January 27, 2025

A North Sea Defence Alliance: Challenges and Opportunities for the UK

By Anthony Heron

Introduction

In May of 2023 the United Kingdom and Norway signed a partnership to counter undersea threats, highlighting a UK reliance on bilateral relations. Norway, alongside the other Nordic countries, has enjoyed strengthened cooperation and common security practices through the body NORDEFCO (The Nordic Defence Cooperation). Despite Finland and Sweden having now made progress towards full integration with NATO, the benefits of NORDEFCO’s sub-regional focus are still clear and the defence structure is set to remain, albeit within the wider structure of NATO. Norway’s defence secretary reinforced this- “Nordefco must be updated within the framework of NATO. At our ministerial meeting in Oslo, we’ll commence work on a new vision for Nordefco”(Gram, 2022). However, the problems solved by Nordic cooperation: fragmented national relations, disconnect at the tactical level, and increased external threats to name a few- largely remain for the North Sea members of NATO. The United Kingdom has long been a key player in European defence. However, post-Brexit political fragmentation, rising external threats, and technological disparities across NATO partners have created significant gaps in regional security cooperation. With the North Sea emerging as a critical geopolitical and economic theatre, there is a pressing need for the UK to lead efforts in fostering a sub-regional defence cooperation structure. Inspired by the success of NORDEFCO (Nordic Defence Cooperation), this article examines how a North Sea defence alliance could bolster the UK’s security, strengthen interoperability, and protect vital infrastructure.

Fragmented political relations

Brexit significantly tested the relationship between the United Kingdom and the other North Sea EU nations- France, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and France (the other North Sea country being Norway, also not in the EU). As Malcolm Chalmers, who was then Deputy Director-General of the RUSI, expressed in 2018- Brexit immediately impacted the UK’s engagement with the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) initiatives. Whilst that was an immediate impact, bilateral cooperation was also worsened by tensions resulting from post-Brexit negotiations, with France and the U.K. holding “a summit designed to rebuild ties” (Reuters, 2023) in 2023. With regards to the CSDP, the EU expresses a rising demand to become “more capable, more coherent” (European Union External Action, 2021). Yet given that the majority of North Sea countries are members of the EU, the United Kingdom’s absence risks the cohesion of North Sea defence. It is important to reinforce here that Norway, whilst in the Schengen area, is also absent from the CSDP, further emphasising the need to facilitate collaboration. A report into Europe’s defence relations with the U.K. post-Brexit, by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, concluded that post-Brexit: “there should be a renewed focus on Europe’s multitude of bilateral, regional or multinational clusters of defence cooperation” (Bakker et al, 2017). However, such a multinational cluster does not exist between the U.K. and Norway and their EU-participating North Sea neighbors, despite the disconnect at the political level.

Interoperability

At the tactical level, there is an evident disconnect between North Sea nations. These differences often become clear during multinational training, as suggested by Lieutenant Benoit of 13th Demi Brigade French Foreign Legion when reflecting on joint exercises between France and the U.K. for example: “We have learned from each other’s processes and ways of thinking because there are a few differences between the French and the British.” (Benoit, 2023). The basis for this lacking Integration is largely technological difference, as emphasised by Dr. James W. Derleth, Professor of Irregular Warfare at the George C. Marshall Center for European Security- “There are vast technological disparities between NATO forces” (Derleth, 2015). The Prime Minister’s Office also noted an intent to increase cooperation in terms of “the provision of equipment, in particular ammunitions” in a 2023 U.K.-France Joint Leaders’ Declaration. Yet this only emphasises the disparities that exist bilaterally alone. Disparity across NATO members also becomes evident as it continues to stand in the way of the West’s attempts to effectively support Ukraine during its conflict with Russia according to the European Army Interoperability Centre, also expressing that the cause is a “lacking standardization of weapon systems” (Adriani, 2023). With regards to the interoperability of Ukraine itself, although it is a part of NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP)-  “the process of generating intellectual and technical interoperability is not rapid enough” (Jolicoeur, 2018). The root causes of this technological difference, such as the obvious budgetary constraints across the 31 NATO members and pressures to purchase local weaponry, can only be solved through a regional response. For example, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “in the 11-year period 1993–2003 there was a relatively low volume of direct deliveries of major weapons from one Nordic country to another” (2008). Yet after it’s founding in 2009, one of the Nordic Defence Cooperation’s main goals has been to engage with industry in order to explore regional benefits. Recently, this has included the procurement of a Nordic combat uniform that is common across Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. It is therefore pivotal that the North Sea region works towards greater interoperability, within NATO, to bolster its joint defence capabilities in the face of rising external threats.

