The Asia-Pacific Strategy Playbook Is Unfolding
Asia’s strategic landscape is fracturing as the US leans into burden-shifting, China expands its leverage through diplomacy and economic pressure, and regional powers recalibrate autonomously, producing a multipolar Indo-Pacific where influence is contested and alliances are increasingly fluid.
The forthcoming US National Defence Strategy oriented towards the ‘America First’ ideology reveals how Washington plans to recalibrate its engagement in Asia (Chatham House, 2025). As the US plans greater burden-shifting, key allies such as South Korea and Japan have already committed to increasing their defence spending to reduce reliance on American security guarantees (Chatham House, 2025).
President Trump’s five-day visit to Asia in October offered limited clarity on future US security posture in the region. It focused instead on expanding US-India defence co-operation, issuing a joint declaration with Thailand and Cambodia, supporting South Korean procurement of nuclear-powered submarines, and and foresight of an implicative escalation and de-escalation cycle in US-China rivalry in the near future (Chatham House, 2025).
Strategic Realignments Underway
The evolving circumstances bear significant implications for India’s own playbook of defence procurement and diplomatic alignment in the region. . New Delhi’s continued momentum of non- conformity with alliance politics continues to push it for defence indigenisation, diversification of strategic partnerships while simultaneously calculating risks and payoffs with the US, Russia, and China. Meanwhile, India’s stated objective of strategic autonomy is well pronounced in its tailored dealings with counterparts like Australia, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, France and the UK beyond defence in areas like AI, Trade, Technology and dispensation of Global Common public goods and services. Current regional realignments may also pull Russia closer to Asia; President Putin’s first visit to India since 2021 reflects this trajectory.
Thailand, host of the major multilateral exercise Cobra Gold with America (also its largest export market) saw its monarch visit China for the first time in 2025 (Khaosod English, 2025). In August, a Bangkok gallery removed works by Tibetan, Uyghur, and Hong Kong artists following objections from Chinese diplomats (Uyghur Times, 2025). Meanwhile, US tariff conditionalities have instigated debates over “economic sovereignty” in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia (The Nation, 2025; Financial Times, 2025).
These realignments appear advantageous for North Korea, Russia, and China, all of which seek a regional order with reduced US influence (Nikkei Asia, 2025). However, their co-operation is constrained by complex bilateral dynamics. For example, Russia and North Korea’s mutual security assistance do not amount to a robust strategic partnership. Analyses of their transactional relationship, particularly since the Ukraine war, show asymmetrical benefits (Nikkei Asia, 2025).
Since 2023, North Korea has supplied Russia with arms valued at $5.6-9.8 billion and approximately 15,000 soldiers. Russia’s contributions in return: food, oil, air-defence systems and possibly fighter aircraft amount to only $457 million to $1.19 billion (Nikkei Asia, 2025).
If the Russia-Ukraine conflict shifts from resource-heavy ground warfare toward drones and hybrid tactics, Russia’s reliance on North Korean soldiers may decline. On the other-hand, irrespective of the payoffs, North Korean soldiers will benefit from the battleground experience in its operations in the disputed frontlines in the Peninsula.
China’s Growing Influence
The recent diplomatic dispute between China and Japan over Taiwan has rekindled historical animosities. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has described any possibility of China’s attack on Taiwan as a survival threat to Japan (Responsible Statecraft, 2025). In response, China officially declared that its trade and political relations with Japan had been “damaged” (Reuters, 2025), and warned its citizens to avoid travelling to Japan with major Chinese airlines offering full refunds for flights (South China Morning Post, 2025). With a low possibility of Takaichi retracting her statements, a quick resolution of the dispute looks unlikely.
This episode is not unprecedented; China has previously wielded its leverage over trade and tourism as a retaliatory tool to counter security risks or to use pressure tactics on other countries. US limited involvement in the region risks China using its diplomatic arms more often than before (South China Morning Post, 2025). The relative absence of the United States in the Pacific may further strengthen China’s ability to shape regional narratives, allowing it to present itself as a stable and “non-interventionist” actor.
Amid increasingly complex bilateral tensions, prospects for a China-Japan-South Korea trilateral meeting, particularly in light of US tariffs have diminished. China recently postponed a scheduled trilateral meeting of cultural ministers with Japan and South Korea (Nippon, 2025). Following the escalating tensions, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung held separate talks with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and Chinese Premier Li Qiang on the sidelines of the G20 summit in South Africa (Reuters,2025).
Priority-Based Partnerships
For Australia, US withdrawal has also caused inconvenience. Its security arrangements such as the Vanuatu-Nakamal Agreement (The Guardian, 2025) and the Papua New Guinea-Pukpuk Treaty (France 24, 2025) required extensive negotiation due to concerns among Pacific Island states about becoming arenas for major-power rivalry. The Pacific Islands countries remain reluctant to choose sides, instead prioritising self-preservation, development, and pragmatic regional security.
With China’s increasing investments in hard infrastructure and human development in the region, the US risks corroding its credibility as a reliable power. Reportedly, China is planning to revive a World War II-era airfield in the Federated States of Micronesia, originally constructed by Japan (Newsweek, 2025).
US contributions to the region have largely focused on the Compact of Free Association (COFA) states: the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau. However, Palau’s government trust funds have suffered major losses in the current fiscal year, largely attributed to the global ripple effects of recent US tariff policies. The most striking impact has been on the COFA trust fund, which saw its value fall by over $42 million between the beginning of the 2025 fiscal year on 01 October 2024, and 08 April 2025 (Islands Business, 2025).
President Trump’s recent statement following the death of a US National Guard member to permanently pause migration from all “Third World Countries” reinforces divisive rhetoric that further erodes regional perceptions of the US (Financial Times, 2025). Irrespective of security re-posturing, such remarks raise questions about whether Washington can afford to alienate democratic partners with whom it shares deep trade and societal links.
Given the evolving regional security environment, the emerging strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific will require development-focused democracies such as India, Japan, and South Korea to assume a more proactive role in shaping responsive trade and security frameworks.
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