After Denmark: Why Europe’s Right Is Becoming Harder to Ignore

Denmark’s election reflects a broader European trend in which right-wing nationalist and populist parties are becoming more electorally entrenched and politically influential.

Denmark’s recent election result is not just a national story. The gains made by several right-wing parties reflect a broader European pattern in which nationalist and populist forces are becoming more electorally entrenched, more politically normalised, and harder for mainstream parties to ignore. This is not evidence of one uniform rightward wave across the continent. But it is a sign that the right is becoming more embedded in European political competition and more influential in shaping debate on migration, sovereignty, and national identity. 

The central development, then, is not simply that more voters are backing right-wing parties, but the way they are reshaping the broader political landscapes. In many European countries, their influence now extends beyond their formal share of the vote or whether they hold office directly. They are altering party competition, putting pressure on coalition formation, and forcing mainstream parties to respond to issues on terms they themselves did not set. This is visible on the controversial topics of migration, sovereignty, and security, where positions once associated with the political margins have moved closer to the centre of debate. The broader story is therefore one of party-system change and political adaptation. The right is not only gaining votes, but increasingly shaping the environment in which everyone else must compete.  

Denmark is a useful place to begin because the recent election showed clear gains for several right-wing parties, including Dansk Folkeparti and Borgernes Parti. These gains may not have been identical in scale or political significance but they are important. They matter because it has come alongside substantial losses for Socialdemokratiet, one of Denmark’s dominant mainstream centre-left parties.  

The result, therefore, points not only to growing support on the right, but also a weakening hold of the established centre. This is particularly notable in Denmark, which is often viewed as one of Europe’s more stable and institutionally resilient democracies. Shifts in such a system are therefore especially worth watching. At the same time, Denmark should not be treated as wholly exceptional. Rather, it offers a useful entry point into a wider European pattern in which the right is becoming more deeply embedded in mainstream politics.  

Germany offers one of the clearest examples of how the radical right is no longer politically marginal. In the 2025 federal election, the AfD won 152 seats, up 69 from 2021, and secured 20.8 per cent of the vote, making it the second-largest force in the Bundestag. That matters not only numerically, but structurally. In a country whose postwar political culture has long placed exceptional weight on democratic containment and historical responsibility, the AfD’s rise signals that the right is becoming harder to isolate and easier to normalise within the broader political system. 

Austria shows a related but slightly different dynamic. There, the FPÖ is not simply a protest vehicle exerting pressure from the margins, but a party with genuine governing relevance. In the 2024 parliamentary election, it won 28.8 per cent of the vote, its best result in the postwar era, finishing ahead of the mainstream conservatives and social democrats. Even though subsequent coalition-building kept it out of government, the significance of the result lies in the fact that the far right has become a fully credible national contender, capable of setting the terms of political debate even when excluded from office. 

Portugal is important because it widens the picture beyond northern and central Europe. For many years, Portugal was often treated as less susceptible to this kind of right-populist breakthrough. That assumption has become much harder to sustain. Chega first surged in the 2024 election, then went further in the 2025 snap election, when it won 22.6 per cent of the vote and became the main opposition force in parliament. The Portuguese case, therefore, suggests that this is not simply a Germanic or Scandinavian pattern, but a broader European development in which parties once seen as peripheral are becoming embedded in national competition. 

Hungary, however, complicates any simple story of a continent-wide rightward wave. Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz had dominated Hungarian politics for sixteen years and long stood as one of Europe’s clearest examples of entrenched right-wing rule. Yet the most recent parliamentary election broke that pattern: Péter Magyar’s Tisza party defeated Fidesz decisively, winning a two-thirds parliamentary majority and ending Orbán’s long hold on power. This does not disprove the broader European trend, but it does show that the right is not advancing everywhere in the same way or on the same timetable. The broader story is therefore less a uniform wave than an uneven pattern of entrenchment, breakthrough, and in some cases reversal. 

Several overlapping dynamics help explain why right-wing nationalist and populist parties have gained ground across Europe. The first is the continued political relevance of migration, borders, and cultural identity. These are not only policy issues, but emotionally charged questions tied to belonging, sovereignty, and national cohesion. Right-wing parties have often been more effective than their opponents at framing them in clear and resonant terms, while mainstream parties have increasingly been drawn onto the same terrain, often adopting tougher language or policy positions in response.

A second driver is economic insecurity combined with broader anti-establishment frustration. Cost-of-living pressures, stagnant wages, and dissatisfaction with political elites have created favourable conditions for parties that present themselves as challengers to an out-of-touch system. In many cases, support for the right is not purely ideological. It can also reflect protest, disillusionment, and a desire to punish established parties seen as unresponsive or ineffective. 

The third factor is the fragmentation of the political centre itself. In many European democracies, both centre-left and centre-right parties are weaker than they once were, and older partisan loyalties have eroded. As party systems become more fragmented, coalition politics creates openings for insurgent actors to gain leverage. The right has benefited especially from this environment, not only by expanding its vote share, but by increasing its ability to shape how political competition is organised. 

What makes this development significant for European politics is that its effects extend well beyond election night. Even where right-wing populist and nationalist parties do not dominate government or enter office directly, they can still exert substantial influence over the political agenda. Their growing strength can pull coalition bargaining to the right, encourage mainstream parties to adopt tougher positions on migration and border control, and reshape debate on sovereignty, EU integration, and security. In this sense, their power is often indirect but still highly consequential. Ideas and rhetoric that once sat at the edge of political debate can become more normalised when other parties begin to accommodate them rather than resist them. The most important shift, then, may not be formal control of government alone, but the growing agenda-setting power of the right within European political competition. 

Denmark should not be read as definitive proof that Europe is moving in one single rightward direction. Electoral politics across the continent remain uneven, and national trajectories still differ in important ways. Yet the Danish result should be taken seriously as part of a broader pattern. Across much of Europe, the political right is becoming more electorally durable, more institutionally embedded, and more difficult for mainstream parties to contain or ignore. The deeper shift is not simply that right-wing parties are winning votes, but that they are becoming a more permanent force in shaping the terms of political debate. Europe is not moving right in one uniform direction, but the political right is becoming more embedded in how Europe debates identity, borders, and power. Denmark is one sign of that change — not the whole story, but part of a pattern that is becoming harder to dismiss. 

Sources 

Altinget. (2026). Valgresultat 2026. https://www.altinget.dk/valgresultat2026

BBC News. (n.d.). Coverage of the most recent Hungarian election. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd9vg782kx7o

Bundeswahlleiterin. (2025). Bundestagswahl 2025: Ergebnisse. https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/en/bundestagswahlen/2025/ergebnisse/bund-99.html

Bundeswahlen.gv.at. (2024). Nationalratswahl 2024. https://www.bundeswahlen.gv.at/2024/nr/

Politico Europe. (n.d.). Europe poll of polls: Portugal. https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/portugal/