Bosnia’s Energy Gamble: Is Geopolitics Undermining the Post-Dayton Order?
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has increasingly become an arena of great-power competition, creating a strategic dilemma between securing an alternative energy supply that would reduce its dependence on Russian gas and preserving the institutions that have underpinned peace and stability since the Dayton Peace Agreement.
For nearly three decades, Bosnia’s post-war order rested on coordinated transatlantic support for institutional governance. Today, however, geopolitical competition, energy security and increasingly transactional approaches to foreign policy are testing that consensus. The Southern Gas Interconnection and the dispute over the appointment of the next High Representative should therefore be understood not as separate controversies, but as two manifestations of the same geopolitical transformation. As energy security becomes a strategic imperative, governance conditionality risks becoming increasingly negotiable. The danger lies not in disagreement over a single infrastructure project or diplomatic appointment, but in the gradual erosion of the institutional foundations that have sustained Bosnia’s fragile stability.
Energy Security Versus Governance
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the energy policy of the European Union (EU) has shifted from being primarily concerned with market liberalisation and decarbonisation to one increasingly shaped by geopolitical and security considerations. The priority is now to diversify away from Russian gas through new infrastructure, including LNG terminals, interconnectors and cross-border pipelines. Bosnia currently imports almost all its natural gas from Russia via Serbia, principally supplying Sarajevo and its surrounding urban districts. The Southern Gas Interconnection would instead connect the country to LNG supplies entering through Croatia, providing an alternative import route that is independent of Russian-controlled supply infrastructure.
Although the pipeline offers a significant opportunity to strengthen Bosnia’s energy security, its procurement process has been politically contentious. AAFS Infrastructure Energy, the company awarded to develop the project, had been established only a year earlier and possesses connections to commercial allies of the Trump administration and has no prior experience of building transnational pipelines. This has raised concerns that political lobbying have outweighed transparent procurement procedures, technical expertise and regulatory oversight. Transparency International cautioned that the selection process had effectively excluded competing firms from the procurement process, undermining transparency, competition and the public interest. Separately, the EU Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Luigi Soreca, emphasised that all energy legislation and procurement decisions must comply with the country’s EU accession commitments.
The dispute is not only about what company should construct a pipeline – it concerns the standards under which Bosnia’s strategic infrastructure is planned, awarded and regulated. A project intended to reduce Bosnia’s geopolitical vulnerability could simultaneously weaken the governance safeguards through which the country is expected to pursue European integration.
This issue has exacerbated Bosnia’s already strenuous relationship with EU regulatory conditionality and institutional reform. The state’s fragmented constitutional structure dispersers power across multiple layers of government and frequently produces institutional paralysis. Republika Srpska, one of the state’s two constituent entities, has often leveraged its extensive autonomy to delay or obstruct reforms required for closer integration with the EU. Previously, it opposed the construction of the Southern Gas Interconnection, favouring continued reliance on Russian gas supplies via Serbia. More recently, however, it has sought closer relations with Washington.
Following the reported lifting of US sanctions on Milorad Dodik, then President of Republika Srpska, in October 2025, Republika Srpska moved closer to Washington-linked actors and later supported the US-backed Southern Interconnection pipeline. Whether these developments were directly connected is ultimately less important than what they reveal about Bosnia’s changing geopolitical environment; strategic infrastructure has become increasingly intertwined with political bargaining, commercial interests and geopolitical realignment.
More broadly, the Southern Gas Interconnection reflects a transformation in Western engagement with the Western Balkans. During much of the post-Dayton period, major infrastructure investment was expected to remain subordinate to regulatory reform, institutional oversight and democratic conditionality. Increasingly, however, strategic projects are being assessed through the competing imperatives of energy security, supply diversification and geopolitical influence. This does not necessarily mean that governance standards have been abandoned, but it does suggest that they may become more negotiable when weighed against immediate strategic objectives.
Geopolitics and The Post-Dayton Order
The same tension between strategic priorities and institutional governance is visible in Bosnia’s international supervisory architecture. As external powers increasingly prioritise geopolitical positioning and commercial access, the institutions responsible for overseeing Bosnia’s constitutional order are themselves becoming objects of strategic contestation. The debate surrounding the Office of the High Representative therefore reflects the same underlying transformation visible in the Southern Gas Interconnection: a gradual movement away from coordinated, rules-based post-conflict governance towards more transactional forms of external engagement.
The Office of the High Representative (OHR), established under the framework created by the Dayton Peace Agreement, remains the principal international mechanism for safeguarding Bosnia’s constitutional order. The High Representative derives their political authority from the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), whose Steering Board has historically operated through a broad transatlantic consensus. Recent disagreements over the appointment of the next High Representative therefore raise broader questions about whether the international community remains united in defending Bosnia’s institutional framework.
Recent reporting suggests that the Trump administration has signalled greater openness to reducing the role of the OHR as part of a broader shift away from internationally led state-building, while the EU has maintained that the prerequisites for scaling back the OHR’s mandate had not yet been satisfied. This divergence became particularly visible during discussions over Christian Schmidt’s successor. Washington reportedly supported the Italian diplomat Antonio Landi, despite his limited previous experience in the Western Balkans, and signalled that it would reconsider its “role in the current international presence” if he were not appointed.
It is plausible to interpret US pressure for the early departure of former High Representative Schmidt and the subsequent push for Landi’s appointment as evidence of Washington’s preference for a Representative more closely aligned with its strategic and commercial priorities. This raises broader questions about whether geopolitical and economic considerations could, in certain circumstances, take precedence over the EU’s regulatory frameworks and governance standards in major infrastructure projects. This dispute is particularly consequential since the High Representative is not merely a diplomatic figure – but possesses extensive authority to intervene in Bosnia’s political system, including through the Bonn Powers, which permit the imposition of legislation and the removal of public officials considered to be obstructing the peace settlement.
Equally important is how a U.S.-backed High Representative would navigate Bosnia’s persistent institutional dysfunction. The response to Milorad Dodik’s repeated challenges to state institutions, constitutional authority and the legitimacy of the OHR would provide an early indication of whether Washington’s preferred leadership intended to preserve the existing enforcement mechanisms of the Dayton settlement or facilitate a more limited international rule. The High Representative’s ability to confront obstruction by Republika Srpska while avoiding a deeper constitutional crisis would reveal whether the new leadership could preserve the delicate balance between enforcing the Dayton framework and maintaining political stability within Bosnia’s already fragile constitutional order.
Conclusion
Bosnia illustrates how great-power competition can reshape not only infrastructure investment but also the international institutions designed to sustain post-conflict peace. The controversy surrounding the Southern Gas Interconnection and the appointment of the next High Representative reflects a broader shift in Western policy. Rather than viewing these developments as isolated disputes, they should be understood as evidence of a changing balance between strategic necessity and institutional governance. How Western governments manage this tension in Bosnia will have implications not only for the country’s future, but also for the credibility of the post-Dayton order and the EU’s broader approach to enlargement and post-conflict state-building.
