June 19, 2026

The Australian Factor in Current Indo-Pacific Conflicts

By Julian McBride

This article examines the increasing importance of Australian defense in the Indo-Pacific, and its role in countering the growing maritime influence of China through closer defense cooperation with countries like the Philippines and Papua New Guinea. It argues that Australia is an increasingly important security partner for the US, and examines the challenges that Australia faces – including recruitment shortages, logistical limitations, and economic dependence on China.


Amid a rising Chinese naval force, People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), which routinely encroaches upon maritime territorial waters of various countries in the Indo-Pacific, the United States has enhanced its strategy under a ‘rebalance’ implemented by former President Barack Obama. In the pivot to Asia strategy, containing and countering China’s maritime ambitions are a key priority that requires various American allies to bolster their forces and play crucial roles in the region.

Australia is one of the American allies whose soft power and growing military capabilities will be needed to plug security gaps in the Indo-Pacific. Already in an alliance with the US – the Australia, New Zealand and US military alliance (ANZUS) – and having close relations with Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and others, the Australian factor in the region can help mitigate coercion and armed conflicts.

Australia’s role in the South China Sea

Amid China’s militarization of man-made islands in the South China Sea, the Philippines is the most at risk of encroachment by PLAN and Beijing’s Coast Guard (CCG). Currently, Australia and the Philippines are finalizing a new defense pact to counter the security challenges.

In the new defense pact, Canberra is currently investing in eight infrastructure projects at five Philippine military installations. Furthermore, the agreement will allow the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) to be deployed in the Philippines if requested, and simultaneously, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) will be able to deploy in Australia.

Continuing to build on the Visiting Forces Agreement, the ADF will also help the Philippine Coast Guard counter PLAN and CCG by bolstering Luzon, which is geographically located along the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. Akin to Manila, much of Canberra’s trade routes are maritime, and any domination of the region by Beijing could bring uncompromising coercion.

Bolstering Papua New Guinea’s defense

Australia’s contributions in the Indo-Pacific do not only include the Philippines and the South China Sea, but also responsibilities in their own backyard of Oceania. On October 6th 2025, Australia solidified a mutual defense pact with Papua New Guinea (PNG), which can help both countries secure each other’s flanks.

The mutual defense pact with PNG is Australia’s second major alliance since the 1951 ANZUS agreement with the United States and New Zealand. Furthermore, Canberra has the opportunity to curtail Chinese influence in Port Moresby by integrating PNG athletes into the National Rugby League.

Amid recruitment hurdles, the mutual defense pact allows upwards of 10,000 PNG troops to serve in the ADF, which can help mitigate force reconstitution if units become understaffed. Continuing to enhance defensive relations across Oceania will be critical for Australia’s homeland defense after China solidified the crucial 2022 Solomon Islands security agreement and conducted a major incursion in the Tasman and Coral Sea in February 2025.

A potential role in a Taiwan Contingency

Arguably, Australia’s most precarious Indo-Pacific flashpoint will be a Taiwan Contingency that could see both China and the United States embroiled in armed conflict across the region. Under the ANZUS treaty and trade routes threatened by potential PLAN and CCG control over the South China Sea during a cross-strait conflict, Australia will be expected to play either a direct or indirect role over Taiwan.

Australia will almost certainly play a supporting role in sharing signals intelligence with America, Taiwan, and Japan, and could host some US forces that will participate in a contingency. Nevertheless, Canberra could find itself in a precarious situation with Beijing.

Canberra’s economy has become intertwined with Beijing’s exports, and due to this, the Chinese government could provide some economic pressure towards Australia. Amid turbulence in the current US tariff strategy, China could look to extend influence amongst American allies who are looking for stable trade partners, as Canada and the UK have already considered.

Furthermore, despite having a capable military, the ADF suffers from logistical constraints in sealifts, which the US Navy would have to provide support for. If a Taiwan Contingency takes place, the US may prioritize lifting a potential blockade in the Straits and South China Sea—especially as America’s shipbuilding capacity has become stagnant.

Hurdles the ADF could face

Australia’s expanding security role in the Indo-Pacific will come with challenges, hurdles, and at times, setbacks due to a myriad of concerns in recruitment, logistical constraints, trade, and naval stagnation.

Regarding recruitment, approximately 80% of the 69,000 minimum recruits needed to maintain the ADF have been reached, which became one of the key factors of the mutual defense pact with PNG. According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, confidence in the ADF remains low, and enhanced recruitment strategies will be needed to attract younger potential recruits.

Aforementioned, the ADF faces logistical constraints if a broader war were to take place in the Taiwan Strait. Furthermore, Canberra’s future Virginia-Class nuclear submarines under AUKUS are being produced slower than originally expected, which leaves the navy exposed to China’s submarine warfare.

Instead, if Australia obliges under the ANZUS treaty, which it has done under various American-led wars, the ADF can help advise and assist the Philippines around Luzon and provide support to mitigate the freedom of movement of the PLAN and CCG.

Lastly, the aforementioned tariff wars have put Canberra at a crossroads where Washington needs cohesion with allies more than ever. With Beijing having an economic foothold in Oceania, the Australians will need more American investments and support to help distance themselves from Chinese influence if armed conflict were to come in the future.

Australia’s contributions to Indo-Pacific security are both strategic and calculated. Enhanced cooperation in the South China Sea by helping to bolster Philippine security while enhancing relations with PNG in Oceania can help curb China’s influence. Despite not being logistically ready for a protracted conflict, the ADF can help advise and assist American-led forces, provide key basing access, and secure flanks around Oceania.

 

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