A “Taiwan Dilemma” for the Philippines

Introduction

The Philippines’ geographic position in the Indo-Pacific is pregnant with risks because of its neighbor – the island-nation of the Republic of China (ROC) or Taiwan – to its north as China continues to rise as a regional hegemon. Taiwan poses a strategic dilemma for the Philippines based on two scenarios. One, if Beijing prevails over Taipei, China will likely increase its footprint in the Luzon Strait; and two, if Taipei prevails, Taiwan will possibly increase assertiveness downward in the Itu Aba in the South China Sea. With its geostrategic position relative to Taiwan, the Philippines has to develop its contingencies to ensure its interests.

A Taiwan Dilemma

The 1992 Consensus in Hongkong between Beijing and Taipei officials has framed the stable Cross-Strait relations for about 30 years. As the author argued elsewhere, the said consensus is imperative because it drew the line within which Taiwan can operate without raising the threat of military action from China, and thus mitigates the prospect that Taiwan’s domestic politics will provoke Beijing.

But with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2012, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen’s election – who defies the 1992 consensus – in 2016, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the worsening US-China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, Taiwan’s future is at stake. And the Philippines would have to rethink ways to cope with it.

China has not risen peacefully because it seeks to replace US regional leadership in the Indo-Pacific. Xi embarks his country for “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” To achieve his dream, Xi has radically reformed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In consolidating its position in its backyard, the PLA uses Gray Zone tactics such as the use of the Chinese Coast Guard and Maritime Militia while its Navy “leads from behind” in the South and East China Seas. But it also demonstrated its ability to wage conventional war this August when it launched an “aircraft-carrier killer” medium-range missile in the South China Sea.

In the Taiwan Strait, China has hardened its reunification stance with Taiwan, stressing on its interpretation of the 1992 Consensus. Developments over Taiwan’s domestic politics such as the continuity of Tsai’s presidency and the growing sentiment of Taiwanese identity have made China more insecure than ever.

As Hong Kong experiences a harder grip from Beijing through the passing of the National Security Law this year, Tsai fears that Taiwan may be next if the island-nation keeps on adhering to the One China Policy. Accordingly, Beijing proposes a “One Country, Two Systems” format similar to Hong Kong which Tsai’s political party, the Democratic Progressive Party, duly rejects.

Taiwan’s security guarantor, the United States, rejects China’s power projection for both Hong Kong and Taiwan. US President Donald Trump elevated Taiwan into a formal security partner in 2019. Furthermore, Trump has signed stronger congressional bills for Taiwan’s political status and defense sales, of which likely encouraged Tsai’s push for de jure coexistence with Beijing. Just this year, high-profile American cabinet members arrived in Taiwan such as its Health Secretary and the Undersecretary of State for Economic Growth to signal American commitment to undermine Chinese interests of dominating the island-nation.

In this regard, China moves at great lengths to undermine Taiwan. At the diplomatic level, China isolates Taiwan such as barring the latter from joining international institutions like the World Health Organization. At the military level, the PLA intensifies its military exercises and regularizes the show of force to convey its capacity to invade the island-nation.

Taiwan’s political ambiguity, a similar democratic political system, strong economic relations, hopes for China’s democratization, and the Philippine military’s focus on internal security may have prevented Manila’s strategic thinking from planning a strong Taiwanese contingency. But since the Great Power competition has returned, the Philippines is pitted in a difficult situation where it has to address the risks posed there.

If Beijing Prevails?

China has vowed via its 2019 National Defense White Paper to reclaim Taiwan by force if necessary should Tsai continues to provoke “separatism” from the mainland. Though some argue that invading Taiwan will be bloody and costly for China, wishful thinking of impossibility about Chinese victory over Taiwan is also costly. Because Beijing, like any state in the international system, is driven by fear, honor, and interest to avoid another humiliation of losing territory. Moreover, the fog and friction of war may provide China a chance for victory.

If Beijing prevails over Taipei, then China would increase its footprint in the Luzon Strait. The Philippines is currently strengthening its hold and presence in the Fuga Islands in Northern Luzon, as well as putting sovereign markers in its northernmost islands in Batanes province. Luzon Strait can likely be a battlefield between Chinese versus American-Taiwan naval, air, and missile capabilities, putting the Philippines’ island province of Batanes vulnerable. Manila may not be able to absorb the shock with its relatively weak defense posture at the moment.

If Taipei Prevails?

China’s insecurity may fuel its drive for an invasion. As Taipei prepares for a conventional war against Beijing, the former has increased the deployment of its marines in Itu Aba against the latter in August this year. This move may seem a defensive war against China now. But the structure of the international system underpins that the uncertainty of other’s actions and one’s minimum offensive military capabilities can make other states insecure.

This scenario is a case where the Philippines can be put at risk if left unchecked. According to the Lowy Institute’s 2019 Asia Power Index, the Philippines ranks seven times lower than Taiwan in terms of military capability, and five times lower in terms of resilience in deterring both real and potential external threats. If Taipei prevails over Beijing, Taiwan may likely increase assertiveness downward in the features of the Itu Aba (Taiping) in the Spratly Islands.

This is a problem for the Philippines since Taiwan does not recognize Manila’s 2016 legal victory in its sovereign claims in the South China Sea, as the ruling is inconsistent with its jurisdiction in the said features. Accordingly, Taipei claimed that Manila did not include Itu Aba in the legal protest while the ruling assumed it otherwise covered it. It also resented that the arbitration alienated Taipei’s opinion in this regard, making the award not legally binding in their view.

Taiwan may be a democracy like the Philippines. Still, the latter should not put hope on the democratic peace thesis that Taipei would trade its security interests to avoid offending a fellow democracy. Moreover, Taiwan expressed in 2018 that it seeks to host the US Navy in the Itu Aba as a force multiplier posed against China. This likely puts Manila’s legal victory more awkward since its security ally, Washington, is placed in the way. This picture limits the Philippines’ strategic freedom to carve for its interests.

Conclusion

The Philippines’ geographic proximity to Taiwan provides geostrategic implications that it cannot avoid any longer. Be it from increasing Chinese threat, loopholes of the American posture, or even a possible Taiwanese assertiveness in the future, the certainty of uncertainty in the international system prompts Manila to think and act for its strategic gains. Manila has to address the risks of its Taiwan dilemma now. Regarding miscalculations with Taiwan, the Philippines should continue practical cooperation with them. This effort includes technical cooperation in fisheries and unplanned encounters at sea to ensure Philippine interests and keeping potential Taiwanese ambitions checked.

US strategic ambiguity over Taiwan is likely the most workable option for regional stability if there is no workable, if not better, alternative in the meantime. As Tsai has been stating since then, Taiwan is a functioning democracy with an independent political, economic, and social system. And Beijing has to respect it or otherwise account for the costs of its regional ambition. Manila’s acknowledgment for an independent Taiwan may be another matter for discussion. But the geostrategic risks of Taiwan’s proximity vis-à-vis the Philippines must be addressed by striving to cultivate contingencies on its “Taiwan dilemma”.