Immediate external threats

A former defence minister of Finland reinforced the importance of shared threats during a speech in Washington DC “the three main security challenges for Finland today are Russia, Russia and Russia- and not only for Finland”  (Häkämies, 2007). He was talking about the security situation shared between Finland and other Western countries. This is one of the three types of regionalism according to Andrew Heywood: economic regionalism, political regionalism, and in this case, security regionalism- “the desire to gain protection against a common external enemy” (Heywood, 2011). The war in Ukraine has brought the risk that exists from a growing common external threat to the forefront of public attention, alongside the importance of international alliances. A clear sign of this threat is the continuation of Russian bombers testing the RAF’s response over North Sea airspace. In August of 2023 two Russian long-range bombers passed north of Shetland, within NATO’s air policing area (UK Ministry of Defence, 2023). Yet NATO exercises can’t always emphasise preparedness in the North Sea, something that is logical given the sheer geographical spread of its member states. The most recent NATO exercise, Air Defender 23, focused only on German airspace (AIRBUS, 2023). A regional cooperation alliance would guarantee regular North Sea-specific operations. NATO’s Warning & Control System (AWACS) aircraft are also based out of Germany. Furthermore, the U.K., alongside France, “exercises limited participation” (NATO, 2023) in the Airborne Early Warning and Control Force. Whilst NATO’s overall Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) “can facilitate the procedures and technology to promote sharing” (NATO, 2023), it does not necessitate it. NORDEFCO’s NORECAS (The Nordic Enhanced Cooperation on Air Surveillance) on the other hand, directly addresses this problem. Its core purpose is to enhance data sharing and common solutions through joint projects, to provide robust surveillance of the entire Nordic region’s airspace under the pressure of common regional concerns and shared identity. Efficient information sharing would also benefit maritime security in the North Sea given the prevalent threats it faces. In May of 2023 NATO’s intelligence chief warned that Russia may further seek to sabotage undersea infrastructure such as cables and pipelines, specifically citing increased activities in the North Sea (Siebold, 2023). Given the vital projects underway in the United Kingdom in 2023, such as the Jan De Nul Group’s contract to install an interconnecting cable between mainland Scotland and the Orkney island of Hoy (Emanuel, 2023), it is only logical to shore up maritime intelligence sharing in the North Sea region.

Conclusion

One of the clear arguments against the proposal of a North Sea defence cooperative is that all of the region’s countries are either members of NATO, thereby making it redundant. Yet NORDEFCO has proved invaluable when it comes to solving the aforementioned issues. Whilst NATO continues to serve its core purpose as a deterrent, a region covering 570,000 square kilometres (220,000 sq mi) that contains 8 like-minded western allies, deserves a cooperative framework to improve contemporary defence and emergency response capabilities in the outside prospect it faces conflict. By stressing “the NORDEFCO structure is a cooperation structure, not a command structure” (Nordic Defence Cooperation, 2023), the informality of the Nordic Defence Cooperation completely avoids entanglement with NATO’s needs and functions. In conclusion, the benefits of founding a North Sea defence cooperation in the image of NORDEFCO are clear.

Bibliography

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