Asymmetric Warfare and the Rise of Low-Tech Defense: Lessons and Opportunities for Europe to Enhance Strategic Autonomy

The growing significance of low-tech hardware and capabilities is changing the global defense and security landscape. The cost-benefit ratio between the latest high-tech defense systems and low-tech alternatives make long military engagements of nations with advanced militaries less sustainable. Europe should embrace the opportunities this provides to expand its low-tech defense industrial base and thus decrease its dependence on US military power.

    Analysing the war in Ukraine highlights how low-tech capabilities, particularly drone warfare, now play an increasingly dominant role in armed conflict. By 2025, drones were responsible for 80% of total combat casualties, a substantial increase from only 10% in 2022 (Kostiuk et al., 2026). Unmanned aerial systems are estimated to account for 60-70% of destroyed Russian equipment (Watling and Reynolds, 2025). The decision of Ukraine’s Prime Minister to establish the Unmanned Systems Forces as an independent branch of the military is another indication of the significance this type of warfare has taken on (Savage, 2024). Targets which once required technologically advanced military systems can now be reached with relatively low-tech equipment. Using drones, Ukraine has demonstrated the capability to strike deep inside Russian territory, without the need for expensive military aircraft or missile systems (Kabachynskyi, 2024).

     The recent hostilities between the US-Israel partnership and Iran illustrate the limitations of conventional advanced military hardware in modern warfare. The issue of sustainability for developed nations with advanced militaries, both financial and industrial, has been graphically demonstrated. The production cost for Iran’s Shahed-136 attack drone is estimated at $20,000-$30,000, in contrast to a US Tomahawk cruise missile which costs approximately $2million (Pfeifer, 2026). The cost disparity for defensive systems is similar. US Patriot interceptor missiles are sold for over $3million, compared to Ukraine drone interceptors which range from $1,000-$5,000 (Hollenbeck, 2025; Petraeus and Kaluderovic, 2026). This differentiation in price put countries using advanced military technology at a serious sustainable disadvantage.

     The sustainability problem extends to manufacturing. Ukraine produced between 2.5 million and 4 million drones in 2025, with a target to produce 7 million in 2026 (Crebo-Rediker, 2026). Even the US, which possesses the most sophisticated defense industry, can only produce a fraction of the number of advanced, high-tech attack and defense missiles. Even after signing new contracts with manufacturers to boost production, the target production number of Patriot (PAC-3 MSE) missiles is a mere 650 by 2027 (Cranny-Evans, 2026). An agreement has been made to quadruple the production of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors from 96 per year currently, to 400 in the near future. The US and Israel were already experiencing missile inventory shortages following the 12-day war in June 2025 (Rumbaugh, 2025). The situation has become so critical that the US is relocating missiles from South Korea and other areas in the Pacific theater (Matthews, 2026). Due to the industrial production gap, the position of a nation with more advanced military technology will atrophy the longer a conflict continues.

   Europe needs to take advantage of the changing security landscape and maximise the opportunity to become an industry leader in low-tech defense. The asymmetric advantage of low-cost, low-technology systems provide a possible solution for Europe’s primary security concern: the threat of Russian expansion into the Baltic countries. Supplying the countries that border Russia with offensive and defensive low-tech systems would provide a significant deterrent at an affordable cost. Over recent years, the US has proved to be a volatile and unreliable ally. Whether its inconsistent support for Ukraine, threats to invade Greenland, or the weakening of NATO’s Article 5 security guarantee, establishing European strategic autonomy is a priority. Developing the low-tech capabilities to defend itself would dramatically reduce Europe’s security dependence on the US. In addition, defense exports of leading inexpensive low-tech systems will assist in developing an independent foreign policy.

      To fully realise the opportunity in the low-tech defense space, European decision-makers need to be vastly more ambitious in the scale of investment and the timeline for fully sovereign production. The European Commission plans to increase domestic drone procurement from 30%, currently, to 60% by 2035 (Remmen and D’Errico, 2026). The strategic window for Europe to establish itself as an industry leader will not remain open indefinitely. While heading in the right direction, policymakers should aim to achieve a fully domestic supply-chain urgently to reduce vulnerabilities created by over-reliance on Chinese components (Tollast, 2025). In February, the European Commission (2026) announced a new $400million package, with a further $250 million for direct purchases. Without question, this is a positive step. However, to take full advantage investment on a much larger scale is needed.

     The cutting edge of defense technology is no longer in expensive advanced systems, but in cheap, low-tech solutions. Europe should commit the necessary investment to position itself at the head of this emerging defense sector. By acting boldly now, Europe can foster security at home and garner influence abroad.

Bibliography

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