following economic grievances and severe fragmentation of the Tunisian government. The evolution of Tunisia’s relationship with democratic governance calls the international community to examine whether or not democracy will ever be viable in the nation, and if there is still public faith in the democratic system as a whole. 

Revolution, and the Move Towards Democracy in Tunisia 

Tunisia became the epicenter for the Arab Spring following the ‘Jasmine Revolution,’ sparked by widespread public dissatisfaction with the existing authoritarian leader Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, catalyzed by the self-emulation of 26-year-old street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi. The protests were successful, and Ben Ali eventually fled the country. Pro-democracy opinions were widespread across Tunisia following the revolution, averaging about 80% of citizens being in favor. Political elections were met with significant turnout, electing the Ennahda as the primary political party, characterized by moderate Islamist policy (Pew Research Center, 2014). A new constitution was passed in 2014, which was widely understood to be the most progressive in the Arab world at the time. The new constitution further cemented hopes for a democratic future (Khaddar, 2023). 

The Decline of Faith in Democracy 

Attempts at solidifying a democratic system began to falter when corruption, political fragmentation, and economic issues persisted for civilians (Desrues & Gobe, 2023). Tunisia’s overall GDP did not increase due to high unemployment rates, specifically among youth and young adult citizens (Prasad & Kumar, 2024). In addition, political disillusionment began to take over the attitudes of civilians as emerging politicians and political parties failed to deliver on campaign promises (Khaddar, 2023). A final attribution to the decline is linked to an increase in terrorist activity, including the Bardo Museum attack in 2015 (Pew Research Center, 2014). 

As seen in the figure above, public desire for democracy faced a stark decline from over 80% at the start of the revolutions in 2011, down to 44% in 2016. Civilians increasingly regarded democracy as a system that continued economic instability and political fragmentation, leading to decreased faith in its ability to meet public needs (Romdhani, 2024). 

Resurgence of Authoritarianism 

It is in 2021 that democracy is publicly abandoned by the Tunisain President Kais Saied as he declared executive rule and dismissed the presence of Parliament (Khaddar, 2023).While some Tunisians feared a return to authoritarian rule, the previously cited grievances with democracy also led to some Tunisans viewing Saied’s move as necessary to preserving effective government functions. While typically a nation’s youth produce the most progressive attitudes towards political function, a 2022 Arab Barometer poll found that only 43% of Tunisian youth (ages 18–29) believed democracy was favorable to other modes of government, compared to over 60% a decade earlier (Robbins, 2022). 

Modern Trends in Favor of Democracy 

Referencing the above graph, an upward trend in pro-democratic attitudes can be seen in the period between 2022 and 2024. One potential reason for this shift could be tied to public dissatisfaction with Saied’s governance style. While initially favorable among some Tunians, the lack of bettering economic conditions for civilians has proved authoritarianism is not a viable political solution, regardless of separate democratic drawbacks (Khaddar, 2023). In addition, pro-democratic mobilization has grown increasingly strong from NGO’s and politically-active Tunisian youth, including several recent pro-democracy and political freedom protests in the region (Romdhani, 2024), (Desrues & Gobe, 2023). The most recent data suggests that 55% of Tunisians view democracy favorably, suggesting a split in opinion for how Tunisia’s government should be structured in the future. 

Recent Elections 

The recent 2024 presidential election in Tunisia held space for a shift, but Kais Saied was reelected in a landslide victory. However, critics suggest he utilized political weaponization against his opponents, with many of his challengers jailed, or off the ballot by the time of election. “We’re going to cleanse the country of all the corrupt and schemers,” Kaid Saied is quoted, perhaps solidifying his desire to maintain an autocratic rule. However, the election was also marked with one of the lowest voter turnouts for Tunisia, with only about 28.8% of eligible voters turning out, suggesting that perhaps Saied’s 90% win is not representative of the percentage of Tunisians who support him.

Conclusion 

It is evident that public opinion towards democracy has significantly fluctuated between the initial Jasmine protests in 2011 to today. Initial support and public faith in democracy post-2011 was strong, but failure of successive governments to adequately solve economic and political challenges led to decreases in public support, and Tuniasian civilians increasingly felt their needs were being unmet. The 2021 power grab by President Kais Saied shows a crux of political disillusionment. However, in the last three years, recent pushes from pro-democracy coalitions suggest a potential shift back towards public democratic aspirations.  

The future of Tunisia’s political landscape is growing increasingly uncertain, and much of it’s outcome seems to indicate it will depend on shifts in economic stability, further promotion from civil society organizations, and Saied’s ability to independently retain power. 

Bibliography

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